An interesting article here from AFJ entitled "When the Network Dies", advocating for a range of operational and tactical level initiatives to better prepare Soldiers in a heavy cyber/satellite denied environment. Very few operational imperatives should be higher on the list at Fleet Forces Command--I surely hope there are people thinking this way within the Navy.
Bryan McGrath
Saturday, January 12, 2024
Friday, January 11, 2024
Submaine Collision in the Arabian Gulf
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| YOKOSUKA, Japan (Nov. 15, 2012) The Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) moored at Fleet Activities Yokosuka. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 1st Class David Mercil/Released) |
No one was hurt when the periscope on USS Jacksonville (SSN 699), a Los Angeles-class submarine, struck a vessel while operating in the Arabian Gulf Jan. 10 at approximately 5 a.m. local time.After the submarine got hit, they tried to raise the first periscope and could not, so they raised the second periscope and were able to ascertain a bit of understanding of the damage before surfacing.
Jacksonville surfaced from periscope depth to ascertain if there was any damage to the unidentified vessel. The vessel continued on a consistent course and speed offering no indication of distress or acknowledgement of a collision.
Damage appears to be limited to one of Jacksonville's two periscopes. The reactor remains in a safe condition, there was no damage to the propulsion plant systems and there is no concern regarding watertight integrity.
A U.S. P-3 Orion aircraft conducted a search of the area and saw no debris in the water or vessels in distress. The airborne search of the area is complete.
The incident is under investigation.
Jacksonville is on a scheduled deployment to the U.S. 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.
Due to accidents, the number of submarines in the force able to report as fully prepared is steadily dropping in number. This marks the third nuclear attack submarine put out of action due to damage in an accident; USS Miami (SSN 755), USS Montpelier (SSN 765), and now USS Jacksonville (SSN 699); all in the last 10 months.
While USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) hasn't officially been sent home from deployment yet, unless the Navy is able to completely mitigate the damage, the submarine will likely be sent home. Even the slightest damage to one of our nuclear attack submarines can disrupt the stealth advantage of the submarine, and because they do dangerous work every day that no one should be talking about publicly, I do expect for the Navy to send the submarine back to homeport in Pearl Harbor.
The littorals are becoming more crowded. It is not unreasonable to assume this type of accident will happen from time to time, indeed it is probably more unreasonable to assume that every single instance of something like this happening can be mitigated by the vessels crew.
With that said, with the zero-tolerance policy environment for Commanding Officers of ships, submarines, and aircraft in the US Navy today, I suspect the career of the CO is likely over. I personally find sympathy with both sides of the argument regarding whether the policy is good or bad for the Navy, and I can't say the verdict regarding the effectiveness of that policy is cut and dry.
In Which I Respond to Raymond on Hagel
WARNING***This post contains political opinions that may offend some. If you are easily offended by such, please cease reading now.
Raymond has written and open letter to America on the nomination of Chuck Hagel to be the next Secretary of Defense. It is a serious bit of thinking and it urges the rest of us to just as serious reflection upon our times and this choice. Yet I came away from its reading with the sense that somehow Raymond was judging me and others like me who have legitimate questions about Mr. Hagel's suitability for the job, questions raised by Mr. Hagel's own statements, votes, and views. Raymond appears to dismiss questions about Israel and Iran as strategic side-shows, preferring instead to concentrate on matters raised a strategic notch above these. There is nothing wrong with this--Raymond generally tends to think at strategic levels, and he does so with great skill. Where I break with him in this discussion is the extent to which he appears not to see side show issues as illustrative of a strategic worldview in Hagel, one that I believe warrants discussion and inquiry.
I have not yet determined whether I would vote for Chuck Hagel or not, were I to be in position to wield such a vote. There is no doubt in my mind that he is qualified to hold the position, that his experience both in the public and the private sector has well-prepared him for the post for which he is nominated. However, I believe the advise and consent power of the Senate is more than simply a resume check. More must go into a vote to confirm than a simple evaluation of the qualifications of the nominee. A review of their record--what they did and what they said--is in order. If a Senator reaches the conclusion that while a nominee is qualified, they are unsuitable, then that Senator should vote against them.
Raymond raises a number of issues to which he would have Mr. Hagel respond; better, it appears that he would like Mr. Hagel to have already responded to them so that his views on these serious matters would be public record. I believe that Raymond will get his wish, but the place where these answers are generally given (or at least solicited) is in confirmation hearings. Mr. Hagel will sit before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and at that time, Raymond's post should be required reading for each of the Senators.
But what is to be done in the meantime? Should we as citizens, aided and abetted by our free press, not engage in inquiry and ask tough questions about the paper trail left behind by someone as prominent as Mr. Hagel? I say yes, we should. I believe it is a legitimate part of the process, and it will inform the questioning of the nominee. So, what could the process so far have revealed, which might be of interest to a voting member of the U.S. Senate?
My as yet incomplete assessment of the foreign and defense policy views of Chuck Hagel are that he is an offshore-balancer at heart. In the spectrum of offshore balancers--from neo-isolationists on one hand to near selective engagers on the other, I'd put Hagel closer to the neo-isolationists, but certainly not one of them. How might I confirm my suspicions of his instincts? Well, I might go to Cato's homepage, the think-tank most closely associated with offshore balancing and what is increasingly becoming called the "Strategy of Restraint". From the authors who have commented on the nomination, there is a clear support for Hagel, to include tired references to "neo-cons" and the like.
When one thinks about contemporary offshore balancing dogma, the "two I's"--Israel and Iran--figure prominently. Most OB's think our relationship with Israel is problematic, that it causes more problems than it solves, and that it costs more than it saves. With respect to Iran, their pursuit of nuclear weapons does not raise the same level of concern that it does in others (some even have called for them to get the weapon), they believe that sanctions and ganging up economically on Iran accomplishes little, and they feel that even our maritime presence in the Arabian Gulf is an irritant, with rich Arab nations free-riding on our largess.
This is why Hagel's statements on Israel and the Arab and Persian worlds matter. They add to a building picture of a nominee who CLEARLY has a worldview, though he may not have yet articulated it to the degree that might be sufficiently responsive to Raymond's questions. We who are watching this process from afar can be better informed as the nomination moves forward. I have no problem with a US Senator as an Offshore Balancer. Like many popular libertarian views, this one tends to alloy with other approaches (in this case, prmacy and or neo-isolationism as the case may be) to produce interesting policy approaches. I am far more concerned with a Secretary of Defense who is an offshore balancer, especially when paired with a President whose national security policy appears to me to be one that moves the U.S. to a less influential role worldwide, partially out of a concern for economics and partially out of an ideological sense that the U.S. had exceeded its brief worldwide. One way to accomplish both of these ends is to have a smaller, less globally influential military, and I don't think it can be argued convincingly that this isn't what Mr. Obama and the modern Democratic Party desire.
So what better turn of events than to put a man into the Secretary of Defense job who can be cited as a Republican, and whose natural instincts--while ideologically different than those of the President--move the military in the same direction....smaller and less engaged?
Mr. Hagel's nomination is not SIMPLY about politics. It is also about pragmatism, something I believe Barack Obama can be justly praised for. He wants a smaller military, and he is putting a guy into the Secretary's job who he can rely on to make that happen--not because he's carrying the President's water, but because he is carrying his own.
This is why the discussion--some of it which seems to bother Raymond--is important. We can indeed begin to build a picture of who our next SECDEF might be, and what he might think--based on existing evidence available to us. It doesn't mean we've been captured by the "Jewish Lobby", to be wary of his views on Israel--it means we suspect that his views on Israel are the tip of an iceberg, the rest of which we may not wish to see.
Bryan McGrath
Raymond has written and open letter to America on the nomination of Chuck Hagel to be the next Secretary of Defense. It is a serious bit of thinking and it urges the rest of us to just as serious reflection upon our times and this choice. Yet I came away from its reading with the sense that somehow Raymond was judging me and others like me who have legitimate questions about Mr. Hagel's suitability for the job, questions raised by Mr. Hagel's own statements, votes, and views. Raymond appears to dismiss questions about Israel and Iran as strategic side-shows, preferring instead to concentrate on matters raised a strategic notch above these. There is nothing wrong with this--Raymond generally tends to think at strategic levels, and he does so with great skill. Where I break with him in this discussion is the extent to which he appears not to see side show issues as illustrative of a strategic worldview in Hagel, one that I believe warrants discussion and inquiry.
I have not yet determined whether I would vote for Chuck Hagel or not, were I to be in position to wield such a vote. There is no doubt in my mind that he is qualified to hold the position, that his experience both in the public and the private sector has well-prepared him for the post for which he is nominated. However, I believe the advise and consent power of the Senate is more than simply a resume check. More must go into a vote to confirm than a simple evaluation of the qualifications of the nominee. A review of their record--what they did and what they said--is in order. If a Senator reaches the conclusion that while a nominee is qualified, they are unsuitable, then that Senator should vote against them.
Raymond raises a number of issues to which he would have Mr. Hagel respond; better, it appears that he would like Mr. Hagel to have already responded to them so that his views on these serious matters would be public record. I believe that Raymond will get his wish, but the place where these answers are generally given (or at least solicited) is in confirmation hearings. Mr. Hagel will sit before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and at that time, Raymond's post should be required reading for each of the Senators.
But what is to be done in the meantime? Should we as citizens, aided and abetted by our free press, not engage in inquiry and ask tough questions about the paper trail left behind by someone as prominent as Mr. Hagel? I say yes, we should. I believe it is a legitimate part of the process, and it will inform the questioning of the nominee. So, what could the process so far have revealed, which might be of interest to a voting member of the U.S. Senate?
My as yet incomplete assessment of the foreign and defense policy views of Chuck Hagel are that he is an offshore-balancer at heart. In the spectrum of offshore balancers--from neo-isolationists on one hand to near selective engagers on the other, I'd put Hagel closer to the neo-isolationists, but certainly not one of them. How might I confirm my suspicions of his instincts? Well, I might go to Cato's homepage, the think-tank most closely associated with offshore balancing and what is increasingly becoming called the "Strategy of Restraint". From the authors who have commented on the nomination, there is a clear support for Hagel, to include tired references to "neo-cons" and the like.
When one thinks about contemporary offshore balancing dogma, the "two I's"--Israel and Iran--figure prominently. Most OB's think our relationship with Israel is problematic, that it causes more problems than it solves, and that it costs more than it saves. With respect to Iran, their pursuit of nuclear weapons does not raise the same level of concern that it does in others (some even have called for them to get the weapon), they believe that sanctions and ganging up economically on Iran accomplishes little, and they feel that even our maritime presence in the Arabian Gulf is an irritant, with rich Arab nations free-riding on our largess.
This is why Hagel's statements on Israel and the Arab and Persian worlds matter. They add to a building picture of a nominee who CLEARLY has a worldview, though he may not have yet articulated it to the degree that might be sufficiently responsive to Raymond's questions. We who are watching this process from afar can be better informed as the nomination moves forward. I have no problem with a US Senator as an Offshore Balancer. Like many popular libertarian views, this one tends to alloy with other approaches (in this case, prmacy and or neo-isolationism as the case may be) to produce interesting policy approaches. I am far more concerned with a Secretary of Defense who is an offshore balancer, especially when paired with a President whose national security policy appears to me to be one that moves the U.S. to a less influential role worldwide, partially out of a concern for economics and partially out of an ideological sense that the U.S. had exceeded its brief worldwide. One way to accomplish both of these ends is to have a smaller, less globally influential military, and I don't think it can be argued convincingly that this isn't what Mr. Obama and the modern Democratic Party desire.
So what better turn of events than to put a man into the Secretary of Defense job who can be cited as a Republican, and whose natural instincts--while ideologically different than those of the President--move the military in the same direction....smaller and less engaged?
Mr. Hagel's nomination is not SIMPLY about politics. It is also about pragmatism, something I believe Barack Obama can be justly praised for. He wants a smaller military, and he is putting a guy into the Secretary's job who he can rely on to make that happen--not because he's carrying the President's water, but because he is carrying his own.
This is why the discussion--some of it which seems to bother Raymond--is important. We can indeed begin to build a picture of who our next SECDEF might be, and what he might think--based on existing evidence available to us. It doesn't mean we've been captured by the "Jewish Lobby", to be wary of his views on Israel--it means we suspect that his views on Israel are the tip of an iceberg, the rest of which we may not wish to see.
Bryan McGrath
Unimaginable Statements and Signs of Surrender
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Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and Army Gen.
Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discuss the
effects of sequestration during a news conference at the Pentagon, Jan.
10, 2013.
|
“We really have no choice but to prepare for the worst,” Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told reporters at a Pentagon news briefing Thursday. “Regardless of what Congress does or fails to do, we still have an obligation to protect this country...”I get to this point in the article discussing sequestration and I'm feeling pretty good about how the DoD is handling the immense challenge and burdens the sequestration process has placed on the DoD. My glass is half full until...
Earlier this month, Congress came to an agreement to avoid the so-called fiscal cliff, but instead of eliminating the threat of sequestration, the deal simply delayed the automatic, across-the-board cuts until March 1.
“Postponing sequestration doesn’t prevent, it just prolongs the uncertainty for our force and for our military families,” said Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Readiness is what’s now in jeopardy. We’re on the brink of creating a hollow force, the very thing we said we must avoid.”
Absorbing billions of dollars in cuts nearly halfway through the fiscal year would be even more damaging to the military, Panetta and Dempsey said, which is why the military must take steps now to prepare.
If sequestration does take effect, Dempsey said, troops in combat, those about to deploy to combat and wounded warriors will be protected.If you are the top General in the United States Armed Forces, and you know something is coming that must be planned for, and you have been telling everyone that you have been preparing for that something going back over a year now, if you are not prepared when it arrives is that not a failure of leadership to be prepared?
“But for the rest of the force, operations, maintenance and training will be gutted. We’ll ground aircraft, return ships to port, and sharply curtail training across the force,” he said. “Within months, we’ll be less prepared. Within a year, we’ll be unprepared.”
Brett Friedman said it best. "Can you imagine a USMC 4-Star ever saying "we'll be unprepared'? Never"
It is comments like these that have me concerned that US Army leadership is unprepared for the fiscal situation that is about to hit that great institution harder than the other services. I get it that Dempsey is CJCS and not fully engaged with the US Army anymore, but his comments sound depressing, defeated, hollow...
The US Army really does need to be the most innovative and motivated service of the three major branches of the military if they are going to manage the upcoming budget cuts well. General Odierno is a brilliant tactician, operator, and warfighter but I have not been able to find much media reporting where he is discussing sequestration, or any comment whatsoever where he is able to articulate a compelling strategic vision for a smaller US Army heading into the 21st century.
The US Navy today has this incredible depth on the bench of remarkably brilliant one and two star Rear Admirals, which for the record, makes me think that suggestions the Navy has lost the best and brightest of this early 80s graduation generation of sailors is a bunch of nonsense. When the current group of three and four star Flag Officers in the US Navy retire over the next 2-4 years, which include the remaining group of sailors who come from graduation classes in the late 70s, I strongly believe the Navy is going to be in fantastic hands with a collective cadre of the smartest, strongest leadership the fleet has had in modern naval history - for good reason too, their system of promotion collectively required them to be educated more than any previous generation, and it shows. These Rear Admirals were all doing their DH tour during the post cold war contraction of the US Navy, and if you think about it that gives them a lot of insight regarding what needs to be prioritized. The US Navy has extremely strong leadership right now, and I think there are signs of it everywhere.
As for the Army, not so much. I can't remember the last time I read something from a General in the US Army and thought to myself how smart it was, indeed nearly every really bright idea from an Army officer these days comes from someone in a field grade. I have to believe (or maybe I just want to believe) that after over a decade of war, and because they are of the same generation of military officer, the US Army has depth on their bench of brilliant one and two star Generals that most of us never see or hear from. OSD needs to be more keenly interested in this issue, and make it clear it is time for that generation of US Army officers to step up for their service and their country in what is clearly a significant challenge that will require significant changes forced almost entirely by fiscal stress to the US Army, because from my perspective most of the three and four star Generals in the Army today not only physically look defeated, they are starting to sound defeated.
Airpower vs. Jointness
In the interest of equal time, I link here to a piece by an Air Power advocate who argues for the supremacy of the Air Force at the expense of Jointness. As I am familiar with a cousin of this argument (insert "Seapower" and "U.S. Navy"), it was interesting to read this work I can't even begin to catalog my disagreements with the logic here, but we could do no better than to start with his assertion that "...wars are always won in the air, never on the ground." I take a lot of potshots at the Army and land forces, but I am careful never to forget that it is the taking and occupying of the other guy's land and stuff that wins wars, and that is the job of land power.
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