One of the things that I've been really focusing on in the past few months is the recent dramatic expansion of China's civilian maritime force. Much of this is caused by the border disputes with Japan, Vietnam and Phillipines. I think another part of this is the Chinese government supporting its domestic shipbuilding industry during the recent downturn in the global shipbuilding market. Before we start, here is a refresher course on what each of the agencies are about.
First, let us focusing on the expansion of CMS (Chinese Maritime Surveillance), which is beneficiary of the majority of the new cutters. From 2008 to 2011, CMS received 11 new large cutters with one of 3000+ ton class (Haijian-50), two of 1500+ ton class (84, 15) and 4 of 1000+ ton class (75、23、66、26). After that, we received the news 36 new cutters of 600 to 1500 ton for provincial CMS. Table below shows which provinces are getting them and where the cutters are built at and for how much.
Looking at this list, you can see that HP and WC are building the large cutters of 1000+ and 1500+ class, whereas the smaller cutters of 600 ton class are being built by less known shipyards like Guijiang, Huanghai, Tianjin, Xijiang, Chongqing, Nanhuang and Fuman. It's interesting that so many of the not well known smaller shipyards are involved in the process. Out of these, only Guijiang and possible Xijiang+Tianjin have really built cutters or auxiliary ships for PLAN. The cost of the cutters range from 53 million RMB ($8.5 million) for a 600 ton cutter at a smaller shipyard to 126 million RMB ($20 million) for a 1500 ton cutter at HP shipyard. Cost also varied based on the number of cutters that province has on order with the particular shipyard. Looks like each provincial CMS held some kind of RFP by itself.
On top of these new ships to be built in the period up to 2015, we have seen 11 PLAN ships converted and transferring to CMS in the past year. They include decommissioned 051 ships (131, 162), 814 Minelayer, North Sea Tug 710, Ice breaker 723, 852 ELINT ship and several auxiliary ships. So there is a variety of ships that are entering CMS for different roles.
On top of this, the bidding for a fresh wave of CMS ships have been decided or still ongoing. They include 2 12000 ton cutters to be built by JN shipyard, 4 5500 ton + 5 4000 ton cutters by WC shipyard and 4 5000 ton + 5 4000 ton cutters by HP shipyard. WC agreed to those 9 cutters for a total of 2.5 billion RMB ($400 million USD). There are 6 3500 ton cutters that have yet to be decided. The table below shows an estimate of 1000+ ton for different agencies by ocean districts. About 2/3 of those ships will be serving in CMS.
Looking at this list, the next largest bloc belongs to FLEC. Similar to CMS, it has also been getting many converted ships from PLAN. The largest of which is YuZheng-88, which was converted from the 888 replenishment ship. Currently, only one major cutter and a bunch of smaller 300-ton cutters are on order for FLEC. However, plans have been drawn up for 11 3500-ton class and 3 1500-ton class ships. Outside of CMS, we've also seen FLEC most often in disputed areas around Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.
Next on the list is Haiguan (General administration of customs), which has historically been the weakest of the 5 branches. It is also getting major upgrades. From the most recent news, it is getting 3 new 1500 ton class and 9 new 600 ton class cutters for a total of 1.8 billion RMB ($300 million). Interestingly enough, the speed and design requirements for these cutters are higher than the other cutters. The 600-ton cutter is suppose to reach over 30 knots with aluminum superstructure. The 1500-ton cutter is suppose to reach over 25 knots with two pumpjet driven propulsion. Most of the CMS ships only have speed requirements of 18 to 20 knots.
The last one on the list is Haijing (Maritime Police). Traditionally, these cutters have been the most armored ones. The charts below actually show the production of the most common type of Haijing ship the Type 618 and 618B cutters (in 600 ton class). They are mostly built by Guijiang shipyard. Going forward, it seems like they have a small number of larger cutters in 2000 and 3000-ton class planned, but are definitely not as ambitious as the other ones.
The one I did not talk about here is MSA, which in the past have had the most personnel, but really don't seem to be receiving many ships recently. Overall, the expansion of CMS and FLEC has really been impressive. Huangpu shipyard has been so busy with cutters that 056 production has been slowed down. WuChang shipyard is also extremely busy with them. With a lot of competition, the prices for the ships have been knocked down to under $10 million for the smaller ships and $20 million for 1500-ton class ships and $40-$50 for the 4000 to 5500 ton ships. The maritime surveillance ministries have certainly benefited from China's strong shipbuilding sectors. The only question is whether they can actually find enough qualified people to operate these ships and get enough aircraft to help patrol the disputed areas.
That's my major update for the 5 maritime agencies. I do apologize for having only Chinese characters in all the charts. I will be in China for two and half weeks, so will be out of commission for a while. Hoping to not miss out on any big news while I'm gone.
Sunday, January 20, 2024
Saturday, January 19, 2024
China's maritime disputes
In light of the recent entry by Galrahn on the issue of China's expanded map, I want to just put my thoughts on this. I was originally thinking of writing a separate entry on the dramatic expansion of China's maritime surveillance agencies of CMS and FLEC, but I want to spend a little time just looking at the non-military part of this.
The main point I want to make here is that China's border dispute with entirely different than its border dispute with India and the countries around South China Sea. We often read about China's recent actions have made neighbouring countries feel uneasy and have pushed them toward America. While I do agree the other countries reactions have been similar, it's important to note that these are different issues for Chinese people.
And this has everything to do with the historical relationship of the two countries. It starts from 1895 when China was badly defeated by Japan, who it had always looked upon as a vassal nation. The unfair treaty which resulted in war reparation in addition to annexation of Taiwan was followed up by the brutal Russo-Japanese war of 1905 which was fought over Chinese soil and resulted in the Japanese control of Lushun (Port Arthur). Of course, all of this was small compared to the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and second Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945. The Chinese side has claimed that around 20 million civilians were killed during this conflict. If that's true, it would in effect be the equivalent of 3 holocausts. I do not know how accurate these numbers are, but I did hear a story (growing up) where my friend's ancestor was tortured to death by Japanese soldiers. And my opinion is that most people born in my generation or prior in China probably have heard of such stories from their family or friends. When I visited Nanjing in 2006, I was told by locals that the only place not pillaged during the Nanking massacre was the Sun Yat-Sen memorial. Even by then, Japanese business was not allowed on the city's premise. There has been a lot of anger within China toward Japan in the past 10 years due to the visits by Koizumi/Abe of the Yasukuni Shrine and the denials of wartime atrocities by some Japanese Nationalists. While I do not think that the Japanese government is denying th war atrocities, I do think a lot of people in China would feel better toward Japanese if the Japanese government adopt the same attitude toward this subject as Germany has adopted toward the Holocaust. When something like the recent Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute came up, it came across as another reminder of Japanese aggression for Chinese people. Back when the two countries normalized relations in 1978, Deng Xiaoping made a strategic decision to not overly press Japan over this issue in exchange of money and technology to help with the Chinese economy. And I think while China was still economically weak and needing Japan, this was something it was willing to do (not overly voicing past grievances). However with China's growing power in the past 10 years, this is no longer the case, so the current generation of Chinese population and officials do not see the need to hold pacifying attitude toward Japan. With the Koizumi/Abe visits, all of these anger/grievances from the past 60 years flared up and it is tough for me to see how relations between China/Japan will get better.
The difference between the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and the South China Sea dispute is that the entire Chinese population is invested in this issue. It's not just the PLA or a group of nationalist cranks on the internet forums that are passionate about this, it's the ordinary people. You've seen that with the wide spread boycotting of Japanese business in the past few months due to the outrage in China over the entire Diaoyu/Senkaku issues. This is not just a couple of islands. This is 70 years of grievances. It's also seen in the expansion of civilian maritime patrol fleet. In the past few months, 11 ships from PLAN have been sent to the shipyards to be retrofitted and removed of weaponry so that they can join the CMS fleet and patrol the disputed regions with Japan. And I think that until the Japanese government adopts an attitude toward its World War II crimes toward China (and South Korea) as Germany has toward Israel, there will always be that underlying tension that makes all border disputes even worse. I think that the relationship between the two countries have gotten so bad that it may be more likely a conflict will break out between China and Japan rather than China and Taiwan in the next 10 years. That's really unfortunate, because the two countries have so much to gain in this economically unstable period if they can somehow move past this issue and resolve past grievances.
As a last point, it really bugs me that Japan is often put in the same category as Vietnam/Philippines with regards to needing American help to defend itself against the big bad Chinese. Even with the rise of PLAN, JMSDF is still clearly the stronger force at this time. The Japanese civilian patrol fleet is also a very powerful fleet, so it is not going to be scared away by the presence of a few 1500 ton CMS cutters. In fact, CMS has this huge build up just so that it can get somewhat close to the size of its Japanese counterpart.
The main point I want to make here is that China's border dispute with entirely different than its border dispute with India and the countries around South China Sea. We often read about China's recent actions have made neighbouring countries feel uneasy and have pushed them toward America. While I do agree the other countries reactions have been similar, it's important to note that these are different issues for Chinese people.
And this has everything to do with the historical relationship of the two countries. It starts from 1895 when China was badly defeated by Japan, who it had always looked upon as a vassal nation. The unfair treaty which resulted in war reparation in addition to annexation of Taiwan was followed up by the brutal Russo-Japanese war of 1905 which was fought over Chinese soil and resulted in the Japanese control of Lushun (Port Arthur). Of course, all of this was small compared to the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and second Sino-Japanese War between 1937 and 1945. The Chinese side has claimed that around 20 million civilians were killed during this conflict. If that's true, it would in effect be the equivalent of 3 holocausts. I do not know how accurate these numbers are, but I did hear a story (growing up) where my friend's ancestor was tortured to death by Japanese soldiers. And my opinion is that most people born in my generation or prior in China probably have heard of such stories from their family or friends. When I visited Nanjing in 2006, I was told by locals that the only place not pillaged during the Nanking massacre was the Sun Yat-Sen memorial. Even by then, Japanese business was not allowed on the city's premise. There has been a lot of anger within China toward Japan in the past 10 years due to the visits by Koizumi/Abe of the Yasukuni Shrine and the denials of wartime atrocities by some Japanese Nationalists. While I do not think that the Japanese government is denying th war atrocities, I do think a lot of people in China would feel better toward Japanese if the Japanese government adopt the same attitude toward this subject as Germany has adopted toward the Holocaust. When something like the recent Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute came up, it came across as another reminder of Japanese aggression for Chinese people. Back when the two countries normalized relations in 1978, Deng Xiaoping made a strategic decision to not overly press Japan over this issue in exchange of money and technology to help with the Chinese economy. And I think while China was still economically weak and needing Japan, this was something it was willing to do (not overly voicing past grievances). However with China's growing power in the past 10 years, this is no longer the case, so the current generation of Chinese population and officials do not see the need to hold pacifying attitude toward Japan. With the Koizumi/Abe visits, all of these anger/grievances from the past 60 years flared up and it is tough for me to see how relations between China/Japan will get better.
The difference between the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and the South China Sea dispute is that the entire Chinese population is invested in this issue. It's not just the PLA or a group of nationalist cranks on the internet forums that are passionate about this, it's the ordinary people. You've seen that with the wide spread boycotting of Japanese business in the past few months due to the outrage in China over the entire Diaoyu/Senkaku issues. This is not just a couple of islands. This is 70 years of grievances. It's also seen in the expansion of civilian maritime patrol fleet. In the past few months, 11 ships from PLAN have been sent to the shipyards to be retrofitted and removed of weaponry so that they can join the CMS fleet and patrol the disputed regions with Japan. And I think that until the Japanese government adopts an attitude toward its World War II crimes toward China (and South Korea) as Germany has toward Israel, there will always be that underlying tension that makes all border disputes even worse. I think that the relationship between the two countries have gotten so bad that it may be more likely a conflict will break out between China and Japan rather than China and Taiwan in the next 10 years. That's really unfortunate, because the two countries have so much to gain in this economically unstable period if they can somehow move past this issue and resolve past grievances.
As a last point, it really bugs me that Japan is often put in the same category as Vietnam/Philippines with regards to needing American help to defend itself against the big bad Chinese. Even with the rise of PLAN, JMSDF is still clearly the stronger force at this time. The Japanese civilian patrol fleet is also a very powerful fleet, so it is not going to be scared away by the presence of a few 1500 ton CMS cutters. In fact, CMS has this huge build up just so that it can get somewhat close to the size of its Japanese counterpart.
Friday, January 18, 2024
Why I Advocate Scrapping SSBN's
Several times in the past year, I have dropped mentions into my blog posts here at ID advocating that the US Navy be relieved of its strategic nuclear weapons watch, the latest of which was in my recent post about a GOP based national security strategy. One of the pillars of such a strategy was to make real choices, choices that are strategically based, which challenge dogma, and which have real results. Invariably, my suggestion that we move away from the nuclear triad solicits comments from those who believe my approach unwise. They raise time-tested arguments and generally wish to engage me in a comment section debate. I have avoided such a debate until now for two reasons: 1) my thinking was less mature than it is now and 2) I generally don't like comment section serve and volleys. Most of the time, I say what I say, you say what you say, and third parties then think for themselves. I enjoy a good give and take in person, but do not derive much pleasure from its poor relation blog cousin.
It was clear however, that I needed to address this issue in some more coherent form. Serious people disagree with me, people who I respect greatly, including the estimable Dr. Bridge Colby. Additionally, a piece on the Daily Caller earlier this month by Rebeccah Heinrichs of the Heritage Foundation brought my attention to the Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Report co-authored by Secretary of Defense nominee Chuck Hagel. This report advocates a dramatic drop in the number and type of our nuclear weapons, in addition to removing the land-based ICBM portion of the nuclear triad from the inventory. They do so for a number of reasons, most of which resonate with me. Where we differ ultimately is on which leg of the triad to remove.
That Chuck Hagel would argue for the Global Zero position is not surprising; what might be surprising to some is the degree to which I agree with him and his co-authors, at least on the logic.
What is most gratifying to read in the Global Zero report is the readiness of its authors to take on what my friend Frank Hoffman calls the "Nuclear Priesthood" and the theology under which they have operated for decades. By questioning long held dogma, the authors of the report give us the intellectual space necessary to consider the kind of strategic change that offers the prospect of real defense re-alignment appropriate to the 21st century security environment. Just as Eisenhower saw the promise of nuclear weapons in the potential they provided to reduce conventional force levels, decision-makers now can and should evaluate the environment and realize that it has shifted. Conventional deterrence simply means more today than it did in the 1950's, and the contribution of nuclear weapons to U.S. national security has significantly decreased. I will not rehash the Global Zero logic here, I will only urge you to read it. Please don't ask me in the comments to state the logic--again, I am borrowing theirs. My task here is to justify my position to scrap the SSBN force.
1. Return on Investment. In order to replace the Ohio Class SSBN's, the U.S. will spend approximately $350B over the course of 30 years in total ownership costs, over half of which would logically come out of Navy shipbuilding and operations accounts. For the life of the acquisition program, roughly half of the Navy's shipbuilding budget would be dedicated to building SSBN's, at a time when a shrinking fleet hazards the very basis upon which this entire approach hangs--conventional deterrence--which I take to be a far more valuable capability and naval contribution to U.S. national security. Keep in mind....this $350B investment represents one of THREE methods at our disposal of accomplishing the increasingly dubious aims of strategic deterrence.
2. "Survivability" Hype. When locked into a global nuclear superpower struggle with the Soviets, "survivability" had relevance as a discriminator in the psychology of nuclear exchange, though even then, it would be questionable whether anyone would wish to survive in a world in which the "second strike" was relevant. Survivability simply isn't as important a discriminator today. We have had decades of experience with nuclear weapons, and the prospect of a modern nation state with the capacity to launch a crippling first strike is so remote as to render preparing for such a strike financially irresponsible. Those agents more likely to attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons are far less likely 1) to buy into the psychology of survivability that justifies the our investment 2) to be deterred by the threat of nuclear weapons in the first place.
3. Conventional Flexibility. One of the draw-backs to fielding an SSBN force is that we have built up a strategic arms control regime over the past few decades that severely restricts conventional capabilities, specifically, serious modern discussions about global conventional strike often immediately dismiss submarine launched conventional ballistic missiles because of the possibility that they might be mistaken for a nuclear launch. Putting aside for a moment the fact that our current primary military planning focus (China) is in no way hamstrung by such concerns (nor is Iran, for that matter), we are under-utilizing what is perhaps our most notable competitive advantage over the Chinese, our SSN force. While submarine launched TLAM's would likely be very important in a conflict with China, their dependence on GPS could jeopardize their effectiveness. The development of a submarine launched conventional ballistic missile of sufficient range (likely to be in the current INF Treaty no-go zone)--one not dependent on satellites for targeting--ensures the ability to hold Chinese interests at risk in a satellite denied environment. Treaty limitations (with the Soviets, now Russia) limit our ability to do this. Many observers find themselves baffled (me included) as to why the Chinese--comparatively speaking--spend so little on ASW. I have come to conclude that they simply don't fear our SSN advantage as much as we think they do...or should. Giving them an important additional reason to fear it could alter the current "wrong side of cost curve" we find ourselves on by inducing them to spend more on both ASW and on Ballistic Missile Defense--which is also something they spend comparatively little on. We would also acquire a very useful capability for a war-time environment we would likely face.
4. Reinforces the Emerging Role of American Seapower. Were the Navy to be relieved of its "strategic global thermonuclear war" responsibilities, it would reinforce within the U.S. defense establishment the place of modern American Seapower as the primary method of U.S. military engagement, assurance and deterrence in the world--with the U.S. Air Force and Army assuming largely (but not solely) critical strategic war-fighting roles including nuclear deterrence, conventional major power war and the conduct of nuclear war.
5. Reversibility. (Updated). This one just occurred to me. In the Defense Strategic Guidance issued by the Obama Administration a year ago, the concept of reversibility was raised there as one of the principles of their strategy. I think it is a good one. Applied here, it means that if for some reason, a new nuclear arms race broke out, we could change course and once again raise the triad. We would not be--as we were in the '50's--building the SSBN capability from scratch.
I hope this is sufficient rationale to advance the conversation. If I felt like a U.S. Defense establishment were capable of funding the conventional Navy sufficiently AND recapitalizing the SSBN force, I would withdraw this argument. But the plain truth is that in order to do that (within this Administration's priorities), the Army and likely the Air Force would lose budget share in a manner that I believe is unlikely to occur as long as Jointness continues to euthanize true strategic thinking.
Bryan McGrath
It was clear however, that I needed to address this issue in some more coherent form. Serious people disagree with me, people who I respect greatly, including the estimable Dr. Bridge Colby. Additionally, a piece on the Daily Caller earlier this month by Rebeccah Heinrichs of the Heritage Foundation brought my attention to the Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Report co-authored by Secretary of Defense nominee Chuck Hagel. This report advocates a dramatic drop in the number and type of our nuclear weapons, in addition to removing the land-based ICBM portion of the nuclear triad from the inventory. They do so for a number of reasons, most of which resonate with me. Where we differ ultimately is on which leg of the triad to remove.
That Chuck Hagel would argue for the Global Zero position is not surprising; what might be surprising to some is the degree to which I agree with him and his co-authors, at least on the logic.
What is most gratifying to read in the Global Zero report is the readiness of its authors to take on what my friend Frank Hoffman calls the "Nuclear Priesthood" and the theology under which they have operated for decades. By questioning long held dogma, the authors of the report give us the intellectual space necessary to consider the kind of strategic change that offers the prospect of real defense re-alignment appropriate to the 21st century security environment. Just as Eisenhower saw the promise of nuclear weapons in the potential they provided to reduce conventional force levels, decision-makers now can and should evaluate the environment and realize that it has shifted. Conventional deterrence simply means more today than it did in the 1950's, and the contribution of nuclear weapons to U.S. national security has significantly decreased. I will not rehash the Global Zero logic here, I will only urge you to read it. Please don't ask me in the comments to state the logic--again, I am borrowing theirs. My task here is to justify my position to scrap the SSBN force.
1. Return on Investment. In order to replace the Ohio Class SSBN's, the U.S. will spend approximately $350B over the course of 30 years in total ownership costs, over half of which would logically come out of Navy shipbuilding and operations accounts. For the life of the acquisition program, roughly half of the Navy's shipbuilding budget would be dedicated to building SSBN's, at a time when a shrinking fleet hazards the very basis upon which this entire approach hangs--conventional deterrence--which I take to be a far more valuable capability and naval contribution to U.S. national security. Keep in mind....this $350B investment represents one of THREE methods at our disposal of accomplishing the increasingly dubious aims of strategic deterrence.
2. "Survivability" Hype. When locked into a global nuclear superpower struggle with the Soviets, "survivability" had relevance as a discriminator in the psychology of nuclear exchange, though even then, it would be questionable whether anyone would wish to survive in a world in which the "second strike" was relevant. Survivability simply isn't as important a discriminator today. We have had decades of experience with nuclear weapons, and the prospect of a modern nation state with the capacity to launch a crippling first strike is so remote as to render preparing for such a strike financially irresponsible. Those agents more likely to attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons are far less likely 1) to buy into the psychology of survivability that justifies the our investment 2) to be deterred by the threat of nuclear weapons in the first place.
3. Conventional Flexibility. One of the draw-backs to fielding an SSBN force is that we have built up a strategic arms control regime over the past few decades that severely restricts conventional capabilities, specifically, serious modern discussions about global conventional strike often immediately dismiss submarine launched conventional ballistic missiles because of the possibility that they might be mistaken for a nuclear launch. Putting aside for a moment the fact that our current primary military planning focus (China) is in no way hamstrung by such concerns (nor is Iran, for that matter), we are under-utilizing what is perhaps our most notable competitive advantage over the Chinese, our SSN force. While submarine launched TLAM's would likely be very important in a conflict with China, their dependence on GPS could jeopardize their effectiveness. The development of a submarine launched conventional ballistic missile of sufficient range (likely to be in the current INF Treaty no-go zone)--one not dependent on satellites for targeting--ensures the ability to hold Chinese interests at risk in a satellite denied environment. Treaty limitations (with the Soviets, now Russia) limit our ability to do this. Many observers find themselves baffled (me included) as to why the Chinese--comparatively speaking--spend so little on ASW. I have come to conclude that they simply don't fear our SSN advantage as much as we think they do...or should. Giving them an important additional reason to fear it could alter the current "wrong side of cost curve" we find ourselves on by inducing them to spend more on both ASW and on Ballistic Missile Defense--which is also something they spend comparatively little on. We would also acquire a very useful capability for a war-time environment we would likely face.
4. Reinforces the Emerging Role of American Seapower. Were the Navy to be relieved of its "strategic global thermonuclear war" responsibilities, it would reinforce within the U.S. defense establishment the place of modern American Seapower as the primary method of U.S. military engagement, assurance and deterrence in the world--with the U.S. Air Force and Army assuming largely (but not solely) critical strategic war-fighting roles including nuclear deterrence, conventional major power war and the conduct of nuclear war.
5. Reversibility. (Updated). This one just occurred to me. In the Defense Strategic Guidance issued by the Obama Administration a year ago, the concept of reversibility was raised there as one of the principles of their strategy. I think it is a good one. Applied here, it means that if for some reason, a new nuclear arms race broke out, we could change course and once again raise the triad. We would not be--as we were in the '50's--building the SSBN capability from scratch.
I hope this is sufficient rationale to advance the conversation. If I felt like a U.S. Defense establishment were capable of funding the conventional Navy sufficiently AND recapitalizing the SSBN force, I would withdraw this argument. But the plain truth is that in order to do that (within this Administration's priorities), the Army and likely the Air Force would lose budget share in a manner that I believe is unlikely to occur as long as Jointness continues to euthanize true strategic thinking.
Bryan McGrath
Recent Stuff
Apologies for lack of engagement recently, although looks as if this place is hopping again. I have some thoughts on the diffusion of anti-access military technology over at The Diplomat
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had a strong political incentive to maximize diffusion of its military capabilities. Proxies with Soviet technology could fight the United States and its proxies on their own. Consequently, states from North Korea to Vietnam to Cuba to Syria, Iraq, and Egypt gained access to the many of the most advanced Soviet fighter, submarine, and missile systems. Often, these systems overwhelmed the capacity of recipients, with buyers lacking the ability to put pilots in planes, sailors in subs, and mechanics in either. Nevertheless, these systems still forced the United States to act cautiously; the combination of a couple Nanuchka class missile boats, some Foxtrot subs, a few MiG-23s and a reasonably sophisticated air defense system could give the US Navy or Air Force a bad day.
Russia doesn’t see much of an upside in this kind of diffusion today. States get the equipment they can pay for, without political subsidy . China has displayed little interest in developing proxy relationships of the type seen in the Cold War. Moreover, few states have an interest in devoting resources and attention to making life difficult for a superpower. Still, given the rapidly advancing capabilities of China’s anti-access forces, questions of diffusion and proliferation bear consideration.Also, on this week's episode of Foreign Entanglements, Justin Logan of Cato and I talked retrenchment:
I'm an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky.
风向转变时,有人筑墙,有人造风车
A new map to be released later this month by China’s National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation increases from 29 to 130 the number of disputed areas marked as officially part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) claimed by Taiwan and Japan.
Previous editions of the “Wall Map Series of National Territory,” which presented China’s claimed territory in horizontal format, only included the larger contested islands in the South China Sea in a separate box at the bottom right of the map, Xinhua news agency said at the weekend. The territories included in the box were half scale and not clearly detailed.
The new map is vertical and is to be distributed by Sinomaps Press on behalf of the Chinese authorities starting next month. It will for the first time display the entirety of the PRC’s claimed territory on the same scale as continental China.
“The new map will be very significant in enhancing Chinese people’s awareness of national territory, safeguarding China’s marine rights and interests and manifesting China’s political diplomatic stance,” Xu Gencai (徐根才), editor-in-chief at Sinomaps Press, told Xinhua.
That is an article you want to read in full.
Now that you have read that article, read this blog entry at the Defense News blog Intercepts, and oh yeah you really should read all the links they provide there too. I note that Christopher Ford is noting the behavior of the PLA, not the Chinese people as a whole, although anyone who has done any business with China is familiar with the cultural differences one finds between a Chinese business person educated primarily in China and a Chinese business person educated primarily outside of China, and with that in mind you can shape your own conclusions regarding what Christopher Ford is noting from his recent visit. The comments are interesting as well.
Bottom line, we aren't going to effectively convince the Chinese there is a problem with this map, so get ready for that map being their new normal position. I used to be glass half full regarding US relations with China heading into the 21st century, but I will admit I have had my fill of experiences over the last 6 months that is changing my view of China.
Meanwhile, This article at gCaptain is discussing the state of the Chinese shipbuilding sector and aircraft engines.
Chinese ministries are drawing up plans to stimulate the two sectors following studies led by high-level government officials late last year, including State Councilor Ma Kai, Miao Wei, head of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and Wang Yong, director of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the report said.This is important. The Chinese shipbuilding sector became the largest in the world in 2010, but the sector has taken a major hit as the global economy has fallen off. The Chinese shipbuilding sector has been discussed as a strategic industrial infrastructure capacity that represents an important pillar of Chinese economic growth, and the government has prioritized the shipbuilding sector by staying engaged in their effort to grow shipbuilding as a key manufacturing sector.
Chinese ship builders have been grappling with weak demand and overcapacity, hurt by Europe’s debt woes in recent years, with orders and prices dropping sharply.
While the global economy is likely to bottom out this year, excess capacity will continue to weigh on ship builders, the report said. “It’s likely that 50% of Chinese ship builders will go bankrupt within two to three years,” the report cited an unnamed official as saying.
But the shipbuilding sector in China has hit a crossroads, and we are about to learn a lot. Commercial orders are down and only able to fill so much capacity, and there are shipyards that have gone inactive over the last 12 months. The 12th Five-Year Plan period (2011-2015) speaks specifically regarding shipbuilding by stating China will "rationalize the sector's structure, to innovate and improve overall quality over the next three years."
That suggests we will start to see a consolidation and modernization of the Chinese shipbuilding sector. The key question is how much consolidation will there be, and to what degree will the government step up to fill orders when the sector is primarily under-performing on the commercial side due to the global economy down turn?
The United States has 6 major shipyards and 20 second tier smaller yards. China had at least 270 active large shipyards as of 2010 capable of building large ships, although like I mentioned several of those shipyards are struggling to find new orders and some have gone inactive. As best I can tell, the Chinese have been building their naval and government operated maritime vessels with only around 10% of their large shipyards, and for the last decade the shipbuilding sector in China has been growing primarily due to commercial orders for new ships, not government orders for government ships.
What does the PLA Navy look like if the Chinese decide to retain their shipbuilding sector through this downward economic period by keeping only 30 (~15%) of their major shipyards open via governemnt orders? I don't know what that would look like, but I will note that 30 major shipyards building navy ships is the same shipbuilding capacity the United States leveraged to build all warships in World War II. While no one would expect China to field ships at the same pace the US did in WWII, even if China adds orders of a single large PLAN vessel or multiple smaller vessels for 30 shipyards over 5 years while sustaining current construction pace for PLA Navy and government maritime agencies, the size of the PLAN and associated government maritime agencies could potentially triple by 2020.
Now tell me what it looks like if the Chinese government sustains 30%, or even 50% of their shipbuilding sector with government orders for PLA Navy and government maritime agency vessel orders. In theory, the Chinese government could decide to build their own 1000 ship Navy over the next 5 years by simply buying 2 ships at only 100 of their large shipyards for the sole political and economic purpose of saving the 50% of shipbuilders who are expected to go out of business over the next 2-3 years, with the very real alternative being that all those manufacturing workers become unemployed.
And given the kind of vessels China is starting to build, not to mention their renewed focus on airlift capacity, that brand new 1000 ship Navy may not be designed to be a regional defensive force, rather the largest global force in the world. This may sound far fetched, but the story of China's brand of communism is that the government steps in when the Chinese brand of capitalism starts to slack, and if you apply that model to a purpose of sustaining the shipbuilding sector during an economic down turn of a few years it would be an entirely rational political and economic move by the Chinese government to build Navy ships in low quantities at multiple shipyards, and while 100 shipyards sounds like a lot, that is actually only between 35-40% of their total shipbuilding capacity. Even if all 200 ships average 5000 DWTs, that would only be 1 million DWTs worth of ships, which would only make up about 10% of total DWTs the shipbuilding sector was down in 2012 from 2011. Still think it is far fetched? The Chinese could build 200 ships a year that averaged 5000 DWTs spread out across 100 shipyards and the Chinese shipbuilding sector is so large from it's 2010 high that the sector would still contract and consolidate.
I don't know about you, but I am very interested in what State Councilor Ma Kai, Miao Wei of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) is going to recommend, because it could be a geopolitical game changer if the recommendation is for government to subsidize the Chinese shipbuilding industry with government orders - which would be the historical way nations deal with challenges facing key manufacturing sectors.
If this is a topic of interest, read the links. All of them. For the record, the title is a Chinese proverb that when translated literally means 'when the wind of change blows, some build walls, while others build windmills.' It is another way of saying it is better to adapt than to be stubborn. When I think about the variety of topics discussed, I thought the proverb fit, not just the Chinese but us as well.
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