What to make of speculated deals for Su-35/Lada?

In the past week, there have been a lot of speculations regarding a deal where Russia would export 24 Su-35s and 4 Ladas to China.  Now, there have been official denials from Russian government and sukhoi has also not put this on their website.  That would indicate this deal is definitely not done yet.  I normally would ignore these su-35 rumours from Russia, but there have been enough support reading through the Chinese sources for me to think that there are serious discussions for this.  In addition, Chinese sources also indicate that there could also be sale of S-400 and IL-476 as part of a large deal.  Obviously, this would be the largest sale package from China to Russia since probably 2002.  I will just look at the individual parts of the deal and whether they make sense from a Chinese point of view.

Back in 2008 when the su-35 rumours first came out, it made sense for China to buy 2 or more regiments of Su-35.  As time went on, it seemed like the domestic flankers produced by SAC have been more or less satisfactory for PLA.  I often read on Western/Russian news sources about how they are shocked to see Russia is still willing to sell such an advanced aircraft to China even after China “cloned” Russian fighters, but those articles really do not seem to have a good grasp on reality.  We know that China has two “stealth” fighter jet programs under development that will probably achieve IOC sometimes toward the end of this decade, so it doesn’t make sense for China to buy and then “copy” a large number of su-35s.  Shenyang AC is actively developing and producing naval and fighter bomber versions of flankers in J-15 and J-16.  Su-35 is mostly an air superiority aircraft, so it’s not going to help those projects.  At the same time, China is also not exporting any of its flankers to other countries, so this export deal will not threaten Russia’s other export markets.

One of the reported reasons from Chinese side for purchasing Su-35 is the coming end of production of J-11B.  They have requirement for 1 regiment (24 aircraft) of air superiority version of flankers before the more advanced 5^th generation fighters can enter service.  While that is possible, I think su-35 will create a logistical problem in the future like the Sov destroyers with the Chinese navy.  They will need to maintain a new type of aircraft, a new engine, a new generation of Russian avionics and Russian missiles.  That would seem to be a lot of trouble for just one regiment.  That would lead to my conclusion that they are purchasing this strictly to get their hands on the 117S engine.  Russia made it clear to China early on that they would only be willing to sell 117S to China as part of a Su-35 order.  I think 24 is probably the minimum number of Su-35s that Russia would be willing to sell to China to allow Chinese access to 117S engine.  China does have the largest MRO plant for AL-31F outside of Russia.  All maintenance work for AL-31 is done inside China.  I would assume 117S maintenance and life extension work would also be done there.  Despite improvements in the reliability of WS-10A, I still read about problems found in deployment.  If there is one problem that can cause real delay in J-20, it would be not having a reliable engine solution in its development and early deployment.  117S would also be possible options for J-10 and J-15/16 projects.  If China does choose to purchase Su-35s, access to 117S engine would be the primary motivation.  And Russia would benefit by exporting su-35 and possibly large numbers of 117S engine later.

The deal for 4 Lada submarines is more interesting.  Many PLAN followers have asked why China would be interested in purchasing so many units of a submarine that Russia has not even accepted into its own service (its AIP system is not going to be ready until later).  Typically, China chooses to only purchase mature systems that it can quickly induct into service.  On top of that, it seems to some that Chinese submarines seem to have reached the technology levels of their Russian counterpart with that mysterious new conventional submarine in 2011.  The reality is that Chinese submarines still have a way to go in stealth.

As part of this deal, China will be getting transfer of technology along with local production for 2 of the 4 submarines.  On top of that, some unreported Chinese subsystems will be going onto these submarines.  So, the question is what is China providing as part of this submarine and what is it interested in?  The currently mass produced 039B submarine are already equipped with AIP system that can be installed on the Chinese version of Lada submarine.  On top of that, China could install its own sonar system and combat systems onto Lada.  The latter part should not be surprising since China has also installed its own sonar on kilo submarines.  What China seeks as part of this deal is the Russian’s design of Lada submarine and its noise insulation technology.  From Lada, China could learn how to design and build a single hull submarine with conformal sonar.  If we look at China’s new submarine that came out in 2011, it seemed to adapt numerous features from Lada submarine.  This submarine is supposedly one of a kind built to replace the old Gulf class ballistic missile test bed.  It is probably too large and expensive to be mass produced.  Based on their experience from this submarine and Lada project, it’s quite possible that China’s next series of submarine would look somewhere in between (possibly single hull) and have many of the features currently on Lada class.  Russia also has a lot to gain here, because it needs a new submarine for export to replace kilo.  Regardless of whether Russia chooses to use any Chinese subsystems for Lada in the future, Chinese involvement in this project will ensure that the export version of Lada becomes fully developed and commercially viable.

So while I’ve read numerous panic articles online about how this deal will significantly improve China’s capabilities and shift the cross strait balance of power even more toward China’s favour, I think those articles really show very little appreciation of China’s current military industrial complex.  While these purchases will help and speed up PLA development, they are by no means game changers.  However, these purchases will improve ties between the two countries at a time where Russia constantly complains about the trade imbalance.

Context Reveals a Reckless CVN CO Got His Revenge

This New York Times article is incredible. A lot of people are talking. Read it all.

Comment:

No one in the Navy can survive a five month investigation, so whenever that happens the officer being investigated is going to get hit hard. Doesn't matter who it is. The SECNAV will have the last word on this, so I'll wait to see what the ultimate conclusion is. And yeah, FOIA will tell all, because everyone and there mother wants to know if the Navy is jumping the shark with all these firings. Is the Navy upholding a high standard for leadership, or an unrealistic standard and simply using the firing of COs for PR purposes now? Time will tell.

Be warned, the "racially insensitive remarks" are not going to be what you think it is, unless you get offended when a strike group commander is encouraging the 5000 person crew of an aircraft carrier to be vigilant and intelligent when protecting the ship from the beeping beep Iranian mother beepers. The context is going to be interesting, and it will be very interesting to see how Ray Mabus sees this.

Here is what is really fascinating to me though. The New York Times just told the American people that the CO of the only CVN in the 7th Fleet today is a vengeful, reckless asshat. As outlined by the New York Times, the CO is so reckless that he will "fly" a 100,000 ton nuclear reactor waving the US flag through the most congested sea lanes in the world, and when the CO was called out for his reckless behavior at the time it was occurring, the CO reacted by getting his superior shipped off the CVN through the IG process, and ultimately ruined the career of the Admiral with a FIVE MONTH IG investigation - an investigation which no one of any rank in the Navy can possibly survive. When process is weighed with result, the IG process is looking less credible, and when the CO is still in command the Navy loses credibility.

The aspect of the New York Times story related to the CO is shocking when everything is examined in context. The behavior demonstrated by the CO is dangerous. It is poison to the institution when commanding officers must be that cautious when witnessing incredibly dangerous behavior, deadly behavior even.

Kirby may think he doesn't need to comment on the IG report, but when the New York Times undermines the CO of a deployed aircraft carrier in a way that tells a very specific and detailed story of a CO on a power trip, that issue cannot simply be ignored. I find it incredible that the Navy has looked the other way on the CO here, because this is clearly not an issue of a whistle-blower, this is an issue of a CO abusing professional processes for purposes of person revenge being told to America through the New York Times.

Putin Goes Hollywood

From Defense News:

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday ordered unscheduled military exercises involving thousands of troops and dozens of ships in the Black Sea region to test their battle readiness, the Kremlin said.

The order was presented to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in a sealed envelope at 4 a.m. (2400 GMT), his spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told Russian news agencies, adding that the exercises would involve 36 ships and up to 7,000 troops.

Peskov indicated that the surprise order by Putin was aimed at testing the battle readiness of the Russian armed forces and said Moscow was not obliged to warn its partners of the plan.

“Today at 4 a.m. the president of the Russian Federation and supreme military commander (Putin) gave the order to the defense minister to begin major military exercises in the Black Sea region,” Peskov said. “We are talking about major exercises, intended as a check.”

Maybe Marko Ramius is trying to defect? Or maybe Putin is answering the call for BRIC nation assistance by Cyprus. The Black Helicopter crowd is going to have a field day with news like this.

My only question is: what would Connor Stark do?

Naval Aviation: An Evolutionary Apporach

My latest at the Diplomat takes a look at China's approach to naval aviation:

Ranging from the Colossus class carriers distributed across the world at the end of World War II, to the Spanish Dedalo, to the modern Hyuga class Helicopter Destroyer, the USN could and can depend on allies to conduct escort missions. The USN could also rely on access to airbases worldwide in order to support land-based sea control aviation. 

China has none of these advantages. No Chinese ally is likely to devote treasure to the construction of sea control ships in the near future (Pakistan might be the best long term bet), and China lacks access to good bases for counter-sea aviation.  For sea control beyond China’s littoral, the PLAN has few, if any, good options. 

In a structurally similar position to China (although much less dependent on foreign trade), the Soviet Navy started with what amounted to Sea Control Ships, in the form of the Moskva class helicopter carriers and the Kiev class “heavy aviation cruisers.” Although these ships weren’t designed specifically with commerce protection in mind, they were specialized for anti-submarine warfare, with allowance for air superiority and surface warfare in the Kiev class. Moreover, Soviet naval aviation evolved over time, with new platforms benefitting from experiences earned with older vessels. 

China has been determined to leap several stages, with consequences for training that are already becoming apparent. But perhaps more importantly, by skipping ahead the PLAN has left itself bereft of the kind of low cost, medium size platforms that can support sea control operations at a distance from home.

I'm curious if Feng has any thoughts on this. The PLAN's approach to just about everything apart from carrier aviation seems to have ben evolutionary, with knowledge gained from older platforms feeding into the design process of new platforms, and (importantly in this case), the older platforms still have relevant roles to play in general PLAN strategy. The leap to a full (if skijump) carrier seems outside normal practice.

On LCS: What's Really Bothering You, Blackshoes?

The Littoral Combat Ship has engendered a considerable amount of discussion since it was announced as part of the 21^st Century Family of Ships in the Fall of 2001.  Since then, the debates have often been heated, with the interlocutors on both sides among the smartest folks writing and thinking about naval issues.  It is hard for anyone—let alone someone with a deep background in fleet design and naval architecture (which I don't) —to grind things down to ground truth. 

Yesterday, I got to thinking that maybe, just maybe, many of us are having a collective case of what some of you may recognize in the day-to-day business of child-rearing.  That is, the great likelihood that when your child is acting out, the cause is often not what the child articulates, and it takes a bit of calm talk and good parenting to eventually get to the “real issue”. 

Please, I am not trying to ascribe parent/child roles here, only to raise a point.  What if the strength and emotion of the objections to LCS are only partially a reflection of the merits of those ships?  What if a good bit of the anxiety is due to something else?  If so, what could that be?  I think I have an idea.

I believe that there is growing anxiety within (primarily) the Surface Navy, that when it comes to ship on ship warfare, we are dramatically “out-sticked”, and the problem will only get worse in the future.  We see the combatants currently being built and note that none have a surface to surface missile (SSM) capable of killing another ship beyond the radar horizon.  Let’s face it, LCS is not the only “outsticked” ship we are building.  It has been 14 years since the United States built a ship capable of engaging enemy surface forces over the horizon—USS PORTER (DDG 78).  All TICONDEROGA Class Cruisers and ARLEIGH BURKE Destroyers 51-78 were equipped to fire the Harpoon Missile.  Not one of the DDG’s built since PORTER was so equipped (and this includes the DDG 1000’s under construction).  I would hazard a guess that there are many readers of this blog who cannot fathom the fact that our modern, sophisticated “Destroyers” cannot destroy another ship.  But this fact is never far from the hearts and minds of those serving in our surface forces.  The fact that our “pacing threat”—China’s PLA-Navy—continues to field ships capable of long range over the horizon engagements—is also not lost on the surface force. 

 

Graphics by Delex Systems, Inc.  Data from Jane's Missiles and Rockets.  SM2 range is radar-horizon limited.

But it gets worse—not only are we are not building ships equipped with OTH surface to surface missiles, but every CG and DDG that is decommissioned between now and when USS PORTER decommissions (roughly 2034) will take with it the capability to employ the Harpoon, meaning an ever-increasing percentage of our fleet will lack OTH SSM capability. The Navy is studying this issue, and a new ASUW weapon is working its way through myriad acquisition hoops, with one authoritative briefing from N96 projecting IOC in 2024.  Should this new weapon meet this IOC date, it would likely at best represent holding the line on the diminishing fleet ASUW capability.  We need to move faster to arrest and reverse this decline, and we need to stop thinking the Carrier Air-Wing is going to be there to save our bacon when it comes time for a fight.

First, in the spirit of the much ballyhooed “Copeman” memo that Chris Cavas wrote aboutlast week, LCS must be improved if it is to be built in the numbers suggested.  No fewer than half of all LCS built should be altered to fire the Harpoon missile; if this means some trade-off with respect to other capabilities, so be it.  The rest of the world is lousy with crappy little boats with significant SSM capabilities, while LCS waits on future iterations of the LCS SUW Mission Module.  This is unacceptable. 

Second, the Navy should immediately begin a program to enable vertical launch of the Harpoon Missile, with a goal of not more than one year from program announcement to test firing.  In order to guarantee the most “bang for the buck”, the newest DDG’s in the fleet should be altered first, working backward to DDG 79. 

This is not a manhood issue, this is a fleet design issue.  Solve the “out-sticked” problem for the fleet, and LCS will not stick out like the sore thumb some see it as.  

Bryan McGrath