The Liberation of Naval Intelligence Collection

Although I am not an intelligence officer, I’ve been privileged to work closely with many bright, talented intel professionals across the services and government over the past two decades.  It goes without saying that the Snowden espionage case has been a shock to many who serve in the intelligence community.  I won't/can't discuss the implications of that egregious breach, but what is overlooked in discussions surrounding it is that the insider threat is only one of the current dangers facing state run intelligence organizations.  What might be more threatening over the long term to those who work in in this field, including naval intelligence, is the ongoing erosion of their monopoly of the use of high-end collection capabilities.

The availability of various tools and techniques to non-state actors such as terrorists, activists, and insurgents to acquire, analyze, and collect intelligence on the disposition, tactics, and intentions of naval forces will require adjustment in how navies do business and maintain operational security.  Some of these tools include:   

IMINT - Twenty years ago, only a handful of governments had access to high-resolution satellite imagery.  Now, commercial imagery services, and processing/analysis tools such as Google Earth, are becoming better, cheaper to access, and easier to use every day. Moreover, for less than $1000, someone can build or buy a rudimentary tactical UAV capable of flying pre-planned search patterns on autopilot, while collecting and streaming real-time imagery to smart phones or tablets.  Imagery that can then be disseminated over-the-horizon, and coordinated with other collectors.  We have seen eco-activists use this capability at sea and it is only a matter until other maritime non-state actors use the same aircraft for more nefarious purposes.

HUMINT - There are commercially available vehicles that can now provide superb human intelligence on denied areas in many cases more timely, just as accurately, and much more affordably than the government agencies chartered with that task.  These platforms are enabled by the same technologies that have increased productivity elsewhere - ubiquitous internet and smart phones, which coincidentally are increasingly found in regions of the world where the rest of the infrastructure is extremely austere.  The crowd-sourcing of HUMINT via social media is another interesting emerging field.

Computer Network Exploitation - For some time now, private hackers and other miscreants have become quite proficient at socially and technically engineering our credit card numbers, accessing corporate networks, etc.  It stands to reason that as more naval data networks come on line - especially those in the RF spectrum - they will eventually be targeted by non-state actors.

Other capabilities, such as online tools for tracking ships’ AIS signals, home-made unmanned underwater vehicles, and unattended maritime sensors round out the portfolio of the non-state naval intel collector. Though some capabilities are still out of the reach of these actors for now, expect more and more collection tools, especially those that listen to and make sense of the crowded electromagnetic spectrum, to come online.

The implications of this democratization of intel collection will be long-term and wide-spread.  “Friendly” ports calls may actually be filled with unfriendly collectors, armed with hand-held collection tools disguised in the form of smart phones.  EMCON and encryption remain important, just as they are to shield against collection from state foreign intelligence services. The forgotten art of naval deception should be revisited and balanced in light of friendly navies' increased propensity for strategic communications transparency via social media and public affairs.   

MINERVA works to expose Iran's clandestine smuggling routes.

Not all of these non-state actors should be viewed as threats, however.  In some cases, their interests may be aligned with friendly navies.  An interesting example is the Maritime Intelligence Network and Rogue Vessel Analysis (MINERVA) system.  This group uses a variety of the above-mentioned techniques focused on exposing Iran’s attempts to circumvent sanctions, especially oil smuggling.  A useful adjunct to this work would be to begin collecting and illuminating the more dangerous aspects of Iran’s clandestine maritime rat lines, especially weapons smuggling to insurgents involved in conflicts of interest in places such as Syria and Yemen.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

A little PLAN update

It's been a while since I posted due to work and personal commitments. Things haven't really stopped moving in the world of Chinese military, but it also hasn't been the most hectic spring season.

The biggest news from the past while is probably CV-16 (formerly Varyag) going on its first training exercise of the year out in the oceans. Since the take-off and landing tests in November of last year, they've been busy making preparations and training crew members in the naval aviation training facility close to Tianjin. There is a really nice thread here talking about the facility. From what we can see, the take-off and landing exercises in this second trip are done by the same two J-15 prototype aircraft that did the first one. Since J-15 has reportedly begun serial production, I was hoping to see more J-15 aircraft out in the ocean this time.

Other than that, Type 056 continues to be launched and commissioned into PLAN at a very fast pace. There have been at least 12 of them launched with at least 5 being commissioned. They are mostly replacing Type 037 currently in service with PLAN.

The production of Type 054A seems to be winding down. At least 15 have being commissioned now, with 3 more in HD shipyard that are in various stage of completion.

We are also seeing the unified Maritime Police fleet taking shape. Many of the larger cutters from CMS and FLEC have now been repainted and numbered into the new agency's colours.

And finally, I think one of the better articles I have read recently is this one by James Bussert. It's something I have been saying for a long time. You can see the scope of PLAN modernization by works done on their three weapon trial ships. For PLAN followers, this is the best place to look for what PLAN has in store.

Winston Churchill plans Armageddon, and the pitfalls of Grand Strategy

Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty 

     While most of us are used to seeing Winston Churchill as a rotund older gentlemen sporting a yachting cap and large cigar, his less familiar, younger, more nattily attired self seen here was equally interested in all elements of grand strategy. While not the primary character in British historian Nicholas Lambert’s 2012 book, Planning Armageddon, British Economic Warfare and the First World War, he is one of its most recognizable characters.  Lambert explores the extensive efforts that originated in the British Admiralty in the years before the First World War to craft a grand strategy of economic warfare. British admirals, intelligence officials and politicians, notably Admiral Sir John Fisher, and later Churchill himself, while serving as First Lord of the Admiralty intended that the British would leverage their virtual control over the world’s shipping, energy, communications, economic, and financial systems to create a global economic blockade of the German state. This bold plan’s objective was to cripple the Imperial German war effort at the beginning of hostilities and promote a swift conclusion of conflict. German merchant ships would be seized on a global scale, cutting the German state off from vital trade goods such as iron ore, chemicals, and foodstuffs necessary for a protracted war. Neutral shipping bound for Germany would also be targeted and the British government would support the overall effort by using the financial power of the City of London, then the world's center of economic power to penalize those nations and companies doing business with the German state. 

      When war came in August 1914, nearly all of the British leadership except Churchill hesitated to pull the switch on such a mighty war plan for fear of antagonizing both allies and important neutrals like the United States. This British version of the Schlieffen plan for a swift end to the war might have succeeded in significantly shortening the First World War, but it threatened to cause such upheaval in the globalized economic world of 1914 that despite Churchill’s vehement protests, the British govt. shelved the full implementation. The Royal Navy’s more conventional blockade ultimately had the effect of starving somewhere between 400,000 to 800,000 Germans (mostly civilians) to death during the course of the war, but it did not have the shock value at the outset great enough to compel Germany to sue for peace.

     While the book leaves the reader wondering if the First World War’s mass trench warfare casualties might have been adverted, it also serves to warn of the awesome power of global economic connections, even in 1914. The United States today is in a position analogous to that of Great Britain in 1914 in that much of the globe’s communication, energy, transportation, and financial systems either have their roots in Anglo-American initiatives or remain in the control of the "Anglosphere" and/or friendly allies’ hands.  The United States might seek to exploit this system in war, or perhaps other nations might desire to attack the global economic system outright for their own wartime gain. The same pitfalls however that prevented the British from potentially saving millions of lives in 1914 will likely again confront any nation who attempts to cripple any part of today’s even more networked global economy.  While opinions may vary on how successful the British might have been in 1914, or any other nation could be today, this book should be a useful addition to any grand strategist’s library.

Navy Historical Research, Writing Academic Awards

Admiral Sims & group, January 16, 2024 (original)

The Navy Historical Research, Writing Academic Award Winners were announced last week. The people were selected as winners.

The Rear Adm. John D. Hayes Pre-doctoral Fellowship in U.S. Navy History, named in honor of the Hayes for his enthusiastic encouragement of naval scholars and his own significant contributions to the field, was awarded to Alan M. Anderson, a doctoral candidate at King's College, London. Anderson received the fellowship for a study analyzing the impact of laws of war on naval strategy in Great Britain and the United States, 1899-1909. His dissertation shows a deeper understanding of interrelationships between new technologies and the laws of war, particularly regarding autonomous attack systems. NHHC will provide Anderson $10,000 aid for dissertation research and writing.

The Rear Adm. Ernest M. Eller Graduate Research Grant, named in honor of a former Director of Naval History, for his contributions to U.S. naval history, was awarded to Steven T. Wills, doctoral student, Ohio University. Wills proposes to study of the effects of the 1980's naval grand strategy on the Reagan Administration. The NHHC committee was impressed by the quality of Mr. Wills' select list of key individuals he will interview. NHHC awarded Wills a stipend in an amount up to $2,500.

Vice Adm. Edwin B. Hooper Research Grant, named in honor of a former Director of Naval History, for his great contributions to U. S. naval history, was awarded to William F. Althoff, for a history of lighter-than-air aircraft in the U.S. Navy during the early Cold War (1945-1962). Althoff's study proposes to examine the research and development of the aircraft in the nuclear age, as well as the challenges of operation and command experienced by Navy personnel. An understanding of why the Navy abandoned this technology during the Cold War could be useful to Navy planners considering its future potential. Althoff will be paid up to $2,500 by NHHC after commencement of research.

The Samuel Eliot Morison Supplemental Scholarship, named after Rear Adm. Samuel Eliot Morison, USNR, an eminent naval and maritime historian and winner of the Pulitzer Prize, was awarded to Lt. Cmdr. Benjamin F. Armstrong, USN. Armstrong will receive the scholarship to support research on his doctoral dissertation, examining in tactical detail case studies of irregular warfare by the U.S. Navy in the age of sail. With the increase in the proportion of littoral combat ships and other small combatants in the fleet -- portending greater responsibility at lower levels of command -- irregular warfare is likely to retain its relevance. Armstrong's study looks to give junior officers knowledge of the Navy's heritage in the types of operations for which they will have responsibility, and help contextualize the Navy's experience in recent small wars. Armstrong was awarded the scholarship by NHHC up to $5,000.

Two things were noting.

First, I was pleasantly surprised to see the Rear Adm. Ernest M. Eller Graduate Research Grant awarded to Steven T. Wills. I was unaware of his selection for this award until after Steven joined the team here at Information Dissemination as a regular contributor - Lazarus.

Second, The Samuel Eliot Morison Supplemental Scholarship was awarded to Lt. Cmdr. Benjamin F. Armstrong, USN, who has contributed to Information Dissemination in the past. I intend to do a review of his latest book 21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era later this week.

Congratulations to both of you!

Actually, all of you.

JMSDF in Action!

What a wonderful image of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense force in action!

Note the sinking PLAN carrier Liaoning in the background.  Obviously there's been some sort of dreadful accident-- apparently near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands-- and the Hyuga is rendering desperately needed assistance to the Chinese ship. Those Ospreys are undoubtedly rescuing scores of Chinese sailors.  I can only hope that the goodwill and generosity evident in this artwork helps serve as a bridge between the two great East Asian nations.