ASB: T.X. Hammes Responds

I cross linked here last week to a piece I did at War on the Rocks about AirSea Battle, and T.X. Hammes figured prominently in it.

He has ably responded this morning with a piece of his own.  It is well worth the read.

Bryan McGrath

H.R. McMaster Sets His Sights On AirSea Battle

Major General H.R. McMaster is one of the smartest men in our military, the epitome of a warrior-scholar.  He has been famous since he was a Major and he is one of the few serving officers who can confidently have his work placed in the New York Times, which he did yesterday.  He is the most eloquent advocate for land power on the scene today, and he will invariably provide much of the Army's intellectual heft in the coming QDR and concomitant budget battles.  Read closely in his NYT piece and you see the Army's argument clearly.  That is, without even mentioning AirSea Battle, he has lumped it in with the Revolution in Military Affairs, Net Centricity, and Rumsfeld's reorganization ideas as fashionable passing fancies we must not follow again.  Instead, we must keep in high readiness a large powerful Army capable of combined arms maneuver AND the ability to occupy large portions of the earth's surface. 

If you think that I'm wrong, and that he's not arguing against AirSea Battle, then it is not worth your time to read on.  If you think he is or might be, then consider moving forward.

McMaster employs the straw-man technique of argument in this piece, defining for us "War" by three of its "age old truths" and by inference, pointing out the shortcomings of this shadowy approach that he does not name.  Additionally, he creates a ridiculously high bar over which "defense concepts" must hurdle, one that lards the full weight of the conduct of war upon constituent pieces thereof.  His first lesson:  " Be skeptical of concepts that divorce war from its political nature, particularly those that promise fast, cheap victory through technology."  So, we are to be skeptical of military concepts that do not take into consideration a full Clausewitzian approach to war?  How hamstrung will that leave us?  Why should concept development worry about the political nature of war?  Isn't this the purview of statesmen and politicians?  Is it not the job of military thinkers and planners to put together a menu of possibilities for civilian leadership to choose among, one aspect of which would be the political fall-out therefrom?  This line of operation is aimed squarely at the possibility that in a conflict with China, we might target mainland objectives.  "There go those irresponsible fools in the Navy and the Air Force, talking about mainland strikes.  Why this would lead to horrible escalation, probably nuclear war.  Why would we even consider these things?"  We consider them because they could be militarily useful, and because a commander might wish to utilize such an approach in an actual war, guided by the political instructions received  from civilian leadership.  It is not the job of military planners and thinkers to discard viable options because of their perception of the politics of the matter.  As for  "...fast, cheap victory...", I know of no one who thinks about an actual conflict with China who believes it would not be a conflict measured in YEARS, rather than months or weeks.  AirSea Battle is not a strategy, or a theory of victory; it is however, a concept through which a commander might regain access to the maneuver space necessary to project power. 

McMaster's next lesson is:  "Defense concepts must consider social, economic and historical factors that constitute the human dimension of war."  Really?  All of this is expected of a "defense concept?"  I beg to differ.  This is the realm of true strategy, existing several levels above the ideas which McMaster is criticizing in his veiled approach.  I'm sure this lesson garnered many "tut-tuts" and knowing nods from the readership of the New York Times, but McMaster is dangerously conflating strategy and operations in a manner that few military thinkers and planners would support.  Of COURSE war strategy must consider these factors; and McMaster is correct in pointing out where in the recent past these factors were not closely identified and considered.  But the whiff of suggestion that defense concepts need to be vetted through the humanities department at West Point (or Harvard) defies understanding.

His final lesson?  "American forces must cope with the political and human dynamics of war in complex, uncertain environments. Wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be waged remotely."  That's correct; wars which demand hundreds of thousands of ground troops for a decade or more, cannot be waged remotely.  This is apparently (for McMaster), the only kind of war there is.  And politicians should heed McMaster, in that should they wish to wage this type of war, there will be huge requirements.  But all war is not the same.  The United States effectively contained Saddam Hussein for more than a decade "remotely", yet McMaster does not see this use of military force as "war".  Presumably, then, Kosovo wasn't either. This is in fact, one of the most glaring weaknesses in McMaster's views--that war isn't "war" unless it involves large ground formations and extended occupation.  He actually tipped his hand to this view in the Army's 2010 "United States Army Operating Concept" (which he helped write) in paragraph 3.3 where it states:  "Succeeding in future armed conflict requires Army forces capable of combined arms maneuver and wide area security within the context of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts."  Success in ALL future conflict?  Requires both combined arms maneuver and wide area security?  All kept in a high state of active duty readiness?  The devil is in the details here, and a healthy, active QDR process should tease these details out. 

Look for more of these kinds of articles in the months to come.  Sequestration and declining budgets are actually beginning to threaten the cozy, least common denominator approach to strategy and budgeting that has dominated the Pentagon in the Goldwater Nichols era.  The gloves will come off, and perhaps we will have the debate this country has needed for two decades.  I for one welcome it, and I welcome the views of General McMaster. 

Bryan McGrath

Video of "If We Can't Afford the Navy We Need...."

Here is the video from my chat at the Navy Warfare Development Command yesterday.

I was a half-hour late due to some seriously poor planning on my part, and I am very sorry to those who attended but who had to leave due to my stupidity. 

Many thanks to the folks at Navy Warfare Development Command for their flexibility and patience. 

Bryan McGrath

Potentially False SCMR Logic

Colin Clark at Breaking Defense has a piece up entitled "SCMR Concludes Pacific Pivot Needs More Cash, Missions:  GEN Dempsey", after CJCS told the Senate Armed Services Committee that DOD would “further prioritize missions within the context of a continued rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.”  His conclusion?  "The next Pentagon budget will almost certainly include increased spending for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force to boost their presence and operations in the Asia-Pacific region."

While I would be all too happy if Mr. Clark's reading of those tea-leaves were true, he misses one other possibility; that the next budget would NOT in fact include INCREASED spending, but that the next budget would deal smaller CUTS to those services than it does to the Army.  This too, is a method of "prioritizing missions".

The proof will be in the PB15 budget pudding.

Bryan McGrath

India's Coming Carrier Force, Plus Sundry

A few links that may be of some interest:

• One of my co-bloggers at LGM writes about the Port Chicago Naval Magazine explosion, with related thoughts about race, labor, and military service.
• I have two columns on Indian naval aviation up at the Diplomat, both displaying some skepticism about the structure of the program.
• Also at the Diplomat see this good Zachary Keck post on the Golden Ratio between services in the U.S.
• Curious to see what people think of Dan Drezner's contribution on the value of military primacy.  I'm still formulating my own thoughts.
• Finally, Clayton Thyne and I exchanged some political sciency thoughts on the Egyptian coup.