Tuesday, July 23, 2024

Lessons from a previous "Pivot to the Pacific"

HMS Prince of Wales
HMS Repulse

With all of the recent discussion on Air Sea battle and how it might affect a "pivot to the Pacific", it may be useful to examine the last attempt at such a strategy by a great power with major interests but few military forces in the region. That power was of course the British Empire. These two ships represent the end of that attempt. These photos show HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse leaving their forward base at Singapore on Dec. 8 1941 to intercept Japanese amphibious forces invading Malaya. Two days later they were both sunk with heavy loss of life by Japanese aircraft. Singapore itself fell to Japanese forces less than two months later. The British had been planning a "pivot to the Pacific" with just this sort of war in mind for over twenty years. Why did their effort fail?

Some background is in order. In 1919 with victory over the Central Powers at hand, Great Britain should have been looking forward to a period of peace. The Empire's immediate opponent, Imperial Germany was substantially crippled by the Peace of Versailles. Recent friends, but historical opponents like France and now Soviet Russia were exhausted by war and in no position to challenge the victorious Royal Navy at sea or attempt to conquer British imperial possessions. Instead the British warily eyed two friends and allies, the United States and the Empire of Japan as its next probable enemies. Although still the single biggest country for British investment, the United States had grown powerful and some American navalists demanded a navy "second to none" as a guarantee of safety against their former friends. Japan's naval forces had also grown during the war and while eager to take German colonial possessions in the Pacific, Japan had shown no interest in sending large formations of ground troops to die in the trenches of Europe or the deserts of the Middle East. Both powers were rising economies and the British may have been justified in feeling threatened.

Britain was in no position to wage a new naval race. Debts from the First World War, widespread disgust for all things military in the wake of the conflict and public demand for armaments reduction and social spending left the British no choice but to seek accommodation and defense reductions. If this was not bad enough, internal divisions in the British Empire essentially forced them to choose between the U.S. and Japan for the nation with which Britain would accept naval parity. The Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand wanted Britain to choose Japan for obvious geographic reasons while others like Winston Churchill (himself half American by birth) wanted a closer relationship with the United States. The British chose the Americans and in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 accepted naval parity in capital ships with the U.S. The Anglo-Japanese defense treaty, which had been in place since 1902, was allowed to lapse in 1923. In return for Commonwealth concerns and based on feelings by some British military and civilian leaders that Japan might some day be hostile, Britain conceived its own planned "pivot to the Pacific" in case of hostilities with Japan.

When first conceived by British military leaderships, war with Japan was still considered unlikely. Even Churchill doubted there would be a war with Japan in his own lifetime. While planning to transfer a significant part of its battle fleet and air forces to the Pacific, the British still proceeded throughout the 1920s to reduce military spending.  In the 1930s however, preparations became more serious. Japanese aggression against China and indifference to world condemnation spurred further British efforts in the Pacific. Singapore was re-constructed as a naval fortress. More troops and aircraft were dispatched to Malaya and British plans were revised to include updates in technology such as anti-submarine and anti-air defenses for the city.  The British naval effort to relieve its Pacific possessions entitled "Main Fleet to Singapore" was well planned and war gamed on par with the U.S. War Plan Orange strategy for war in the Pacific. All should have gone well. The British should have been able to relieve Singapore and at least successfully defend the Malaya peninsula against a Japanese invasion.

Sadly no war planning should be done in a vacuum. Britain was first confronted by a resurgent fascist Germany and Italy.  A successful defense of France and Western Europe might have allowed the British to send part of their fleet to the Far East, but France fell. U-boat and surface raider attacks in the Atlantic scattered the British fleet and losses in the Mediterranean subduing the Italian fleet and its German Air Force allies further sapped British strength. In addition, in late 1941 half of the British battle fleet and aircraft carriers were undergoing badly needed refits at home in Britain as well as the United States. The British had only begun to effectively increase military spending in 1937, and long-delayed refits of badly worn out ships were finally being completed. When the Japanese occupied former French colonial airfields in Indochina and Winston Churchill needed to send at least a deterrent force to the Far East, all he really had to send were Prince of Wales and Repulse.

As the U.S. contemplates its own "pivot to the Pacific", what lessons might be learned from the British experience? (1). Be mindful that a lot can happen in a mere twenty years. Many senior leaders are conditioned to a Cold War that went on for decades. The period from 1990 to the present may not have seen the same level of change that transpired between 1919 and 1939, but the world today is significantly changed from the end of the Cold War. (2). Do not conduct war planning in a vacuum. Yesterday's friend could be tomorrow's enemy. Today's weakened former opponent may quickly rise again in a decade or two, and provide sophisticated arms to a rising theocracy. All three could also be simultaneous opponents. Forces must be available to cover a wide range of threats. The British planned to have "just enough" forces to fight in the Far East. When that fight actually came they were already too stressed on multiple fronts to send enough quality forces to the Pacific. (3) The choices made by a nation and the risks it is willing to accept have consequences. The British gambled that Japan would not attack in the 25 years after the First World War. When they did, the results cost them their Pacific imperial possessions and influence. Australia and New Zealand sought closer ties with the U.S. and Indian Empire troops captured in Singapore eventually joined the Japanese as an anti-colonial army to free India. If the U.S. gambles and looses, the cost both in lost allies and economic relationships could be staggering by comparison with Britain' s defeat in 1941. (4) Finally, this time there is no safety net. When the British failed to preserve their Pacific possessions, the United States was able to step in and fight the Pacific war against Japan near singled handed until 1945. Unlike then, no great democratic power like ourselves will step in to save the United States from a failed Pacific pivot.

The United States can successfully conduct a Pacific pivot of its military forces provided it heeds these lessons from Britain's failure. In the end, it really comes down to what choices a nation makes and what level of risk it chooses to sustain in pursuit of a given strategy. China might remain a friend for the next 25+ years, but then again it might become more aggressive and hostile. The Russians might again become strategic competitors and Iran remains unpredictable and dangerous. The British took risks then that we now cannot afford to do. Hopefully own own Pacific pivot will take these lessons into account. We do not want to be left some day with only a USS Prince of Wales and USS Repulse to counter aggression in the Pacific.

China's Type 32 class submarine

We've known about this class for a while, but it has now been officially unveiled as shown in image below.



For those who don't know, this is the super class conventional submarine with a lot of lada/kilo influence that was launched in Wuchang shipyard back in 2010. At the time, we thought it might be a new conventional submarine class to replace Yuan. However, it turns out this is basically a one ship class that will be used to replace the old No. 200 Gulf Class ballistic missile test bed. This will likely be used to test out ballistic missiles as well as new vertical launch system. It is Chinese navy's new submarine test bed.

Some more information on this class:
  • Program was established in Jan 2005, ship launched in September 2010, completed test run by September 2012
  • Was handed over Oct 16th, 2012 and has already started to be used for testing.
  • It is double hull, has length of 92.6 m, 10 m width, hydroplane width of 13 m and largest height of 17.2 m.
  • It has draft of 6.85 m when surfaced with displacement of 3797 tons. Its submerged displacement is 6628 tons.
  • It operates at 160 m depth with maximum dive of 200 m.
  • Its maximum surfaced speed is 10 knots and maximum submerged speed is 14 knots.
  • Can operate with 88 crew for 30 days without resupply, or 200 crew for 3 days.

ASB: T.X. Hammes Responds

I cross linked here last week to a piece I did at War on the Rocks about AirSea Battle, and T.X. Hammes figured prominently in it.

He has ably responded this morning with a piece of his own.  It is well worth the read.

Bryan McGrath

Sunday, July 21, 2024

H.R. McMaster Sets His Sights On AirSea Battle

Major General H.R. McMaster is one of the smartest men in our military, the epitome of a warrior-scholar.  He has been famous since he was a Major and he is one of the few serving officers who can confidently have his work placed in the New York Times, which he did yesterday.  He is the most eloquent advocate for land power on the scene today, and he will invariably provide much of the Army's intellectual heft in the coming QDR and concomitant budget battles.  Read closely in his NYT piece and you see the Army's argument clearly.  That is, without even mentioning AirSea Battle, he has lumped it in with the Revolution in Military Affairs, Net Centricity, and Rumsfeld's reorganization ideas as fashionable passing fancies we must not follow again.  Instead, we must keep in high readiness a large powerful Army capable of combined arms maneuver AND the ability to occupy large portions of the earth's surface. 

If you think that I'm wrong, and that he's not arguing against AirSea Battle, then it is not worth your time to read on.  If you think he is or might be, then consider moving forward.

McMaster employs the straw-man technique of argument in this piece, defining for us "War" by three of its "age old truths" and by inference, pointing out the shortcomings of this shadowy approach that he does not name.  Additionally, he creates a ridiculously high bar over which "defense concepts" must hurdle, one that lards the full weight of the conduct of war upon constituent pieces thereof.  His first lesson:  " Be skeptical of concepts that divorce war from its political nature, particularly those that promise fast, cheap victory through technology."  So, we are to be skeptical of military concepts that do not take into consideration a full Clausewitzian approach to war?  How hamstrung will that leave us?  Why should concept development worry about the political nature of war?  Isn't this the purview of statesmen and politicians?  Is it not the job of military thinkers and planners to put together a menu of possibilities for civilian leadership to choose among, one aspect of which would be the political fall-out therefrom?  This line of operation is aimed squarely at the possibility that in a conflict with China, we might target mainland objectives.  "There go those irresponsible fools in the Navy and the Air Force, talking about mainland strikes.  Why this would lead to horrible escalation, probably nuclear war.  Why would we even consider these things?"  We consider them because they could be militarily useful, and because a commander might wish to utilize such an approach in an actual war, guided by the political instructions received  from civilian leadership.  It is not the job of military planners and thinkers to discard viable options because of their perception of the politics of the matter.  As for  "...fast, cheap victory...", I know of no one who thinks about an actual conflict with China who believes it would not be a conflict measured in YEARS, rather than months or weeks.  AirSea Battle is not a strategy, or a theory of victory; it is however, a concept through which a commander might regain access to the maneuver space necessary to project power. 

McMaster's next lesson is:  "Defense concepts must consider social, economic and historical factors that constitute the human dimension of war."  Really?  All of this is expected of a "defense concept?"  I beg to differ.  This is the realm of true strategy, existing several levels above the ideas which McMaster is criticizing in his veiled approach.  I'm sure this lesson garnered many "tut-tuts" and knowing nods from the readership of the New York Times, but McMaster is dangerously conflating strategy and operations in a manner that few military thinkers and planners would support.  Of COURSE war strategy must consider these factors; and McMaster is correct in pointing out where in the recent past these factors were not closely identified and considered.  But the whiff of suggestion that defense concepts need to be vetted through the humanities department at West Point (or Harvard) defies understanding.

His final lesson?  "American forces must cope with the political and human dynamics of war in complex, uncertain environments. Wars like those in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be waged remotely."  That's correct; wars which demand hundreds of thousands of ground troops for a decade or more, cannot be waged remotely.  This is apparently (for McMaster), the only kind of war there is.  And politicians should heed McMaster, in that should they wish to wage this type of war, there will be huge requirements.  But all war is not the same.  The United States effectively contained Saddam Hussein for more than a decade "remotely", yet McMaster does not see this use of military force as "war".  Presumably, then, Kosovo wasn't either. This is in fact, one of the most glaring weaknesses in McMaster's views--that war isn't "war" unless it involves large ground formations and extended occupation.  He actually tipped his hand to this view in the Army's 2010 "United States Army Operating Concept" (which he helped write) in paragraph 3.3 where it states:  "Succeeding in future armed conflict requires Army forces capable of combined arms maneuver and wide area security within the context of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts."  Success in ALL future conflict?  Requires both combined arms maneuver and wide area security?  All kept in a high state of active duty readiness?  The devil is in the details here, and a healthy, active QDR process should tease these details out. 

Look for more of these kinds of articles in the months to come.  Sequestration and declining budgets are actually beginning to threaten the cozy, least common denominator approach to strategy and budgeting that has dominated the Pentagon in the Goldwater Nichols era.  The gloves will come off, and perhaps we will have the debate this country has needed for two decades.  I for one welcome it, and I welcome the views of General McMaster. 

Bryan McGrath

Friday, July 19, 2024

Video of "If We Can't Afford the Navy We Need...."



Here is the video from my chat at the Navy Warfare Development Command yesterday.

I was a half-hour late due to some seriously poor planning on my part, and I am very sorry to those who attended but who had to leave due to my stupidity. 

Many thanks to the folks at Navy Warfare Development Command for their flexibility and patience. 

Bryan McGrath