"Amateurism"

This article by Major General Robert Scales (ret) is remarkable.

The tapes tell the tale. Go back and look at images of our nation’s most senior soldier, Gen. Martin Dempsey, and his body language during Tuesday’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Syria. It’s pretty obvious that Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, doesn’t want this war. As Secretary of State John Kerry’s thundering voice and arm-waving redounded in rage against Bashar al-Assad’s atrocities, Dempsey was largely (and respectfully) silent.

Dempsey’s unspoken words reflect the opinions of most serving military leaders. By no means do I profess to speak on behalf of all of our men and women in uniform. But I can justifiably share the sentiments of those inside the Pentagon and elsewhere who write the plans and develop strategies for fighting our wars. After personal exchanges with dozens of active and retired soldiers in recent days, I feel confident that what follows represents the overwhelming opinion of serving professionals who have been intimate witnesses to the unfolding events that will lead the United States into its next war.

They are embarrassed to be associated with the amateurism of the Obama administration’s attempts to craft a plan that makes strategic sense. None of the White House staff has any experience in war or understands it. So far, at least, this path to war violates every principle of war, including the element of surprise, achieving mass and having a clearly defined and obtainable objective.

While there are points in the article I do not agree with, this article goes on to make several interesting arguments. The Pentagon under Panetta struggled dealing with sequestration, but folks in the Pentagon always believed he fought for their best interest. The same cannot be said of Secretary Hagel.

President Obama traded in people with serious leadership skills - folks like Hillary Clinton,  Leon Panetta, and Tom Donilon - for ex-Senator buddies like John Kerry and Chuck Hagel, or close friends like Susan Rice.

If It's Not "War," It Sounds Like Checkers

In his book On War, General Carl von Clausewitz explains that war "is controlled by its political object," which "will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and makes its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail." Over the last two days, John Kerry has insisted that "President Obama is not asking America to go to war." He even goes so far as to suggest that he, General Dempsey and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel "know the difference between going to war and what President Obama is requesting now."

Over the last two days John Kerry has made a terrible case for war against Syria to Congress. While seeking action by Congress under the War Powers act, John Kerry has argued forcefully that all definitions of war by experts of warfare throughout history are wrong, and his definition is right. Ryan Evans at War on the Rocks captured the moment when Kerry jumped the shark.

Later, a frustrated Kerry revealed the real logic behind his position: public opinion. He noted that no Americans wanted to go to war with Syria and insisted the White House was of the same mind. “We don’t want to go to war in Syria either!” he exclaimed.  “It’s not what we’re here to ask. The President is not asking you to go to war…He’s simply saying we need to take an action that can degrade the capacity of a man who has been willing to kill his own people by breaking a nearly hundred year-old prohibition [against chemical weapons].”

Then, turning to Dempsey, Kerry asked, “General, do you want to speak to that?”

Dempsey responded, “No, not really, Secretary, thank you for offering.” Why? Because General Dempsey knew that was nonsense.

Words matter, and when they are not allowed to matter in policy, we are not being honest with ourselves. Over the last two days John Kerry described the political object with Syria as "to deter, disrupt, prevent, and degrade the potential for, future uses of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction" by the Assad regime in Syria. The Obama administration has apparently convinced itself that a Desert Fox Part II action in Syria will produce the desired result, apparently ignoring that Desert Fox was in part what led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I do not know any serious expert who believes the Obama administrations military approach to Syria will achieve a positive political object for the US.

The Obama administrations national security leadership, in Congressional testimony, is promoting a delusion regarding the act of war, and is incapable of admitting they are about to start a war. Most troubling, they are intentionally dismissing consequences and the gravity of such action under the assumption that military superiority translates to strategic success. The United States does not have a strategy that political leaders can articulate publicly on Syria, nor is the Obama administrations national security leadership publicly seeking meaningful military objectives of consequence to conditions in Syria. The United States does not have a coalition of support to provide legitimacy for military action, a coalition that protects the US from escalation or retaliation. John Kerry, in front of Congress, described those who believe it unwise for the US to inject our nation into another nations civil war uninvited, as armchair isolationists. No one knew for certain the intelligence cited by Colin Powell was wrong in 2003. Every human being educated on the definition of war knows John Kerry is wrong in 2013, and no one credible on the topic of war will ever be able to argue otherwise.

The arrogance of the Obama administration's national security team is a parade of red flags right through the halls of Congress. Secretary Kerry actually argues that if Assad is "arrogant" enough to defend himself that the US and our allies have ways to make him regret that decision, apparently without going to war. The arrogance of John Kerry implies the question to Congress, what could possibly go wrong? With no political policy or strategy that can be articulated publicly, no military objective of consequence, no coalition of consequence or authority, and by taking action that injects our nation into another nations civil war uninvited - my question is, how does this possibly end well?

The Obama administration is taking greater risk with Syria than their calculations suggest, and I truly believe the potential for a significant strategic defeat like nothing seen in at least a century is greater than the potential for success. The entire gambit by the Obama administration rests upon the starting assumption that Syria will do nothing and give the Obama administration exactly what they want. The other starting assumption is that Iran won't get involved or their involvement will be inconsequencial to our political objective. The problem with the first assumption is that John Kerry all but admitted in testimony over two days that while military strikes are not intended to achieve regime change, US policy is to build a working relationship over time with rebels for the intent of regime change. The problem with the second assumption is that Iran historically gets involved, and the chaos they created for Israel in 2006 and the chaos Iran created in Iraq and Afghanistan last decade was extremely effective in countering US political objectives. The starting assumption should be Assad will resist, because he should be well aware long term US policy is regime change, and that Iran will not only get involved but has a history of doing so successfully.


If the Obama administration takes authorization from Congress and moves directly towards military action against Syria, the lack of a coalition is a significant condition that increases the strategic risk to the United States. Iran and Syria will recognize that this may be the only opportunity they will ever have to take on the United States without a broader coalition of support, and as such see this as their best opportunity to strike. In stepping through Red Team's calculations, consider how exposed the US truly is.

1) The United States has no coalition, so a targeted, direct strike against the United States in "self defense" significantly limits the degree to which the international community will respond in support of the US. The UK vote highlights that politically, the rest of the world does not stand with a belligerent United States in a unilateral military action.

2) The United States is strategically and politically exposed and military forces throughout the region are spread thin. There are no troops in Iraq. Sequestration has significantly degraded the capacity of the US military across the entire Department of Defense towards fielding an effective reserve. Political cover by Russia and China will be available to Syria after the the US attacks.

3) Military objectives by Blue Team are not well defined, while military objectives by Red Team are well defined. All evidence suggests the leadership of the United States does not take seriously the threat of counterstrike. Russia has openly stated they will provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to help Syria, and that presumably would also be for support of military action in counterstrike.

4) Successful counterstrike against the United States will be celebrated regionally, resulting in significant restrictions of movement within the region by US military forces and a collapse of US political credibility broadly. Local pressure can be exploited by red team on regional military installations to restrict movement of US assets in the region.

When I take the red team perspective of action unfolding in the Middle East, if I am Iran and Syria supported by Russia, my calculation is that I may never have a better opportunity to change the regional security conditions and balance of power in the Middle East than the opportunity being presented in this situation unfolding. By throwing every military asset possible in attack of the surface action group of 4 destroyers in the Mederterranian Sea, and throwing the entire armed forces of Iran against the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group off the coast of Pakistan, the entire US policy for the Middle East would be dead in the water if Iran and Syrian attacks were to be successful. As red team, I would attack these targets specifically because they are sovereign US targets and don't inherently escalate tensions by giving any other nation a reason to join in.

Oh, you honestly believe - like John Kerry does - that the US would muster the military and muster allies around the world, and would start World War III in response to a tactical defeat at sea? Think again. The simple fact is the world would immediately stand in shock, and there is no evidence anywhere suggesting the Obama administration handles pressure well. The Middle East would explode in celebration of a public US tactical defeat, leaving the Nimitz Strike Group south of the Suez unable to cross north to help. Hu Jinping would shit a Great Wall when facing the possibility of a major war across the sea lines of communication throughout the Middle East, and would be with Russia in the UNSC within 24 hours shouting for a cease fire. Iran would immediately make clear that with the first sign of a US counterattack against Iran, Iran would unload their ballistic missiles into US bases across Afghanistan and potentially leverage other resources to broaden the conflict regionally.

Is Europe going to seriously come to the aid of a belligerent US who got smacked for attacking another nation without a coalition, any legitimate alliance, or a UNSC resolution? The NATO alliance clause doesn't protect the US under the scenario unfolding in Syria. Remember, gas prices across the world will triple - or more, in the first 24 hours on the threat of escalation, so the gravity of the situation will hit the wallet of an happy American population as well.  Where is the support for the US coming from? If you think the US has a reserve force ready to deploy in the US, you don't understand the impact of sequestration on the US military at all. It would take the US weeks, and in some cases months, to mobilize military forces in response to a major escalation. Does anyone honestly believe Asian nations are going to rise up and help the US after our military adventurism that went wrong? If the US Navy takes attrition across the Middle East and the Med, how does one think France - our only real coalition partner right now - will react? When bad ideas lead to things going badly, people don't take great risk in support of the foolish losers.

This isn't some impossible scenario, Syria does have the military capability to defeat 1 surface action group of 4 destroyers if committed to that tactical action, and Iran does have the capability to destroy a single Carrier Strike Group in a surprise attack less than 300 miles off the coast of Iran.

A successful counterstrike leaves the US with no one to turn to except Israel, whose assistance could send the entire region into chaos.

So if I am red team, if Obama goes from Congress directly to war, I attack. The Obama administration is playing a game of checkers, and it is impossible to suggest the absence of policy, strategy, objective, and coalition by the Obama administration is akin to a game of chess. If the enemy plays chess in response, we're screwed. At that point it would come down to US military forces winning tactical battles despite bad strategy to avoid humiliating strategic defeat, which honestly somewhat describes US policy for the last decade across the Middle East.

The Obama administration needs to go from Congress directly to the United Nations Security Council, and not directly to war. The Obama administration needs to build an international coalition to protect the United States from blowback, because without a coalition the US is strategically exposed giving a rare opportunity to Iran to take advantage of our isolation. With the worlds attention focused on Syria regarding chemical weapons, Syria is effectively deterred from using chemical weapons right now while the diplomatic process unfolds. The United States is effectively implementing the political object as laid out by John Kerry before Congress as long as the world's attention on Syria chemical weapons remains evident, so nothing is lost by the US committing to the long road of diplomacy as long as it is public and actively engaged.

Choosing War

Johnson, McNamara and Rusk

Obama, Rice, and Power

Logevall's Choosing War

Today’s news would seem to point to a Congressional shift in favor of supporting President Obama’s request for nation’s legislative branch to sanction military action against Syria. The President has gone to great lengths to state that operations against Syria would not be like those undertaken against Afghanistan or Iraq, and that they would not involve the commitment of American ground forces. In this assessment Obama is correct. His drift toward military action in Syria does not resemble recent conflicts but instead is eerily similar to President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s choice of war in Vietnam in the period from the beginning of 1964 through the March 1965 deployment of the first U.S. combat troops. A short analysis of the similar Johnson and Obama reactions to potential conflict abroad should tell lawmakers that inaction in Syria need not harm wider U.S. interests. Avoiding direct military involvement would in fact give the U.S. more flexibility and international credibility in dealing with the Syrian civil war.

     Lyndon Johnson was not interested in waging a war in Southeast Asia. In fact, he was desperate to avoid a conflict that might compete with the funding requirements for his expansive domestic agenda. His national security team, primarily composed of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly urged or at least did not dissuade the President from pursuing an aggressive stand against North Vietnam. These advisors were concerned that if the U.S. did not respond to North Vietnamese aggression, the nation would lose credibility in its dealings with the Soviet Union, China and other communist threats. Johnson was concerned about his own credibility as a national security leader and did not want to be perceived as soft on communist aggression. The U.S. public was supportive of military action to deter communist aggression, but close NATO allies like Great Britain and France were unconvinced that military action was the best solution to the Vietnamese civil war. Ultimately, largely for reasons dealing with his own credibility vice that of the nation, Johnson chose to fight a war he did not want that eventually cost 58000 Americans their  lives. The Swedish historian Frederik Logevall details this active “choice” of war in his 1999 book Choosing War. Johnson’s own credibility as a foreign and domestic policy leader, rather than actual national interest was in Logevall’s opinion the tipping point for what became a long, costly and ultimately a failed attempt to control the political situation in Vietnam.

     The march toward war in Syria is similar to Lyndon Johnson’s dilemma with Vietnam. President Obama, like Johnson is more committed to domestic rather than foreign policy efforts. His national security team of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, National Security Advisor Susan Rice, Secretary of State John Kerry and United Nations Ambassador Samantha Power also seem to either be at best not hindering or at worst propelling the President toward war as Johnson’s advisors did. The President’s declarations of a “red line” involving Syrian use of chemical weapons have made the issue of his administration’s credibility, rather than that of the nation on the whole at stake in whether or not to join hostilities. As in the mid 1960s, many close U.S. friends and allies are wary of direct military involvement in the Syrian Civil War without a defined end state. Potential adversaries/competitors like Russia, China and Iran have the potential to exploit unilateral U.S. involvement in the Syrian civil war in many of the same ways the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea exploited the U.S. situation in Vietnam. Ultimately U.S. resolve in Vietnam led to the worst defeat for U.S. interests in the Cold War, not so much from the physical loss of South Vietnam, but instead from all of the rather undemocratic tools and methods the U.S. was increasingly forced to employ in order to defeat communist insurgents and North Vietnamese forces. Despite defeat in Vietnam, the U.S. ultimately salvaged much of its reputation as a defender of democratic principles. The U.S. example of democratic government rather than its direct military success was a significant determining factor in winning the Cold War. Today even Vietnam seeks U.S. friendship and could even be an ally against Chinese expansion and aggression in the Pacific.

     President Obama and U.S. legislators would do well to consider the lessons of both Vietnam and the more recent war in Iraq before embarking on a slow slide toward direct involvement in Syria. President George W. Bush was pilloried at home and abroad for the 2003 invasion and subsequent long war in Iraq, but unlike Johnson, Bush entered war with a concern for national and not personal interests, and an exit strategy of a free and democratic Iraq. When methods in use could not produce U.S. success in suppressing Iraqi insurgents, he was willing to radically change the nature of U.S. involvement including large infusions of troops in the 2007 “Iraqi Surge”. President Bush also had greater U.S. financial resources to use in the Iraq conflict. Long years of war and budget shortages make a similar big effort in Syria much more difficult.

     In summation, personal credibility is a poor starting part for convincing a democracy to join a civil war. The U.S. can better preserve its own interests and those of the peoples of the Middle East by remaining clear of direct military involvement. Civil wars are almost always more violent and destructive then traditional wars. Nothing however unites opponents in a civil war better than the intervention of an outside force, particularly that of the world’s most powerful military state. Humanitarian aid, continued involvement with United Nations efforts, and perhaps hosting a Syrian government in exile which could be carefully observed and vetted to ensure its democratic bona fides would allow the U.S. to retain its impartiality and improve its chances for success in ensuring a favorable outcome. As long as the Syrian regime is not directly threatening U.S. friends in the region as Saddam Hussein once did, or terrorist elements do not take over the Syrian state, there is no compelling strategic reason for the U.S. to become militarily involved. More likely, U.S. direct involvement will result in another broken “pottery barn” state for the U.S. to rebuild. U.S. lawmakers should reject calls for direct military involvement in the Syrian civil war. We cannot afford another long drawn-out war and unlike more recent conflicts in Afghanistan or Iraq, there is as of yet no U.S. strategic need for direct action.

The Miltary and Politics

The rise of social media has created numerous ways for service members to speak out, many of which are healthy and laudable, some of which are scurrilous and contemptible.  There has been a rash of the latter recently, as service members have been posting photos in which they hold signs over their faces (while in full uniform) stating their rejection of whatever it is the President is planning to do in Syria and their resolution not to participate.

Putting aside for the moment the unlikelihood that many of them would actually defy authority and not fight, the false bravado of publicly airing one's (anonymous, uniformed) views is not healthy for our Republic.

Nearly fifteen years ago, I was a young LCDR at the Pentagon, serving as Speechwriter to the CNO.  In the morning paper was an Op-Ed by a then Major in the US Marine Corps Reserves, entitled "Please Impeach My Commander-in-Chief".  While contributors rarely pick their own headlines, the body of the piece confirmed the malice of the title.  Below is the verbatim text of my reply, which I believe remains true today.  Note:  I am unable to find the original Op-Ed that this is written to address:
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          When the American people say their prayers at night or when they take the time to reflect upon the many advantages they enjoy as a birthright, protection from a politicized military is probably not on their minds -- and with good reason. Military aloofness from the political milieu -- based on tradition and regulation -- is one of the fundamental contributions the military makes to maintaining the critical covenant of trust that exists between it and the people it serves. When men and women in uniform publicly air their political viewpoints, it is more than just a violation of service regulations; it is a threat to the very fabric of this covenant. Without the trust of the American people, the military will lose its way and may ultimately become a threat to the way of life that it is designed to protect.

. . . . The last 50 years notwithstanding, the American Republic has demonstrated an historic discomfort with large standing armies. The pre-Revolution experience with quartering British troops left a bad taste in the mouths of the framers, and this unease manifests itself in several basic constitutional ways. The president was invested with the power of the commander in chief both to facilitate emergency response and to codify civilian control of the military. By placing the war-declaring function in the Congress, the framers sought to ensure that the decision to fight would represent the will of the people, and not the military or even its commander in chief. Finally, the Constitution prohibits military appropriations in excess of two years, a move specifically designed to frustrate the growth of a military establishment.

. . . . For 150 years, a cycle of mobilization and demobilization was sufficient to suit the security needs of the United States. Yet, the emergence of this country as a superpower and the global security requirements of the Cold War left us with little choice but to maintain a large, peacetime military. Consequently, military political neutrality came to represent not some quaint vestige of a day gone by, but an absolute necessity for the national support such a military would need for its maintenance.

. . . . The tacit agreement into which the American people entered states that they will do what is necessary to provide for a military second to none, all the time knowing that should that military develop a political agenda of its own, no force could oppose it. The American people trust their military not to assert itself in the political process because they know that if the military did get involved, this country would cease to exist as we know it. Neutrality is the military's end of the bargain.

. . . . This is why articles such as Maj. Daniel J. Rabil's are so damaging. That he holds strident political opinions is irrefutable; that he can lawfully air them remains to be seen; that he has crossed the line into an area of dangerous conduct is without question. By publicly calling for impeachment of the president, he has injected himself -- not as a private citizen, but as a United States Marine -- into the political process.

. . . . What if such conduct were to become the norm? What if the military were to follow Maj. Rabil's prescribed course and simply ignore the orders and directives of its civilian leadership? The answer is a military junta, and the answer is anarchy. What if the Congress decides not to impeach the president? What would Maj. Rabil have us do then -- ignore both the Congress and the executive because neither would uphold his personal political values?

. . . . Military service does not disqualify one from participation in the political process. In fact, the Department of Defense is aggressive in seeing to it that its members and their families have every opportunity to register and vote, irrespective of the unit's location or operational tasking. Service members are also guaranteed the right to correspond with their elected representatives without reprisal, and often do so to report situations that they deem unfair, unsafe or contrary to good order and discipline. A service member's decision to air his opinions is not the issue; each member has every right to convey his or her views to our representatives on Capitol Hill. The mistake is in airing them publicly. In doing so, service members bring discredit upon the entire military.

. . . . The American public places considerable trust in its armed services; survey after survey reveals this truth, and it is something of which the military should be both justifiably proud and zealously protective. Essays such as Maj. Rabil's are detrimental to this relationship, and service members should view with grave concern these threats to our place in the public's confidence.
Bryan McGrath

PLAN nuclear submarine development

As we see new Chinese warships come out, there is always the inevitable question of how capable are these new hardware. We can make assessments based on pictures we see and reports that we read. Nothing is harder to assess than nuclear submarines. We don’t get many pictures of them. We don’t know about the capabilities of sonar, torpedoes, combat system or the crew. And most importantly, parameters such as acoustic signature, maximum speed and depth are completely confidential. I have to rely on talking to folks who are much smarter than me on these issues, because I certainly don’t have the data or submarine background to do more than guess these things.

We know that the first 2 Type 093s were launched around 2002/3 and joined service in 2006. PLAN followers saw pictures of Type 093 coming out at that time and made optimistic assessment regarding follow-on units along with talks of Type 095 class. Most of us guessed that Type 093 was at or better than Victor III in acoustic performance (based on 1996 ONI assessment) and that Type 095 would be close to Akula I in performance. The interesting part is that PLAN stopped building Type 093s despite speculations and pictures of what appears to be new Type 093 submarines out of Huludao shipyard. Type 091s were upgraded and continued to be actively used. At the same time, a 2009 ONI study came out with chart indicating that they believe Type 093 to be louder than Victor III class and not that much quieter than Type 091. This chart caused a lot of anger online on Chinese military forums. Looking back, we can also see DoD reports of greater number of Chinese submarine patrols after 2006 along with comments from US naval services that they are able to track PLAN submarines at long range. If we combine this with the sudden stop of Type 093 construction, it would seem to indicate that Type 093 did not achieve the intended goals (of Victor III class?) in terms of noise level. At the same time, due to the greater reliability in reactor technology and improved sonar/combat system, these Type 093s and upgraded Type 091s were probably making a lot more extended patrols. I would imagine they get picked up as soon as they leave the naval base. Or else, DoD would not have such precise numbers of PLAN patrols. Certainly, Song and Yuan class have also been going out to sea for exercises, but they do not really have the endurance and would probably also expose themselves if they go too far out.

Based on everything I see, it seems like Type 093 had more reliable propulsion unit, but also a noisier one due to the need to generate greater power for a slightly larger submarine, more power sonar and higher speed/maneuvering requirements. Since the space for Type 093 probably did not increase that much inside pressure hull, they did not have much additional space for more noise insulation. At end of last year, we saw what appears to be a new type of attack sub coming out. Satellite pictures from Huludao earlier this year showed a new attack submarine and a new Type 094. This submarine was labeled as Improved Type 093 on Chinese forums. According to the latest report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China began building first of 4 improved 093 SSN in 2012. This improved Type 093 looks on the satellite photo to be slightly shorter and wider than the original Type 093. From the overheard satellite photos, it looks like this new submarine has a “hump” (like the one on kilo & Yuan) and a possible TAS installation on the tail. I would imagine the new submarines would have more space across for passive noise reduction technology, newer active noise reduction technology as well as newer generation of nuclear reactor. With the improvement in China’s civilian nuclear technology from the late 90s to mid 2000s, it is possible the newer reactor would be a lot quieter than the ones on the first two Type 093s.

This new attack submarine has now gone on sea trials. It is probably not considered Type 095, because a brand new class of attack submarine would probably have larger dimensions for more power nuclear reactor and associated propulsion gears along with more space for missile installation, sonar, living space and noise insulation. Everything I’m throwing out here is speculations. Up to now, PLAN hasn’t been able to develop a “quiet” attack submarine. USSR made a really big leap in Victor-III class (especially the later units). With lessons from the first 2 Type 093s, improved construction techniques along with other possible improvements, it’s possible that the improved Type 093 could make that leap (later Victor III units). Only time will tell where PLAN intends the performance of this improved Type 093 to be and if they will match the expected performance.

The same US-China Economic and Security Review Commission report also stated that China is continuing to build Type 094 while developing Type095 and Type 096. From past satellite photos, it looks like China launched its 4th Type 094 this year. There is at least one 094 at Sanya naval base and another at Jianggezhuang. The third one has moved around a bit, but the most recent photo from Huludao show two 094 at the piers. That could either be the 3rd and 4th or maybe a fifth one has launched. Although, I think the former case is more likely. The latest Type 094 seems to have its sail and missile installation shifted forward compared to the earlier Type 094s, but its overall dimension or the number of missile hatches did not seem to change. Compared to Type 093, I think type 094 is considered more or less successful by PLAN. The ONI charts indicated Type 094 to be quieter than Type 093 and the production of Type 094 didn’t stop for the same period as Type 093. I think PLAN is satisfied that it has a reliable second strike platform even if it is kind of loud.

As for Type 095, I think we are likely to see the lead unit of this class launched while the improved Type 093 is still under production. It is customary for PLAN to mass produce an earlier class while testing out the first unit of a new series. For example, Type 039 was still in production when the first Type 039A was launched. That would probably but the launching of first Type 095 toward the end of this decade. Type 096 would most likely come after that.