Saturday, January 11, 2024

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board















Friday, January 3, 2025

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board















Some thoughts regarding "China Threat"

Recently, I've noticed that there is a lot of concerns amongst American readers and my fellow bloggers regarding the so called "China Threat". Much of this is due to China's activities and forceful actions in South China Sea in addition to recent ADIZ announcement. I've even seen articles about whether or not conflict with China is inevitable. I think it's important to address why recent events have happened and why the entire "China Threat" is overblown.

First of all, the question is whether or not the military capabilities exist at current time for China to actually pose threat to America. The answer at the moment is no. Both the Chinese navy and air force have improved a lot in the recent years as they have received a lot of improved hardware, but they are still a generation or more behind USAF and USN on most areas of military hardware. On top of that, they are just starting to develop new doctrines in the modern warfare and the usage of modern weapon systems. It will take years to really get up to speed in these areas. Especially when they don't get to interact closely with other military forces around the world due to American pressure. On top of that, they also need to improve their training methodology in order to really be able to effectively use these new platforms. The most China can hope for in the next 15 years is to develop enough capabilities that can be employed in nearby theatre that it can deter or neutralize possible USN and USAF intervention in any nearby conflicts. Regardless of what you read elsewhere, this is the balance of power facing the decision makers in Beijing.

After we move past the capabilities part, the next situation is why would China want to push neighbours around if it cannot achieve its objectives militarily in any conflict with US interventions. In the case of Japan, it won't be able to achieve its objectives even if not facing US inventions. In order to answer that, one needs to look at the largest threats to the Chinese leadership. Anyone that lives in China for a while can tell you the biggest problems facing China today are pollution and corruption. Both of these issues are directly related to the current rule of law in China. The average folk can tolerate lack of free election and some unfairness in the society, but they have trouble dealing with choking pollution that is destroying their family's heath. For all of the progress made in China in the past 30 years, pollution is an issue that no one can get away with regardless of how wealthy or privileged they may be. Scarily enough, this is only getting worse. Back in 2006 when I visited China, I thought pollution and corruption are equally serious problems in ordinary people's lives. But with the choking pollution that I endured in my two week visit in 2013, I see a problem that no one in the country can ignore regardless of how apathetic toward politics they are. Every country's politicians try to divert public opinions on pressing issues by focusing them on something else. What does the Chinese leadership do? They use patriotism and economic growth to divert public from getting angry at the government about pollution and corruption. Outside of the unveiling of major ticket items like CV-16 Liaoning aircraft carrier, J-20 and J-31, there is nothing that unite the public as much as a query with the old enemy Japan. When I was in China, the two main types of major news discussions were on how it is unsafe to go outside and Japan related stuff. You can guess which type of news the Chinese leadership would rather see on TV. That's not to say the leadership in Beijing have a better solution. Most of the local government neglect environmental protection and local debts in order to solve the employment problem and get economic growth in the short term, so that they can get promoted. Corruption is pervasive in every level of society. Since the task of maintaining economic growth and finding employment are becoming ever more difficult in the face of a mountain of local debt and economic excesses that are in desperate need of rebalancing after 30+ years of continual growth, the Chinese leadership really face a very tough job of trying to keep the population happy.

It's pretty clear why Chinese leadership picked these countries as their target. I think most people in China who are 25 years or older have heard of someone around them who were either killed or tortured by Japanese soldiers in WWII. The anger against recent Japanese regimes denials are real and deserved. Even today, Japanese businesses are not allowed within the city of Nanjing due to what happened in WWII. There is a lot of desires within China "to teach little Japan a lesson" for not just what is going with Diaoyu/Senkaku islands but also for what happened in the past. The Chinese public is increasingly confident about China's power around the world. It feels that it should be able to dictate what happens in its backyard like the influence that America has over the Western hemisphere. Now there are many Americans (especially the power brokers) who believe that America needs to be able to dictate all around the world and supports its allies all around the world. Why should China accept that? At some point in the next 30 years, China will probably have a larger economy than America. While its military spending will probably be less, I think it's quite reasonable to assume that it will have second strongest military in the world. The Chinese government is simply feeding into this public enthusiasm to dominate the power balance in South China Sea and East China Sea. In reality, very few people in China (the selected nut cases that exist in every country) want to have a conflict, because that would be devastating for the Chinese economy. There are too many problems facing your average Chinese family for any reasonable person to want more than chatters about a conflict with Japan or Vietnam or Philippines.

If we are to objectively look at threats around China, India would be a far more serious threat. Even though Japan still has a very large economy and strong military, it is a declining in power and will continue to do so. Its debt is great than 200% of its GDP and growing at a very fast pace. Despite the declining Yen, trade balance really have not changed in Japan's favour and it will have to continue to import a lot of natural resources in the future since it does not have any. Worst of all, Japan's demographics is becoming a huge problem since young people are not getting married and having kids. On the other hand, India is only going to continue to grow and become more powerful in the next 30 years. At some point, it will become the third largest economy in the world and compete for the same natural resources that China would like to access. Worst of all to China, it can also disrupt China's trade and energy routes from middle east and Africa. At some point, China would like to have a strong enough navy to defend its trade routes in Indian Ocean against possible threats from India. So, why doesn't Chinese leadership focus on India than Japan? The general Chinese media portrayal of India is one of comedy about the various social, economical and transportation problems in the country. It found the one country in the world that is experiencing even more problems in its growth than China. Because India is looked at comically while Japan is looked at with much anger by the Chinese public, it's quite clear why China is directing far more of its energy toward Japan than India.

So, I think it's important not to overly drum up the so called "China Threat". There are areas of competition between China and America, but much of what is going in China can be explained away if we look rationally at the dynamics of the Chinese society. The worst thing we can do is to not try to understand why another country makes the decisions that it does.

Thursday, January 2, 2025

UAV and JSF

I have another piece on the the future of the F-35 at the Diplomat, one that I think gets to some of the issues brought up in this (excellent) thread:
The question of how UAVs will contribute to air superiority goes to the core of the utility not just of the UCLASS, but also of the F-35C.  If we envision the JSF as the centerpiece of a networked system-of-systems that includes subsurface, surface, and unmanned aerial assets, part of a chain of capabilities between see-er and shooter, it begins to look like a much more formidable weapon, its drawbacks as a fighter notwithstanding.
A bit more on my own views; as my National Interest article suggested, I think we're beyond the point that the F-35 can be "killed" in any meaningful sense. I also think it's going to be a while before we have sufficient perspective to think through how disastrous the program has been.

Tuesday, December 31, 2024

HASC Seapower Chairman and ID Contributor on the Marine Corps

Representative Randy Forbes (R-VA) and I have an Op-Ed at the San Diego Union Tribune site on the centrality of a strong Marine Corps to American Seapower. The text is below:

Marines’ role cannot be shortchanged

Guest perspective: Corps must be placed squarely within rubric of U.S. sea power


As we continue to plunge headlong into shortsighted military unpreparedness driven by a strong case of strategic blindness, fiscal uncertainty and political timidity, it is worth considering the critical role played by the U.S. Marine Corps in protecting and sustaining national interests far from our shores.
In order to do so properly, the Marine Corps must be placed squarely within the rubric of American sea power, the most flexible, ready and present component of U.S. military power. Alongside the other elements of American sea power — the dominant surface and submarine forces, and the world’s most mobile and lethal form of air power (carrier aviation) — the Marines represent a middleweight land force designed to project land power from the sea.
The Marine Corps is not a second land army, although its employment since 2001 has caused it to be viewed like one. Marine leaders have been rightfully vocal about the naval roots of their service in recent years, and it is this aspect of its existence that guarantees the continuing relevance — no, the criticality — of the Marine Corps.
We believe that in light of the drawdown from the land wars of the past decade and in order to implement President Barack Obama’s “rebalance” toward Asia-Pacific, the importance of American sea power in the guise of the Navy-Marine Corps team will only increase. Geography may not be destiny, but it certainly helps define strategy.
The United States is thousands of miles across the Pacific Ocean from five treaty partners and a considerable mass of American national interest. The appetite for permanently garrisoned forces in the region seems to be on the wane, even as friends and allies look to the United States for assurance against destabilizing and persistent Chinese actions.
If we hope to remain a Pacific power with the ability to assure friends, deter threats and preserve access to the global commons that tie our economies together, the logic proceeds that we will need to rely more heavily on the Navy-Marine Corps team for sea-based power projection.
It is difficult to think of a future crisis in East Asia that would lack a critical role for the Marine Corps. While the Pacific Theater is maritime in nature, there is a considerable amount of land that retains strategic value, some of which is under the sovereignty of nations with whom we have mutual defense treaties.
A desire to avoid “land wars in Asia” should not blind us to the reality that in order to protect our interests, we may very well have to conduct “land operations” throughout East Asia and Oceania.
For instance, small islands throughout the First Island Chain (the Japan-Taiwan-Philippines archipelago) could become a mechanism for either China or the United States and its allies to contest the local sea by controlling the land. Such operations are the natural purview of a force designed for amphibious employment, and that force is the Marine Corps.
To be prepared, we must take the following actions:
• We must build more ships. Specifically, we must build more amphibious ships.

The Marine Corps has a war-fighting requirement for 38 amphibious ships, while the geographic combatant commanders’ peacetime presence requirement is similar. Neither is met by the nation’s current shipbuilding plan, which provides for about 30 until well into the next decade and eventually 33.
The utility of these ships is apparent, providing for transport and power projection in time of war and crisis, and disaster response capability in peacetime. However, there is at least a $4 billion average annual gap in funding for the Navy’s planned shipbuilding budget in the decades ahead. But filling this gap and resourcing the current shipbuilding plan does not require a large shift in Defense Department resources, according to Ron O’Rourke of the Congressional Research Service, but instead just 1.1 percent to 1.5 percent more of the department’s current average annual budget.
•  The Navy and Marine Corps must become more integrated. Forward-deployed American sea power is poised to provide for a “bubble” of diplomacy, influence and power of a definable range, within which naval forces execute multidomain dominance.
This is not a war-winning force, and it does not operate without critical support from the Joint Force. It is, however, powerful, flexible, mobile and fully integrated, capable of providing continuous conventional deterrence and crisis response to the vast majority of cases in which military power might be called upon.
Command and control stovepipes within the task organizations of the Navy and Marine Corps must be dismantled, with a common command structure implemented that sees the land power of the Marine Corps as one of its several primary tools. With the fielding of the VSTOL variant of the F-35B, Marine tactical aviation must necessarily evolve from its singular focus on ground support to a broader mission in support of the Seapower Task Force.
The Department of the Navy should consider a variant of the littoral combat ship in which a detachment of Marines provides for maritime security missions while Marine attack helicopters neutralize targets at sea and ashore. The bottom line is that the Marine Corps must fully return to its roots and provide this nation with flexible combat power from the sea.
• We must properly size the Marine Corps. Pressures to draw down the force as a result of defense sequestration cuts should not exert undue influence on the size of the Marine Corps, which must be maintained as America’s force in readiness. The nation can and should provide for a Marine Corps at a minimum 180,000 Marines.
While no one can predict the future with clarity, one must make informed choices about future trends in order to manage current resources. Some call this strategy. We see a limited appetite among the American people for the occupation and administration of foreign lands, even as we understand the desire of the American people to remain powerful and influential wherever our interests lie.
The U.S. Marine Corps, operating as a critical component of forward-deployed American sea power, will play an increasingly important role in ensuring Americans that we can and will carry out their expectations.
Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., is chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee. He is co-leading a bipartisan Asia-Pacific Oversight Series for the House Armed Services Committee.  Bryan McGrath is assistant director of the Hudson Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute, and is managing director of the FerryBridge Group.