The U.S. Navy is soon to release its update to the 2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”. One would hope that history and geography play substantial roles in formulating this document. The long-range strategic interests of the United States have been relatively unchanged in many ways since the end of the Second World War. The Navy has always been the principal service protector of these interests and senior naval officers should be vocal in explaining this to civilian leaders. The service can accomplish this task by ensuring that these three specific concepts are strongly reflected in its latest strategy update.
Preserve the Post World War 2 Economic System
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US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau jr.
with John Maynard Keynes at Bretton Woods1944
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The
Second World War destroyed many old patterns of great power politics and
replaced them with a truly “new world order.” These changes were embodied in
the package of postwar economic structures and regulatory agencies collectively
known as the “Bretton Woods System”. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
other currency and finance regulatory measures exemplified the concepts of free
trade, lower national tariffs, and moderate government interventions in
economic affairs as advocated by the British economist John Maynard Keynes.
Together this globalized financial regulatory effort would identify and be able
to mitigate financial catastrophes like the Great Depression before they could
lead to widespread economic chaos and breed future insidious dictators like
Adolf Hitler, whose fascist movement rose to power in large part due to
Germany’s dire economic distress caused by the financial depression. There have been many changes to this system since the
late 1940’s. Floating currency values, inflation of the U.S. dollar, and shocks
caused by rapid increases in international oil prices caused significant
changes in the postwar economic construct. Nations devastated by the Second
World War have rejoined the global economic community as powerful contributors;
the U.S. is no longer the absolute dominant force in global economics as it was
in the Cold War; and new members of the global market such as China, India,
Russia, and Brazil have made their presence felt in international economic
planning. Despite these changes, the roots of the system in the support of free
trade are alive and doing very well. Advances in technology, especially in the
electronic movement of currency and financial resources have made the system
more profitable than in the past. As its manufacturing system has declined and
diversified, the U.S. has become dependent on the postwar international system
for its financial security. It is the true “center of gravity” of the United
States. The protection of this system should be the principle U.S. strategic
goal.
Defend the Global Commons
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| Guarding the global commons has long been a USN mission |
Maintain the Ability to Strike "From the Sea"
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| Robert Strausz-Hupe |
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| Operation Tomodachi aid |
The
last element of national strategy is preserving the ability to strike as
necessary from secure maritime locations to more remote inland areas as
required in defense of the international economic order and its commercial
lines of communication. The distinguished Austrian-born U.S. diplomat and
geopolitical theorist Robert Strausz-Hupe from the University of Pennsylvania
stated, “one cannot argue with geography.” Seapower has always been based the
exploitation of geographic advantages.
Sufficient expeditionary ground forces are needed to accomplish tasks in
securing those Eurasian and other territories adjacent to the sea. Geopolitical
analysts such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Jacob Spykman, and Sir Halford Makinder
all concurred that control of this “rimland” area (Spykman’s term), was vital
to the continued freedom of trade in the maritime world. Naval forces made
possible rapid access to remote coastal areas. The British Navy incorporated
this movement into its doctrine in the 19th and early 20th
century to the point that iconoclast British Admiral Sir John Fisher referred
to the British Army as a “projectile” to be “fired” by the Royal Navy in
support of British strategic interests. Much of the geopolitical theory involved in the conduct of both World
War 2 and the Cold War revolved around preventing hostile “continental” land
powers such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and heretical maritime states
like Imperial Japan from gaining access to and subverting the free flow of maritime
trade. In the absence of large aggressive continental powers, the ability to
move “from the sea”, also has the ability to prevent violence and restore order
to sections of the global economic system damaged by natural or man-made
disasters. The U.S. Navy’s ability to mount relief operations such as the
“Operational Tomodachi” effort in the wake of the Japanese Fukushima reactor
accident, and more recent aid to the Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan
represent this sea-based capability.
The U.S. Navy has played a significant part in the
achievement of each of these three elements of U.S. national security. Any new
Navy strategy must support these requirements. The Navy has many choices in
what future force structure it builds to support these strategic
components. Technological
advancements will make that force structure more powerful and budget cuts will
limit its ability to conduct its mission. That structure however must support
these strategic principles that have formed the foundation for U.S. national
security since the end of the Second World War. The U.S. Navy must consider
these strategic “building blocks” as the foundation for any new strategy it
pursues in order to support future national security needs.
