Tuesday, March 11, 2024

"Offshoring" the Flotilla Combatant


     
Pacific Patrol Boat operated by the Solomon Islands
Cuts in the total number of  littoral combat ships (LCS) to be purchased and the proposal for a new class of frigate would seem to indicate that the U.S. Navy is not interested in purchasing a large force of corvette-sized combatants. Despite this, it is not inconceivable that the U.S. might eventually be called on to provide either an offshore patrol or regional strike capability in littoral regions. If strategy dictates a stronger presence in littoral waters, why should the U.S. be the only provider of such forces when other solutions are present? The U.S. need not own the flotilla, but instead support and coordinate a U.S. built and trained small combatant force. Such an example of this concept has been successfully operated by the Australians for nearly 30 years in support of the archipelagic Pacific nations. The U.S. could adopt the Australian Pacific Patrol Boat Program to provide tailored small combatant forces to regions where such a capability is desired.

     The Australian government’s Pacific Patrol Boat has provided 22 patrol boats to 12 Pacific Island nations since the mid 1980s. Twenty two boats were delivered between 1987 and 1992 at an initial cost of 155.25 million Australian dollars. Continuing costs have been budgeted at 12.5 million Australian dollars per year, but fuel and operational costs has pushed this figure to 51 million in at least two years. A 350 million (Australian) dollar service life extension program will extend the service life of the boats to 2027.

Scope of the Australian-funded and support program
     These 100 foot craft have an endurance of 2500 nautical miles at 12 knots and can be configured for a variety of missions. They generally serve as offshore patrol vessels but can also mount small weapons up to and including a 20mm cannon. The Australian govt. provides most of the funds to build the ships, and train the crews, but they are operated and routinely maintained by the nations whose interests they serve. Australian naval observers often operate with these ships. This arrangement gives Australia a greater strategic presence in the South and Central Pacific at a very low cost compared with a deployment of Australian warships to the area.

     The U.S. could adopt a similar program to build littoral patrol/missile craft and train recipient-nation crews for service in West African, Middle Eastern, and Western Pacific waters. Individual flotillas could be tailored to the region/nations for which they are destined to serve. A West African flotilla vessel might look very much like the Australian Pacific Patrol boat, while a Western Pacific flotilla combatant might be much more heavily armed like the old Soviet-designed OSA missile boat, or the larger and more capable Ambassador MK III class that has been proposed as a U.S. flotilla combatant by New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) advocates. Proponents of small missile combatants suggest they could be built for U.S. service at 80 million U.S. dollars per copy.  A very simple flotilla combatant built to commercial standards for other nations might be constructed for even less, especially in purchased in large numbers.
OSA type missile combatant

     This program would bring navies from those nations receiving flotilla ships into closer contact with the U.S. Navy, and allow for sustained multilateral operations. Recipient- nation crews would be regionally knowledgeable and more effective than deploying U.S. Navy assets (large or small) in achieving success in littoral missions. Enduring, regular U.S. support to this mission could be regionally provided by an amphibious warfare ship outfitted as a station ship along the lines of those employed for Africa Partnership Station (APS). This unit would provide classroom, and repair, and support for flotilla combatants. It could be substantially crewed by Military Sealift Command CIVAMRS in a format similar to that of the experimental seabase USS Ponce in order to further reduce costs to the mission. Additional support might be provided by one or more Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) deployed in the role of “flotilla leader(s). LCS, with its extensive helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capability and communications/control systems might support and coordinate the activities of U.S. funded flotillas in the event of wartime operations. This capability could be regularly exercised through peacetime deployments and pay great dividends in combat at sea. Most importantly, the U.S. government would not have to pay the crews or many of the immediate operating costs of those vessels.
    
     There is no need to divert thousands of relatively expensive U.S. sailors to littoral missions when those who live and operate in the region can be enabled by the U.S. to conduct that mission. Creating Pacific, West African, and Middle Eastern flotilla groups tailored to the needs of and threats residing in each region can free U.S. to pursue the construction of globally-deployable ships necessary for its own unique strategic needs. The close association these flotillas would have with U.S. naval forces would make them a powerful tool in gathering regional intelligence in peacetime, and useful force multipliers in actual combat operations. A U.S. flotilla combatant program would obviously be significantly more expensive than its Australian counterpart. Such a formation however could still significantly augment U.S. regional engagement efforts and ought to be seriously considered as a means of delivering the benefits offered by the NNFM without its most significant costs in personnel, fuel, and regular maintenance.

Monday, March 10, 2024

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board


















Saturday, March 8, 2024

Midrats!

Tomorrow afternoon at 5pm EDT, I'll be chatting with Cdr Salamander and Eagle One on Midrats about Grounded. Highly recommended. Also, tomorrow morning you might be able to catch my interview with Rachel Martin on Weekend Edition, which is supposed to drop at about 815am in most markets.

Friday, March 7, 2024

J-20 Program Update

Prototype No. 2011 of the J-20 project had its maiden flight last weekend. As previously discussed, No. 2011 has significant changes to the previous J-20 prototypes that we've seen in flight testing (No. 2001 and No. 2002). There were probably 2 more prototypes similar to 2001/2002 for the purpose of static and RCS testing. It seems like 2001/2002 are more like the demonstrator prototypes whereas 2011 is the first pre-production prototype. It's likely that the production version of J-20 will not see any major differences unless major problems are found in testing. The pictures below show prototype 2001 vs prototype 2011 from different view point with Chinese labels on parts that changed in the first 2 pictures.




Generally speaking, CAC appears to have taken much greater care for the LO properties of No. 2011 compared to 2001/2002. Quite a bit of type elapsed from 2002 to 2011 and it looks like they really tried to address a lot of issues from RCS testing. The workmanship and fit/finishing of 2011 all appear to be better. Some of the more obvious changes include
  • Clipped corners on canard/v-tails
  • Redesign slender intakes with bump larger or protruding more
  • F-22-style light-grey colour scheme
  • Larger weapon bay and smaller wing actuators
  • Straightened leading edge
  • Inner canopy frame like F-35
  • Redesigned front landing gear door
  • New EOTS-like sensor and holographic HUD display
  • Redesigned rear fuselage around the engines and nozzles moved further in with longer tail sting.
It seems like more care is put into all-aspect stealth as the clipped canards has decreased returns from some angles and the ventral fins now seem to completely block engine nozzles from the sides. Looking at the inner edge of the canard, they are modified to conform nicely around intake so as to not create gaps.

Here is a good side view of the front part of the prototype.


Comparing to other 5th generation projects, I think PLAAF had a higher LO design requirement for J-20 than PAK-FA, while still trailing F-22/35. Compared to PAK-FA, it looks like everything conform to the body a lot better leaving fewer gaps and deflecting surfaces all around. Compared to F-22, it still has some areas like engine nozzle (which is covered by thrust vectoring plates on F-22) that are just not as well shielded even after the treatments. This is all from my extremely untrained eyes, so feel free to give me insights.

Project 310, China's other next-gen project, at this point still has not received official PLAAF designation. It looks to be in the flight demonstration stage and would probably need to become an offical PLAAF program before proceeding further to where J-20 is right now.

Thursday, March 6, 2024

Coercive Diplomacy

In 1914, concerned about the High Seas Fleet and worried that Turkey would join the Central Powers, the British government seized Sultan Osman I and Resadiye, a pair of dreadnoughts under construction in British yards. These battleships would become HMS Agincourt and HMS Erin, serving in the Grand Fleet until the end of World War I.
In 1980, out of concern about the direction of Iranian Revolution, the United States decided to void a sale of four advanced Spruance-class destroyers to Tehran. These destroyers became the Kidd class, serving in the USN with distinction until their eventual sale to Taiwan, where they remain in service.

And so this is certainly convenient timing:
A French-built helicopter carrier Vladivostok has set sail from the French Atlantic port of Saint-Nazaire on its first sea trial. The warship is part of a 1.2-billion-euro deal ($1.6-billion) that marked the biggest-ever sale of NATO weaponry to Moscow. The Vladivostok is on track to be delivered by the last quarter of this year, said spokesman Emmanuel Gaudez of DCNS, a state-backed naval shipbuilder manufacturing the warships along with South Korean-controlled shipbuilder STX. A sister ship, the Sevastopol is scheduled to be delivered about a year later. 
The two carriers will be delivered to the Russian Pacific Fleet in 2015 and 2016. Under the contract, France shall build each Mistral ship within 36 months. The first of them, the Vladivostok, is to arrive in St. Petersburg from Saint-Nazaire, France, in December 2014. The vessel will receive its additional Russian systems at the Severnaya Verf shipyard in St. Petersburg, and then be handed over to Russia’s Pacific Fleet in November 2014.
For various reasons, a suspension of delivery is unlikely to happen. The French are committed economically to the deal, which has supported French shipbuilding. However, as the first ship is nearly complete and the second well under way, some of the French stakeholders (primarily labor)have already been appeased. With the recent displays of Franco-US friendship, and of Franco-US cooperation in Africa, I have to wonder whether the French could be convinced to delay or suspend delivery as a response to the Russian conquest of Crimea. And especially given that the second ship is named Sevastopol, the optics of transferring LHAs to the Russian Navy right now are genuinely terrible.