Why SSC Evolution Portends a Further Decline in Fleet Numbers

Putting aside for a moment the new ship counting convention recently announced by the Secretary of the Navy, the decision in the 2015 President's Budget to cease contracts on the present version of the Small Surface Combatant (SSC) known as the LCS in favor of a more lethal and survivable SSC (from a clean sheet, an existing design, or an evolved LCS) to fulfill the Navy's 52 ship SSC requirement.will create additional pressure on already scarce shipbuilding funds, adding to an inevitable decline in Fleet size as the country turns increasingly to a Navy decreasingly prepared for the task. One only has to turn to the national asset that is CBO's Eric Labs and his analysis of the 2014 Shipbuilding Plan for the data to support this assertion. Specifically, this passage on Page 3:

"If the Navy receives the same amount of funding (in constant dollars) for new-ship construction in each of the next 30 years that it has on average over the past three decades, it will not be able to afford all of the purchases in the 2014 plan.4 CBO’s estimate of $19.3 billion per year for new-ship construction in the Navy’s 2014 shipbuilding plan is 38 percent above the historical average funding of $14.0 billion (see Figure 1). And CBO’s estimate of $21.2 billion per year for the full cost of the plan is 34 percent higher than the  $15.8 billion the Navy has spent on average per year for all items in its shipbuilding accounts over the past 30 years."

Put another way, if NOTHING had changed in the 2015 Budget (and its likely soon to be released by-product, the 30 year shipbuilding plan) the Navy's plan was underfunded by 1/3, given historical funding levels.  And because ships age and come out of service, Fleet numbers will decline because there are insufficient resources to replace them as fast as they leave service.  But NOTHING did not happen.  What did happen was that forty percent of the SSC requirement was directed to evolve into a more lethal and survivable platform, presumably as compared to the an LCS fitted with any one of the three mission modules (MCM, SUW, ASW).  Round number procurement cost of an LCS with a mission module comes in based on recent numbers in the neighborhood of $480M (this figure does not amortize R&D), and so this figure MUST BE ATTAINED by the follow-on SSC in order just to tread water in terms of fleet size--or more to the point, to decline at the rate that a Fleet underfunded by a third would have declined.  It strikes me as a difficult task indeed to move to a more lethal and survivable SSC while remaining under the $480M figure.  The next ship unit cost will be higher than that of an LCS plus its mission module, which means that unless shipbuilding resources are increased, fewer ships will be built.  This means either fewer of the upgunned SSC's, or fewer DDG's, SSN's, Amphibs, or Logistics ships--all of which are highly desired.

History major math is always dicey, so stay with me on this.  Let's estimate the unit cost of the evolved SSC at $750M, for a total of  $15B.  Purchase of the 20 LCS plus mission modules at $480M per copy would cost $9.6B, for a difference of $5.4B.  What doesn't get purchased if that $5.4B is not forthcoming?  Do we walk away from 2 SSN's?  Or 2.5 DDG's?  Or an LHA(R)?  Or do we revise the SSC "requirement" down from 52 ships to 44 to match the available resources?

The point of this exercise has been to reinforce the position I take here all the time.  The Fleet we have is too small for the uses required of it.  The present plan does not address this shortage; rather, it exacerbates it.  The SSC evolution will make the problem even worse.  We need a bigger Navy.

Bryan McGrath

Watching the Russians... Off Florida's Coast

Tom Hill @te3ej has been tracking the Russian Tug Nikolay Chiker for the last few weeks as it made its way down to Cuba with Russia's premier spy ship the Viktor Leonov CCB-175. Yesterday Tom Hill noted the tug has taken up position just off the coast of Florida - now for two days at 29 18 00.0N, 80 30 00.0W.

While some mock the Russians for always deploying tugs with their Navy, I've grown to appreciate it as I have now observe them use the tugs effectively both in soft power operations and now military operations like trapping the Ukrainian fleet. Navy's can do a lot when they have ships with incredible utility like Fleet tugs, indeed one might ask how the US government screams really loud about climate change, but doesn't build ships like icebreakers and fleet tugs. Like I've always said, we should all start to actually worry about the effects of climate change the day the government starts buying a bunch of those types of ships, because that will be the day the government is legitimately worrying about it.

The Nikolay Chiker is widely considered to be one of the worlds most powerful ocean tugs, but more important from this observers perspective, the tug seems to always be escorting high value assets of the Russian Navy when it deploys.

So the question is, why have the Russians parked their premier Northern Fleet naval tug off the coast of Florida? There are probably several valid reasons, but if I was to speculate, the following two reasons strike me as the most likely.

The ship is observing the launch of Falcon 9 SpaceX CRS3 scheduled for early Sunday morning from the SLC-40 Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket will launch the Dragon C3 for its fifth operational cargo delivery mission to the International Space Station. The flight is being conducted under the Commercial Resupply Services contract with NASA. 

In addition to that though, during previous visits to the US east coast by the tug, US media reported that Nikolay Chiker escorted Russian nuclear attack submarines that were patrolling our coast at the time. Given circumstances taking place in Ukraine, I think it is very possible that Nikolay Chiker is staying near Cape Canaveral for legitimate reasons (to monitor the launch) but is also standing nearby as one or more Russian nuclear attack submarines monitor US Navy activity out of Kings Bay, Mayport, and or Norfolk during a period of political crisis between the US and Russia.

Indeed, given the presence of Nikolay Chiker off the Florida coast and given the events unfolding in the Ukraine, I believe it would be foolish not to assume that Russia is operating submarines off our East coast naval bases.

Special thanks to @russiannavyblog for assisting me thinking through this activity as we have observed/discussed it together on Twitter the last few days.

The status of Project 310

As we've seen the J-20 project proceed to the pre-production prototype stage, Project 310 (Shenyang AC's 5th gen design) is continuing its flight testing. Although, I and many other have called it J-31, it really hasn't become an official PLAAF project yet, so it has no J designation Many have called it the J-21 project, because they expect it to receive that designation once it becomes official.

There have been a lot of discussions online about where this project is at and how is it funded, so I will give me take here. At this stage, project 310 only has one flying prototype in No. 31001. Some would compare it to No. 2001 of J-20 project, but I consider more as a proof of concept aircraft similar to X-35. For example, I think the pre-production prototypes should not longer see the gap between the engine nozzle and nacelle. From what I observed online, it seems to at least have received some funding from PLAAF to arrive at this stage, although SAC does has enough resource/funding to get here by itself. I think we are unlikely to see a second flying prototype until it becomes an official PLAAF project, since No. 31001 and a possible static prototype can give all the data PLAAF would need to make its decision. Based on all I have read, it seems to be foregone conclusion that will happen. Once it does get designation and full funding from PLAAF, SAC is likely to make numerous changes on the next flying prototype and also start conducting radar and weapon testing.

Just looking from front, Project 310 has the contours that one would expect out a stealth aircraft. One does not need to look far before seeing comparison to F-35 and reading articles about "stolen technology" from F-35. Whether this jet will turn out to really be a stealth aircraft depends on all the little details that the designers have to look through to minimize returns from all around. Until we get to a later prototype, it's really hard to say how well Project 310 will do in that area.

I am generally not too concerned about the electronics on the new Chinese aircraft, because I think they have really made huge progress here. I think they can achieve comparable target identification and situation awareness as F-22/35, since it will come into service at a later point when newer technology will become available. I think the biggest concern for this aircraft is its engine. This is a problem with all new PLAAF aircraft. Clearly, RD-93 will not be powering Project 310 in production. The 9.5t class "Medium Thrust" engine models have been around for several Zhuhai airshows. I would imagine that engine will be used on Project 310 and other projects like UAVs. Even though it has great important, it will not be as high priority as the WS-15 project. Since it began at a later point and has lower priority than WS-15, it definitely won't be ready before WS-15. If we estimate that serial production of WS-15 will be under way by 2020, this medium thrust engine won't be ready for serial production until 2025. PLAAF would have to either wait until then or find an interim selection. A large part of its test flight program may need to be done with a different engine.

The other question is what is the expected market for Project 310 outside of China. Unlike J-20, models resembling Project 310 have appeared in air shows since 2011 indicating that it should be available for export sooner rather than later. The problem is who can they sell it to. Ten years from now, most of the Western countries will probably go for F-35. The remaining ones will either go for the eurocanards or for super hornets if they are still in production. Due to politics, they are unlikely to go for a Chinese or Russian aircraft. We know that India and Russia are committed to the PAK-FA project, so what does that leave for Project 310? Most of China's traditional customers in Asia, Africa and Latin America simply don't have the money or the need for a low-end 5th gen aircraft. Project 310 will most likely be exported to Pakistan. After that, it will have to battle against F-35, PAK-FA and Gripen-E in the Middle East, South East Asia, Brazil and South Africa. Its main advantages are its cost and available production slot, but China will have to move fast.

Book!

And here we go. Grounded, now available in hardcover from Amazon.

You can listen to Sunday's Midrats episode here.  In addition, I've collected a lot of links relating to the book on this page. 

Many thanks for enduring what has seemed to be an interminable PR campaign!

"Offshoring" the Flotilla Combatant

     

Pacific Patrol Boat operated by the Solomon Islands

Cuts in the total number of  littoral combat ships (LCS) to be purchased and the proposal for a new class of frigate would seem to indicate that the U.S. Navy is not interested in purchasing a large force of corvette-sized combatants. Despite this, it is not inconceivable that the U.S. might eventually be called on to provide either an offshore patrol or regional strike capability in littoral regions. If strategy dictates a stronger presence in littoral waters, why should the U.S. be the only provider of such forces when other solutions are present? The U.S. need not own the flotilla, but instead support and coordinate a U.S. built and trained small combatant force. Such an example of this concept has been successfully operated by the Australians for nearly 30 years in support of the archipelagic Pacific nations. The U.S. could adopt the Australian Pacific Patrol Boat Program to provide tailored small combatant forces to regions where such a capability is desired.

     The Australian government’s Pacific Patrol Boat has provided 22 patrol boats to 12 Pacific Island nations since the mid 1980s. Twenty two boats were delivered between 1987 and 1992 at an initial cost of 155.25 million Australian dollars. Continuing costs have been budgeted at 12.5 million Australian dollars per year, but fuel and operational costs has pushed this figure to 51 million in at least two years. A 350 million (Australian) dollar service life extension program will extend the service life of the boats to 2027.

Scope of the Australian-funded and support program

     These 100 foot craft have an endurance of 2500 nautical miles at 12 knots and can be configured for a variety of missions. They generally serve as offshore patrol vessels but can also mount small weapons up to and including a 20mm cannon. The Australian govt. provides most of the funds to build the ships, and train the crews, but they are operated and routinely maintained by the nations whose interests they serve. Australian naval observers often operate with these ships. This arrangement gives Australia a greater strategic presence in the South and Central Pacific at a very low cost compared with a deployment of Australian warships to the area.

     The U.S. could adopt a similar program to build littoral patrol/missile craft and train recipient-nation crews for service in West African, Middle Eastern, and Western Pacific waters. Individual flotillas could be tailored to the region/nations for which they are destined to serve. A West African flotilla vessel might look very much like the Australian Pacific Patrol boat, while a Western Pacific flotilla combatant might be much more heavily armed like the old Soviet-designed OSA missile boat, or the larger and more capable Ambassador MK III class that has been proposed as a U.S. flotilla combatant by New Navy Fighting Machine (NNFM) advocates. Proponents of small missile combatants suggest they could be built for U.S. service at 80 million U.S. dollars per copy.  A very simple flotilla combatant built to commercial standards for other nations might be constructed for even less, especially in purchased in large numbers.

OSA type missile combatant

     This program would bring navies from those nations receiving flotilla ships into closer contact with the U.S. Navy, and allow for sustained multilateral operations. Recipient- nation crews would be regionally knowledgeable and more effective than deploying U.S. Navy assets (large or small) in achieving success in littoral missions. Enduring, regular U.S. support to this mission could be regionally provided by an amphibious warfare ship outfitted as a station ship along the lines of those employed for Africa Partnership Station (APS). This unit would provide classroom, and repair, and support for flotilla combatants. It could be substantially crewed by Military Sealift Command CIVAMRS in a format similar to that of the experimental seabase USS Ponce in order to further reduce costs to the mission. Additional support might be provided by one or more Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) deployed in the role of “flotilla leader(s). LCS, with its extensive helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capability and communications/control systems might support and coordinate the activities of U.S. funded flotillas in the event of wartime operations. This capability could be regularly exercised through peacetime deployments and pay great dividends in combat at sea. Most importantly, the U.S. government would not have to pay the crews or many of the immediate operating costs of those vessels.

    

     There is no need to divert thousands of relatively expensive U.S. sailors to littoral missions when those who live and operate in the region can be enabled by the U.S. to conduct that mission. Creating Pacific, West African, and Middle Eastern flotilla groups tailored to the needs of and threats residing in each region can free U.S. to pursue the construction of globally-deployable ships necessary for its own unique strategic needs. The close association these flotillas would have with U.S. naval forces would make them a powerful tool in gathering regional intelligence in peacetime, and useful force multipliers in actual combat operations. A U.S. flotilla combatant program would obviously be significantly more expensive than its Australian counterpart. Such a formation however could still significantly augment U.S. regional engagement efforts and ought to be seriously considered as a means of delivering the benefits offered by the NNFM without its most significant costs in personnel, fuel, and regular maintenance.