U.S. Navy for the 21st Century--RealClearPolitics Panel 9 May in DC

The folks at RealClearPolitics and RealClearDefense are holding a breakfast panel Friday, 9 May from 0745 to 0945 at Charlie Palmer's Steakhouse in DC.  HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Chairman Randy Forbes (R-VA) will keynote, to be followed by a panel including Mackenzie Eaglen (AEI), Paul Scharre (CNAS), Kirk Lippold and me (Hudson Center for American Seapower).

Online signup at this link.

Bryan McGrath

Carriers and Air Wings

Somewhat lost in all the discussion this year on whether or not to proceed with the CVN 73 RCOH has been the analytically questionable conflation of the number of aircraft carriers with numbers of air wings.  As the narrative currently goes, we need one air wing for each active aircraft carrier (N) minus one to account for the one in RCOH, or ten air wings for eleven carriers.  As the Navy provided its budget story for the costs of the RCOH, the costs of the attendant air wing were always cited, in my view unnecessarily "gilding the lily" of how much cost there was.

Additional analytical rigor needs to be brought to bear on the number of air wings necessary to meet operational requirements.  It strains credulity that the maintenance and training requirements of an air wing are gear-tooth locked in with that of an assigned carrier.  The "N minus 1" formula has the potential to create excess "excess capacity", a luxury that current budgetary pressures discourage.

Congress should direct the Navy to report in detail on this matter, giving the chance for the Navy to justify the requirement or re-do its math.

Bryan McGrath

HASC Sends Navy a Strong Message on UCLASS

Great story here from the folks at USNI on the Subcommittee Mark brought forward by the HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee which contains rather strong evidence of congressional displeasure with the discerned direction of the Navy's UCLASS program.  I've written here before of my personal sense of unease with how the Navy is going about bringing UCLASS along.  This move by the HASC is a good one, as it buys time for the return to the debate of the most eloquent proponent of unmanned carrier-based airpower I know, Bob Work.  His voice and intellect on this matter as Under Secretary of the Navy was strong, and once he moved to CSBA, was ably represented by others.  However, their lack of positional authority mattered in these intramural debates.

The Naval Aviation enterprise MUST begin to recognize that attacks on the relevance of the aircraft carrier will only gain momentum the longer it chooses to log-roll effective, moderately stealthy, carrier-based unmanned strike.

Bryan McGrath

What to Do With Those 11 Cruisers

First Aegis cruiser Ticonderoga slumbers in mothballs.
Many of her younger sisters will soon join her

       Speculation on the fate of the 11 Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers that have been slated for “reduced operating status” in response to budget shortfalls continues to mount.  The plan would seem to involve long periods of inactivity in virtual “mothball” status for the ships as facilities and funding become available for modernization work. The age and hard use of the CG 47 class cruisers (the newest was commissioned in 1994) have raised questions on whether the class can continue on much past its estimated 35-year life span. Some experts have raised doubts as to whether a 1980’s era ship designed in the 1970’s can or should be part of the Navy’s front line defense against ballistic and cruise missiles in the 2040’s. The U.S. Navy would appear to have chosen to keep a minimum of 11 ships constantly in commission for the next 20+ years. There is still time however for the Navy to “hedge its bets” by partially preserving some of the Ticonderoga’s in a non-deploying reserve condition in the hope that future funding for a cruiser replacement becomes available. Mr. Putin’s recent shenanigans aside, the drawdown in ground wars in Southwest Asia, and mounting concern over Chinese intentions in the Indo-Pacific basin may yet convince lawmakers to fund large, dedicated air defense ships like the cancelled CG(X) class as a replacement for the aging Tico’s. They have performed in a magnificent manner in both the Cold War and the period of violent peace that followed, but they should not be expected to shoulder on to 50 years of active service.

Spruances and Ticonderogas share a common hull

     The plan for the modernization of the 11 selected ships appears to be arranged so that for each modernized cruiser returned to the fleet, one older, previously upgraded vessel would be retired. This is an even more draconian cut than the previous Navy plan to retire 7 cruisers outright from the order of battle. While perhaps surprising to some, the Navy’s reasoning has some sound basis in fact. The CG-47 class has been “rode hard” over the last twenty five years. Shortfalls in training and maintenance in the decade of the 2000’s as highlighted in the Balisle report further indicate the class has been proverbially “put away wet” without necessary attention as well. The Spruance class destroyers, on whose hull and basic machinery the Ticonderoga class is built, had a programmed life of 35 years. Of these ships, only the first ship of the class, USS Spruance (DD 963), reached 30 years of commissioned service. The newest ship in the class, USS Hayler (DD 997), had only 20 years of active employment. Although hull life is but one indicator of many, it would suggest that the common hull shared by both classes may not have a 35 year life span without significant attention. Deterioration of that hull is accelerated by multiple long transits to and from overseas assignments. Cracks in cruiser superstructures, fuel oil service tanks, and aluminum decks are clear indications that the clock is ticking on the class’ service life.  

     Although they are deteriorating as they age, it may be useful for the Navy to keep more than 11 CG’s in a modified condition of readiness until they can be replaced. This can be done by moving all 11 cruisers into non-deploying reserve fleet status in place of the retiring Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates. Operating costs of the CG’s could be further diminished by placing much of their combat systems equipment in layup maintenance and providing them with skeleton “nucleus crews” as Great Britain’s Royal Navy did with aging battleships and cruisers in the decade before World War 1. Ships in this classification had their crew complements reduced by 1/3 or 2/3 given their re-mobilization status and went to sea for limited training opportunities not to exceed 15 days per quarter. While not as cost effective as complete inactivation, nucleus crew status keeps the ships “on the books” as commissioned members of the fleet and capable of more rapid reactivation in case of national emergency. The RN nucleus crew ships were reactivated in 1914 for World War 1 and gave sterling, useful service as patrol and shore bombardment ships, thus freeing more modern combatants for battle force service.

Scope of cruiser modernization

A Ticonderoga class cruiser shorn of most of its combat systems, operations, and supply departments would qualify for nucleus crew status. A U.S. nucleus crew might spend a week to 10 days per quarter underway with these opportunities spread out rather than concentrated in one at sea event. Underway periods need be no greater than 24 hours in duration in order to provide elements of basic crew training. Crews could eat pre-prepared meals for short underway periods, and a shore-based centralized supply office could support individual ship’s logistics and maintenance support needs. All CG’s selected for such a program would be assigned to geographic areas relatively free from foul weather sortie requirements. The program would need to be flexible in order to be resilient through periods of fluctuating budget support. 

     A nucleus crew option for the cruisers that preserves some of their capabilities might allay Congressional fears of a sharp drop in the most capable air warfare class of U.S. surface combatant. The end of costly ground conflicts in Southwest Asia should free defense spending for naval, vice ground warfare concerns. If aggressive behavior from China continues, Congress might yet be convinced to fund a logical replacement to the CG-47 class cruiser if funds are available. The Navy will save some significant funds in cutting the cruiser rolls to 11. Congress however may not be interested in purchasing a capable successor to the CG 47 class if they linger on into the 2040’s.

     The Ticonderoga class cruisers are rapidly aging and it is perhaps unwise to assume the Navy will get much more than 30 years service out of the hulls of this class. Taking 11 out of service as long-term replacement assets for those that remain active is a good solution. A better solution would be to reduce all 11 to nucleus crew status while they wait for their modernization window. Although substantially reduced in capability, nucleus crew Tico’s would remain functioning assets that could be reactivated for service much faster than an essentially “mothballed” counterpart. The budget outlook remains grim for defense projects in the immediate future. The continued rise or renaissance however of potential maritime opponents might yet guarantee the Navy a modern force of air warfare combatants more capable than the Arleigh Burke Block III. Holding on to more of the CG 47’s for a little longer rather than stringing them out far beyond the lifespan of their hulls and machinery may be the right choice.

H.R. McMaster Makes Time 100; Some Earlier Thoughts on the Sage of Land Power

Congratulations to Army Major General H.R. McMaster, for making Time's List of the 100 Most Influential People in the world.

I've written about the good General twice before, here and here.

Those who would see Seapower advanced as a tool of American grand strategy would do well to understand the thinking of this man.

Bryan McGrath