Two recent articles about military exchange between China and Russia. The first one is Robert Farley's article about 5 ways Russia could help China's military. The second article is about Russia looking to buy Chinese electronic military/aersopace components.
I have written on numerous occasions about what China is still interested in buying from Russia and what China would be interested in buying from Europe if the embargo is lifted. The reason is that the balance of military technology prowess has changed so much between Russia and China in the past 20 years that we have gotten to the point where Russia is looking to now buy Chinese military components. Back in 1990, the gap between the collapsing Soviet Union and China was so great that China had to pick which area of its military it had money to import. In the end, despite the army's overwhelming influence in PLA, the much greater gap in air force and navy led to purchasing Su-27s, S-300s and Sov destroyers instead of MBTs and IFVs. People talk about post TianAnMen square arms embargo as the reason that China turned to Russia, but it's quite obvious to me they would've turned that direction regardless of whether or not an embargo was in put. By 1990, China had already experienced how tightly US and other Western companies safe guarded their technology and IP after numerous projects like the J-8II Peace Pearl project. In the end, China spent $500 million without really getting any kind of industrial boost, while US got a thorough look at what was China's most advanced plane at the time (without being very impressed by it). It was with that backdrop that China turned to Russia for help after warming of the relations in the late 80s. It quickly found that Russia had very lax protection of technology compared to Western countries. On top of that, most of Russian military hardware were on fire sale after the Soviet collapse with pretty much anything available to anyone who had money for it. From there, China got a lot of support from Russians in not only the J-11 project, but all of China's indigenous projects. It's hard to imagine that China could've paid $2.5 billion to anyone else and got anywhere close to the amount of technology transfer, industrial help and advanced fighter jet that China got here. It wasn't until early 2000s that Russia started to catch on top how much China's military industrial complex was improving and how much success it was copying a lot of what Russia was showcasing at the time. By that time, China had already noticed that Russia was increasingly pitching non-existent projects requiring China to pay for development cost, so it was already slowing down purchases even though it seemed like the trade was still booming to the outside world. By 2007, the failed IL-76 purchase stopped all ongoing military cooperation between the 2 side. After that was resumed, China continued to purchase more aerospace engines and helicopters from Russia, but not many other major items. Even the much discussed Su-33 deals never came to fruition as China managed to build J-15s with Ukrainian help.
That brings us to the current state of cooperation between the 2 countries. The most recent deals have been AL-31FN/RD-93 engines, Mi-171E/26 helicopters and refurbished IL-76 transports. The 5 items in Farley's article are aerospace engine, Tu-22M bombers, leasing of Akula subs, S-400 SAMs and ballistic missiles. Outside of Tu-22M, I would agree with all of the other items, although China would be interested in the more advanced Tu-160. Aerospace engines and S-400 have already been proposed to China and have high likelihood of been purchased. The other items are all strategic and Russia have been reluctant to share them with China in the past. With the current international climate, Russia is relying more and more on China as it becomes isolated, one wonders if Russia would change it's mind. China would certainly gain a lot from a similar Akula II leasing deal like India got. I would imagine Tu-160 and Yasen class attack subs are completely off limits.
I have been reading for a while that China has been trying to sell electronic components to Russia for it's military products. One of which was T/R modules for Russia's AESA radar. According to the article, the Russian space agency is looking to purchase several billions of dollars of such components from China, which would be a wide range of products. Maybe this could start military export from China to Russia in other areas where Russian manufacturers have simply fallen behind like in building naval ships. Although, I would say it's far more likely that Russia would purchase subsystems and components.
So things have certainly changed in the past 20 years and the recent change in Russia's isolation around the world has seemingly pushed military cooperation even further in China's direction.
Saturday, August 9, 2024
Tuesday, August 5, 2024
The Adults are Heard From: National Defense Panel 2014

First, a story. Back in the olden days when I was part of a team writing strategy for the Navy, we were exposed to a quiet study done by an outside organization on how the Navy was viewed by policy elites on both sides of the political spectrum. Interviews with a few dozen former Deputy, Under, and Assistant Secretaries from State, Defense, and Treasury revealed a high level of convergence on America's role in the world and the view of the Navy's importance to it. I remember reading the study and making the comment to colleagues that "the adults are in charge" when it comes to these matters, irrespective of political party. Such were the quality of those who served on this year's NDP.
What the study in part reflected was what many view as the "Post WWII security consensus" that has guided this nation's national security policy. The NDP Panel describes it thusly:
"Consistently now for nearly seventy years, no matter which party controlled the White House or
Congress, the United States has followed a policy of deep global engagement and leadership
undergirded by a military capable of forward defense and effective global power projection.
Americans judged that such a policy was the best way to preserve and protect this favorable
international order that served their interests. We believe this logic still applies in an enduringly
uncertain and increasingly hazardous world. This is because an international order favoring
American interests and values - and those of our allies and partners and indeed all nations who
wish to join - is not simply self-generating and self-sustaining. It cannot be left to the mercies of
states and non-state groups that have different agendas. Rather, it requires leadership, global
engagement, and military strength - and the only country with the power, credibility, and
dynamism to play that role is the United States." (p.10)
Increasingly, that consensus is fraying. On the right, some treat the defense budget as if it were simply another domestic spending program worthy of cutting--rather than the organizational product of a sworn Constitutional duty. On the left, some view the defense budget as a bloated anachronism in our modern, global, networked, world, worthy of raiding to fund ever-increasing social outlays. In the past, these were fringe views, and the above consensus dominated. Not so much today.
What the NDP Assessment does is bring into sharp relief the sizable mismatch between that seven decade consensus and the resources programmed to achieve it. More specifically, the study states simply that the strategic aims of the Quadrennial Defense Review it was impaneled to assess are unattainable within current budget levels. Apportioning responsibility in equal measure to Capitol Hill and the White House, the Panel advocates AS A START a return to the Gates 2012 budget baseline while repealing the 2011 BCA and its pernicious offspring, the Sequester.
Our nation's fiscal crisis was not caused by defense spending and it will not be solved by raiding it. Worse yet, doing so will only exacerbate the crises underway. The NDP puts it so: "Attempting to address America’s budget woes through defense spending cuts is dangerous and ultimately self-defeating. In this economically interdependent but poorly integrated and unstable world, an America less capable of global leadership will soon become a poorer America less capable of meeting its other federal priorities."
In a nation that seems to want bi-partisan approaches to policy making and problem solving, the NDP report reaches common sense conclusions and reminds us of the symbiotic relationships among security, military power, and economic prosperity. This report should serve as the entering argument for the next administration's national security team, no matter who is in charge.
Bryan McGrath
I am a forty-something year-old graduate of the University of Virginia. I spent a career on active duty in the US Navy, including command of a destroyer. During that time, I kept my political views largely to myself. Those days are over.
Sunday, August 3, 2024
Israeli Naval Forces Coastal Combat in Gaza
Global demographics shifts will increasingly drive wars towards highly-populated, urbanized coastal areas. Israel's ongoing Operation Protective Edge demonstrates a number of lessons for future littoral warfare in this environment. As learned in over a decade of COIN operations, perhaps most important is a need for significant intelligence assets - eyes on target - required to engage aimpoints precisely in cities where the enemy is closely embedded with the population.
Despite a large volume of coverage on the conflict in Gaza, very little attention has been paid to the naval side of the war. The IDF has released some interesting combat footage, though. The first video below demonstrates some of the unique cooperation between the ship (which appears to a be a Sa'ar 4.5 Hetz missile boat talking to its HQ) and Southern Command ground forces as the vessel engages an enemy mortar site with its 75mm gun.
Despite a large volume of coverage on the conflict in Gaza, very little attention has been paid to the naval side of the war. The IDF has released some interesting combat footage, though. The first video below demonstrates some of the unique cooperation between the ship (which appears to a be a Sa'ar 4.5 Hetz missile boat talking to its HQ) and Southern Command ground forces as the vessel engages an enemy mortar site with its 75mm gun.
An active video information campaign closely linked with combat operations is also vital in a world of instantaneous global communications where every citizen with a smart phone is a potential reporter. Something I find interesting in these videos is the dialogue. For example, the line "mortars are being launched towards Israel" and similar language in other IDF videos seems to suggest that these units may have received some guidance on specifically articulating the threat as their footage would be used in information operations. Contrast this professional language to some of the unprofessional, profanity-laced gun-camera footage leaked early-on during OIF that embarrassed US forces. I would hope by now that we've learned as a military that all radio/data transmissions are being recorded, at all times, and that if we do it right, communications incidental to combat can support overall campaign messaging.
In the video below, a Hamas rocket launcher is engaged with some sort of electro-optically guided, ship-fired missile (Spike?). Of interest is the verbal terminal guidance, "left, left, left, left" just before the missile hits its target. Clearly this sort of precise targeting - which was out of the visual line-of-sight of the ship - required close coordination with ground and air forces. Press reporting shows that both UAVs and Israeli commandos have supported targeting for air and naval engagements during the current conflict.
Dozens of strategic direct action missions into Gaza have been launched by the IDF's Shayetet (Flotilla) 13 naval commando force. In a politically-charged place like Gaza, occupation forces are not palatable and maritime raids, be they surgical special operations or larger scale punitive Marine operations, remain an important tool for ground-force commanders.
The final video is a follow-up to a previous post regarding the failed Hamas naval commando unit infiltration. Apparently, Israel's Navy was also actively engaged in targeting at least some of the five intruders from the water.
The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the US Navy.
Saturday, August 2, 2024
More on US/China naval dialog and J-20 project
In my last post, I talked about China's participation in the Rim PAC 2014 exercise. As this was happening, Admiral Greenert, Chief of US naval operation, made a visit to China and was the first US (possibly first foreign) service member to visit CV-16 Dalian and speak to its crew member. You can see the DOD article here.
Admiral Greenert had what seems to be a good overview and very frank conversations with his Chinese counterpart Admiral Wu about the near future of Chinese naval aviation program. I don't think it's a surprise to Chinese naval followers that they are building another STOBAR carriers similar to CV-16 before moving on to a more modern design. And it's certainly not a surprise that he saw all of the Russian equipments ripped out and replaced with brand new Chinese ones, because that's what we've seen from all of the TV reports. Even so, I really do encouraged at the increased level of communication and discussion between the two sides even though they have feel like they are dealing with possible adversaries. That's the kind of discussions that will hopefully eliminate or at least reduce miscommunications in the future. Greenert also visit a 039B (Improved Yuan) class submarine and some other ships in the North Sea Fleet around where CV-16 is based. The 039B that he boarded was one of the most recently commissioned PLAN submarine, so it certainly seems like Chinese navy is not holding back. From that, I get 2 thoughts:
There has also been more news coming out on the J-20 project. The new prototype No. 2012 has made its maiden flight. From all the pictures I've seen so far, it seems to have minimal changes from Prototype No. 2011. The word is No. 2013 and 2014 will also be coming out sometime this year for test flights. So, I think they will now start comprehensive flight testing programs. On SDF, one of my fellow PLA watcher compared the first 2 flying J-20 prototypes (no. 2001 and 2002) to YF-22 while comparing this new batch of prototypes to the F-22 EMD program. It took over 5 years from the first flight of F-22 EMD prototype to the first production F-22 being delivered to Nellis AFB. I would say it will probably take similar amount of type for the first production batch of J-20s to be delivered (so around second half of 2019). Even though the Russians have been saying production version of PAK-FA will be delivered in 2016, I think there is a good chance that won't happen and we will see the 2 aircraft enter service at around the same time.
Admiral Greenert had what seems to be a good overview and very frank conversations with his Chinese counterpart Admiral Wu about the near future of Chinese naval aviation program. I don't think it's a surprise to Chinese naval followers that they are building another STOBAR carriers similar to CV-16 before moving on to a more modern design. And it's certainly not a surprise that he saw all of the Russian equipments ripped out and replaced with brand new Chinese ones, because that's what we've seen from all of the TV reports. Even so, I really do encouraged at the increased level of communication and discussion between the two sides even though they have feel like they are dealing with possible adversaries. That's the kind of discussions that will hopefully eliminate or at least reduce miscommunications in the future. Greenert also visit a 039B (Improved Yuan) class submarine and some other ships in the North Sea Fleet around where CV-16 is based. The 039B that he boarded was one of the most recently commissioned PLAN submarine, so it certainly seems like Chinese navy is not holding back. From that, I get 2 thoughts:
- China is certainly reciprocating US efforts for greater transparency. It is also showing greater transparency in general.
- Biggest factor to the greater transparency and willingness to show what they have could be their improved hardware and professionalism. A large part of China's secrecy is due to not wanting to be embarrassed with less advanced ships and non-professional crew members.
There has also been more news coming out on the J-20 project. The new prototype No. 2012 has made its maiden flight. From all the pictures I've seen so far, it seems to have minimal changes from Prototype No. 2011. The word is No. 2013 and 2014 will also be coming out sometime this year for test flights. So, I think they will now start comprehensive flight testing programs. On SDF, one of my fellow PLA watcher compared the first 2 flying J-20 prototypes (no. 2001 and 2002) to YF-22 while comparing this new batch of prototypes to the F-22 EMD program. It took over 5 years from the first flight of F-22 EMD prototype to the first production F-22 being delivered to Nellis AFB. I would say it will probably take similar amount of type for the first production batch of J-20s to be delivered (so around second half of 2019). Even though the Russians have been saying production version of PAK-FA will be delivered in 2016, I think there is a good chance that won't happen and we will see the 2 aircraft enter service at around the same time.
AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (USMC) Weekly Read Board
I am a forty-something year-old graduate of the University of Virginia. I spent a career on active duty in the US Navy, including command of a destroyer. During that time, I kept my political views largely to myself. Those days are over.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)