The Chinese navy has done a lot of modernization in the past 20 years, but some areas have been lagging behind others. Even while China was still buying large ticket items from Russia, there was a lot of talks on China's growing submarine force and anti-ship missiles. Not only did the imported ships have some over-hyped supersonic missiles, the domestic built ships and aircraft were also equipped with a fairly modern YJ-83 missile. The path to modernization in ASuW is relatively small compared to other areas, so it was not surprising that PLAN made the largest jump here at first.
By 2005, Chinese navy was in the midst of inducting Type 052C and 051C capable of providing anti-air area defense. Even including the interim Type 052B class, this was a very significant jump from point defense in most of the surface combatants to having ships capable of detecting multiple aircraft and missiles at long distance, processing them on the combat system and engaging them with modern long range vertically launched surface to air missiles. As Type 054A started to proliferate in Chinese navy and becoming the backbone of many flotillas, this became no longer an area of weakness. With more Type 052Cs joining service and the first Type 052D being commissioned, Chinese fleet has now become modernized in the area of AAW.
The one area that PLAN has always lagged is in ASW. For a long time, most of the surface combatants only had hull sonar and some ASW rockets. By the turn of century, the new ships have been installed with Yu-7 torpedo. However, China's limited number of naval helicopters mean that only a limited number of ships can travel with ASW helicopters. Since helicopters are rotated between ships, that would limit the ships training with them and their effectiveness. Before the induction of 054A, China's most advanced ASW assets were diesel submarines and Type 037 sub chasers. They are both limited to littoral waters and cannot be expected to escort a fleet. Even in littoral water, they are limited by their own noisiness and lack of speed or range. The 093s could be useful in blue waters, but they are also very loud.
Type 052As were China's most well equipped ASW ships until Type 052C came along. The Type 052C destroyers were the first of surface combatants to be installed with the new generation of Towed array sonar and acoustic decoy. The Type 052s had their original imported French variable depth sonar replaced with this new towed array sonar. The induction of Type 054A really brought a lot of added ASW capabilities. They were also equipped with towed array sonar and acoustic decoy in the back along with bow mounted sonar in the front. Lack of permanent naval helicopter remains to be an issue, but at least they can launch ASROC type of missiles from VLS. That really extended the range of engaging submarines when a helicopter is not available for such duty. Even so, the passive TAS by itself has limitations and is still more suitable for littoral water.
In the past year or so, a new generation of home grown variable depth sonar has been developed. One of those versions has been installed on Type 056, which should be able to replace Type 037 sub chasers for littoral ASW duties. With the existence of helipad that can land Z-9 helicopter, installation of Yu-7 torpedoes and this new VDS, it should be a huge leap over the Type 037s that are retiring from service. An improved version of 054A has also come out recently with this new variable depth sonar installed next to TAS (position of acoustic decoys on earlier 054As) and the new 11 barrel CIWS. This combination of active VDS and passive TAS is installed on the most recent 4 054As (2 each from HD and HP shipyard). Although more of this type could be built, my guess is that they are just testing out this new ASW combat suite and CIWS for the next class of ships. The new Type 052D destroyer (No. 172) is also fitted with this new combination of active/passive sonar in the back along with a bow mounted sonar in the front. It is also said to be able to launch a longer range ASROC type of missiles from VLS than Type 054A. All of this should give Type 052D very balanced combat capability in ASuW, AAW and ASW. A new type of ASW helicopter based on the developing Z-20 project is needed to really allow this ship to hunt and engage modern submarines. Of course, Chinese navy does have a new ASW helicopter in Z-18F, but it is probably too large to be carried in the hangar of Type 052C/D. However, Z-18F should be able to serve on CV-16 along with large future combatants likes Type 055 and LHD/LPD classes. Z-18F is larger than other ASW helicopters like SH-60, NH-90 and Ka-28. It can carry more sonobuoy and has more snobuoy openings than SH-60. It can also carry dipping sonar along with up to 4 Torpedoes. The rest of the electronics and combat system has been upgraded from Z-8 with a new large surface search radar and modern MAWS and RWR antennas. It also has the range to really hunt modern nuclear submarines. That's why it is expected to be a part of the air wing of CV-16 and future Chinese carriers.
As a whole, the hardware for ASW in PLAN has definitely modernized, but they still lack in many areas. While they finally have a Y-8 maritime patrol aircraft, it's still years behind P-3C and serving too small in number. While Z-18F is a nice addition, a Z-20 or Z-15 based ASW helicopter is badly needed for ships in the class of Type 052D and 054A. And finally, the biggest help to Chinese navy would be newer and quieter nuclear submarines with more powerful sonar. Until that happens, the Chinese navy would always be in a place of danger when it comes to underwater warfare.
Sunday, August 31, 2024
Friday, August 29, 2024
An Unreasonable Approach to American Seapower
“The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man.”
― George Bernard Shaw, Man and SupermanOver the course of the past month, I have written two pieces that attempt to lay out my case for a larger, more powerful Navy and the resources necessary to accomplish it. In "The Paradox of American Naval Power" I made an argument that the Navy's ability to meet crisis response requirements has a perverse impact on its readiness to address the growing threat of great power conflict. In "CNO's Losing Battle to Avoid a Hollow Navy" I made the case that even the ability to meet crisis response requirements is in jeopardy as we attempt to squeeze more presence out of a declining force.
The response to both pieces has been gratifying, with some excellent criticism and some welcome support.
One consistent response set is worth addressing. I have a number of correspondents who are incredibly intelligent, thoughtful, and eloquent, who have written me emails or who have included me in email debates they've had among themselves, who take issue with my arguments from the perspective of their own rational and reasonable ideas for how the Navy could more effectively spend the resources that it is given. Their ideas uniformly reflect deep insight, experience, and a dedication to problem-solving. Essentially, their arguments boil down to support for the "capability vs. capacity" approach, and they assume that I am firmly in the "capacity vs. capability" camp. They see the nation's current fiscal condition and the likely resources that the Navy will receive they generally associate themselves with the CNO's approach, which is to privilege capability. They believe that I would privilege capacity, and in doing so, make us less ready over time.
In addition to these (largely civilian) correspondents, there is the OPNAV Staff, one of the most talented amalgamations of human beings with whom I have ever been associated, and the overwhelming majority of them come to work every single day with one underlying goal in mind: how can the Navy spend these dollars in the most effective manner possible? This is good, honorable, and necessary work, it is work that I have done myself in a past life, I know how to do it, and it is work that I would someday welcome doing again. I honor these individuals, and the nation is very, very fortunate to have them.
However, I am not interested in a "capacity vs. capability" discussion, and nothing I write should lead anyone to believe that I am. There are plenty of really smart people already filling that space. Truth be told, if I were interested in that discussion, I would agree with the capability over capacity crowd. But I am irrational and unreasonable. I wish to argue for MORE resources for the Navy in order that it can become larger, more powerful, and more capable. I think this way not because I think big powerful navies are really neat, but because I think a big, powerful Navy is the table stakes for a nation such as ours, with its far flung interests and its favorable geography. I believe such a Navy is warranted even more so when the nation faces fiscal challenges, as there is no element of military power (and by this I mean Seapower, broadly understood) that more effectively protects and sustains our interests. There is no element of military power that is as flexible and adaptable across the full range of grand strategies as Seapower, with clear mandates for a powerful and capable fleet contained in offshore balancing, cooperative security, selective engagement and primacy.
It does not escape me that my position is more extreme than most, nor that it is not particularly helpful to those engaged in the above discussion (how to spend what the Navy gets most effectively). So be it. If I find myself in my dotage an intellectually lonely old man who made wild claims that are ultimately proven wrong, I pray for the poise to admit it and the good spirit to congratulate those whose ideas prevailed. In the meantime, I will continue to push for more--for three deployment hubs, not two. For an INCREASE in the number of carriers (to 13), rather than a decrease (to 9 or 10); for sixty SSN's; for a plethora of unmanned vehicles on, under and above the water; for twelve Amphibious Ready Groups; for more and more capable air wings.
I aim to help define the Navy that the Nation needs, not the Navy that the Joint Force needs. If those two are the same, then I hope to have the wisdom to see it. If they are not, I wish the same on others.
On this subject, I prefer to be The Unreasonable Man.
Bryan McGrath
Tuesday, August 26, 2024
Saturday, August 23, 2024
Tuesday, August 12, 2024
Warship "Survivability"
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| LCS-Inspired Frigate/Corvette Variants (Lockheed Martin) |
Much of the recent discussion of the
current Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS) program and the proposed new frigate
FF(G)X involves the “survivability” of both classes. Numerous senior civilian
and uniformed officials have called for the FF(G)X to be “more survivable” than
the current LCS. Casual observers may not know how much information goes into determining this feature of a
warship design. Before the Second World War and for some time after,
“survivability” was primarily concerned with how many “hits” of a certain size
projectile a warship could sustain and still be mission capable. In the postwar
era, the concept of survivability changed based on a new ethos in surface
combatant design, the advent of nuclear weapons, and advances in detection, communication,
weapons, and countermeasure technologies. In fact, a warship’s active and
passive defenses against attack from aircraft, cruise missiles and underwater
weapons have effectively replaced armor and other elements of physical
resistance to damage, making a warship’s “survivability” more akin to a combat
aircraft than past combatants.
The
current Navy "survivability" instruction promulgated in 2012 is relatively effective in
measuring this new concept of “survivability”, but other so-called X factors
can play significant roles. The geography of a theater of combat and the
weather there can change the perception of a warship’s relative “survivability.
Today’s reasonably “survivable” surface combatant can equally be tomorrow’s
“iron coffin” if it sustains damage in a remote location or in a worsening sea state. Before moving forward with
a design for a “survivable” successor to LCS, senior civilian and uniformed
officers should specifically determine exactly what that concept means both for
present classes of surface combatant, the projected FF(G)X and those designs
that follow. The November 2012 instruction is a step in the right direction,
but more must be done to accurately measure the survivability of current combatants. A
first step would be upgrading the current Ship Self Defense Test Ship (currently
the ex USS Paul F. Foster) to one of
the current or former CG-47 class cruisers and conducting realistic weapon
testing against its active and passive defensive systems. They are the heart of
real warship survivability and ought to be rigorously evaluated against actual
weapons.
The present (November 2012) Navy
instruction on warship survivability makes a significant change from its
predecessor in that:
“The previous version of this instruction, dated 23 September
1988, established the policy that “Survivability shall be considered a
fundamental design requirement of no less significance than other inherent ship
characteristics.” This basic premise has not changed although survivability is
now considered in terms of capabilities
vice characteristics.”
Survival “capabilities” are divided into the
categories of susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability. While the
physical structure of ships is still part of the survivability “triangle”, the
ship’s capability to resist attack occupies a much larger part of its overall
combat rating. This revision is a welcome change. Over the course of the Cold
War and especially the last 20 years, weapons have grown more accurate and potentially lethal. A surface combatant’s survivability now rests more on active and passive systems to avoid or resist attack than physical structure
or armor. This demand is reflected in
the susceptibility component. The vulnerability and recoverability components
still emphasize the ability of a ship to survive initial effects of attack, but
the trend toward more powerful antiship weapons and more electronic rather than
armor-laden warships makes avoiding attack the primary method of survival and
continued mission accomplishment in a wartime setting.
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| HMS Sheffield |
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| USS Stark |
Other factors that affect
survivability are often omitted by experts. The geography and weather
conditions of a naval battle can significantly impact
survivability. The Oliver Hazard Perry
class frigates are often cited by LCS opponents as more “survivable” as
evidenced by recoverability of the USS
Stark and USS Samuel B. Roberts
after they sustained missile and mine damage. Both crews performed heroically
in saving their respective ships, but the relatively calm waters of the Persian Gulf, and proximity
to friendly bases significantly aided in the retrieval of both ships. Compare
this with the experience of the British destroyer HMS Sheffield lost during the 1982 Falklands War. The ship’s
firemain system was wrecked beyond immediate repair at sea as a result of
battle damage, but remained upright and stable for 5 days until the weather
deteriorated. The ship took on a severe list while under tow to South Georgia and
sank soon after the weather worsened. Sheffield
might have survived had she sustained the same damage in the Persian Gulf
rather than the South Atlantic.
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| Ex-Japanese battleship Tosa |
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| Ex USS Washington |
Tests conducted on incomplete modern
battleships such as the ex-USS Washington
(BB 45) and the ex-IJN Tosa in the
1920’s gave U.S. and Japanese naval leaders a good idea of the survivability of
their capital ships. It is no longer useful however to merely fire weapons into
dead hulks as a method of determining a warship’s ability to survive attack. That
procedure was effective when a warship’s ability to resist attack was only
resident in its physical construction and armor (if any). New methods must be used to assess a warship's active and passive defense capabilities. One
example would involve replacing the present Ship Self Defense Test Ship (SSDTD)
ex-USS Paul F. Foster with one of the
retiring/refitting Ticonderoga class
cruisers. The Defense Department Office of Test and Evaluation
recommended the Navy build a new unmanned test ship in late 2013, but a retiring Ticonderoga would be a more accurate test platform. AEGIS cruisers were designed to defeat saturation cruise
missile attacks on carrier battle groups. Put an unmanned, fully armed AEGIS
cruiser to the test. Take it to a deserted stretch of ocean and fire increasing
numbers of antiship cruise missiles at the target until its defenses are
saturated and overcome. Up to now this
question has been one of dueling mathematical formulas. Salvo equations and
estimates of single shot probability of kill (SSPK) go only so far in
determining “survivability”. An accurate measurement of combat endurance
would either build confidence in current U.S. warship performance or force
significant change depending on what results were obtained in the test. This hypothetical test would be extremely
expensive, dangerous, and violate a number of U.S. environmental statutes, but what is the
price in determining the real “survivability” of a modern warship? The overall goal remains deterring conflict if
possible rather than actually going to war. As several British admirals and American
politicians have said over the course of the 20th century, “battleships
are less expensive than battles.”
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| Ex-USS Paul F. Foster (SSDTS) |
Survivability is a loaded term with many
possible definitions given the large numbers of potential variables used to
determine this vital warship capability. Those seeking to use survivability as
term of discussion should be careful in its employment. Furthermore, the U.S.
Navy should be given the funds and legal latitude necessary to conduct the live
fire testing needed to adequately measure this feature. While expensive and
time-consuming, such testing is necessary in measuring the survival of equally
expensive modern surface combatants.
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