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| ARABIAN GULF (Dec. 8, 2014) The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) prepares for flight operations. Carl Vinson is deployed in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility supporting Operation Inherent Resolve, strike operations in Iraq and Syria as directed, maritime security operations, and theater security cooperation efforts in the region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alex King/Released) |
The following contribution is from Daniel J. Whiteneck, Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses.
Introduction
The conduct of naval operations in the Arabian Gulf region has been the source of extensive debate as political tensions between Iran and Israel, the future of Iran's nuclear program, and the role of the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security continue to frame the security environment of the Arabian Gulf. While Iran's evolving anti-access, area denial (A2AD) capabilities drive some to argue that America's most valuable naval assets would be at high risk if operating inside the Arabian Gulf, there are important reasons for the Navy to maintain a persistent, combat credible presence in the Gulf.
Integrated naval strike force (carrier strike groups, amphibious ships, ballistic missile defence (BMD) shooters, and other necessary surface forces) operations inside the Gulf should be conducted because they are the most effective method for deterring and countering Iranian threats to: regional stability, the security of US allies, and the free flow of commerce. Robust naval forces, centered on capable strike forces, are the centerpiece of a combined arms concept of offensive and defensive capabilities. Their unique capabilities and their presence in the Gulf facilitate the accomplishment of US strategic and political objectives.
Strategic Considerations
The first issue to be addressed is to realize that the US does not control the timing of a potential conflict. Because of that reality, the decision has to be made before a crisis breaks out on the normal operating posture for naval forces. The Strait of Hormuz is the chokepoint where Iran's ability to threaten US naval forces is the strongest, and a transit either in or out during hostilities exposes naval forces to the full range of Iran's A2AD threat. Iran's investments in fast attack craft (FAC/FIAC) with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), mines, coastal defence cruise missiles (CDCMs), and diesel submarines can be most effectively brought to bear in the Strait.
The Navy has to decide before a conflict to fight inside or outside the Arabian Gulf. Fighting from outside means that the Navy would have to "roll back" Iranian capabilities from the Gulf of Oman, through the Strait, and then into the Gulf. Naval air power will have to run the gauntlet of the Strait's air defences, or be granted access and over flight and tanking by GCC nations. This rollback of air defences and CDCMs will be necessary to address a mine threat in the chokepoint because it would be imprudent to operate MCM assets in •contested water spaces. All of this will take more time and resources, and potentially American lives, because Iranian capabilities in the central and northern parts of the Gulf and country will be under far less pressure allowing Iran to concentrate its defensive capabilities against a single avenue of attack.
If the Navy's carrier and other high value units are inside the Gulf when a crisis erupts and the Navy wants to fight from outside, it would have to exit the Gulf through the very threat envelope that everyone wants it to avoid. Leaving the Gulf during a period of high tension would send a negative message to all of America's partners and allies in the region. America's position as the military leader in the Gulf and the guarantor of regional security and global commerce would be questioned. Without US naval forces to deter and support allied defence of the Gulf, GCC partners face strong incentives to bargain with Iran or risk having island territories, energy infrastructure, and shipping subjected to harassment and attack. Iranian naval forces could operate in small groups or in unconventional attacks and would count on US forces making responses lower priorities than anti-access operations outside the Gulf and in the Strait. GCC countries might be faced with meeting such a threat mostly on their own,or with responses by US forces that might be too late to prevent damages to vital economic assets. US presence and power, visible and ready, is required to assure these partners.
Because these two realities can not be escaped (no control of conflict initiation and zero risk tolerance inside the Iranian threat envelope), there will be heavy pressure to operate outside the Gulf at all times. And because the carrier strike group (CSG) and its air power are essential to the safe operations of BMD ships, MCMs, AFSBs, and PCs, these forces will have to operate at higher risk or be forced to withdraw from the Gulf for their own protection.
US naval forces also center a coalition of other national navies that are invested in the security of the Gulf and its resources. US naval forces are the only forces capable of strike operations on a large scale, defence of the forces, and defeating multiple Iranian maritime threats. The allied forces in the Gulf (MCMs, escorts for shipping, ISR) are all dependent on the offensive and defensive capabilities of US naval forces. Without those forces, allied navies will be forced to reconsider their posture in the Gulf, with the ultimate strategic effect of re-thinking their commitments to Gulf security and support for deterring and defeating Iran.
There would also be negative economic and political impacts if US naval forces were not postured to protect and defend commercial shipping and the flow of commerce. Routinely operating outside the Gulf leaves the area vulnerable to Iranian forces. It could expose commercial shipping to Iranian harassment and coercion in the central and northern parts of the Gulf. Reactions from the commercial sector could include increased insurance rates (with cascade effects on prices), or more likely, accommodations to Iranian demands on the control of shipping inside the Gulf.
If US naval forces are unable to prevent Iran from deploying mines in the northern and central parts of the Gulf, commercial shipping would be halted until secure routes could be established and safe transit guaranteed by constant air and surface escort. At the extreme, these conditions might not be enough for some commerce, and it might stop transits until the 'threat is gone.
A worst case scenario is that regional states and commercial interests might cut deals with Iran that create adverse impacts for US regional presence and influence. A long term change in the US security role in the Gulf could also cause major European allies to change their strategies and postures towards Gulf security and the certainty of energy supplies. In addition, other outside powers might increase their own presence to assure access for their commercial interests.
Mission accomplishment from inside the Arabian Gulf
Naval forces postured inside the Gulf ensure that the US has a visible sign of commitment at all times. That force possesses essential deter and defeat attributes of prompt denial and punishment of Iranian maritime coercion or aggression. It is a force positioned to carry out operations, not just respond to Iranian actions from an “over the horizon" posture.
Prompt denial and punishment capabilities are the hallmark of a naval striking force (TACAIR, TLAMs, and amphibious forces) that can carry out strike missions against Iranian targets from north to south throughout the Gulf. The ability to deliver short-notice striking power at a time and place of US choosing is especially important in an environment where the US does not control the initiation of conflict, and the use of shore-based aircraft and tanking is largely dependent on access and authorities from partner nations. Lastly, US naval power to deter and defeat is based on a mobile asset. Shorebased air power is subject to disruption by Iranian short-range ballistic missiles that can fire at predetermined targets. Naval forces are much more secure from this threat, providing a survivable conventional deterrent force. While Iran has claimed that it can threaten US ships with anti-ship ballistic missiles, at this time they are likely unable to field an operational capability that can seriously threaten ships at sea for some time.
Naval forces must also be postured and ready to establish sea control and contribute to the joint force commander's ability to control the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict in response to an evolving strategic environment. A CSG-centered naval force in the Gulf prevents Iran from seizing the initiative for sea control. The US will continue to maintain superior situational awareness by its tactical forces, integrated with joint, national, and allied ISR assets. US forces will be able to use show of force missions to deter, and use the escalation of force in the event deterrence fails.
Naval forces are scalable, enabling deterrent postures and proportional or non-proportional responses to threats. CSG TACAIR can range surface threats and counter at-sea swarms of FAC and/or FIAC. It can also scale up to deliver strike packages against naval bases, support facilities, and missile or mine forces/sites as required. A CSG-Ied strike force will enable amphibious operations, and its planes and ships can be part of strikes against a wide range of targets in Iran. This capability would force an adversary to "honor the threat." Iran would not be able to mass forces in the Strait without exposing its territory and forces in the Northern and Central Arabian Gulf to US power.
Operating inside the Gulf provides maximum protection to commercial shipping and communicates American commitment to maintaining the free flow of commerce and global access to the Gulfs energy resources. This is arguably, the vital mission, for US forces. It is important to remember that it is not enough to force open the Strait of Hormuz if the shipping and energy infrastructure of the Gulf are subject to days of harassment and attack by Iranian forces.
Operating inside the Gulf means that TACAIR will support US and allied forces that are escorting merchant traffic. In the Tanker Wars of the 1980s, the US only escorted its own and Kuwaiti-flagged ships, and as a result was responsible for a limited number of air and surface sorties and assets. The current nature of trade and energy interdependence in the global economy are strong factors against a repeat of such a policy, as nations and the private economic actors all look to US naval forces as the guarantor of commercial traffic. The CSG will be called on to cover a range of missions all designed to protect the flow of commerce and energy ,including; escort operations, energy infrastructure protection, and mine countermeasures.
Naval forces are tasked with contributing to the mutual security of allies and partners throughout the Gulf. That ability also encourages regional partners to participate in coalition actions. If a robust naval strike force is operating inside the Gulf, it will be optimally postured to carry out this mission. BMD ships postured in the Gulf must be protected in order to concentrate their capabilities on their mission. CSG assets must be positioned for persistent defence of these ships. CSG assets will also be called on to protect smaller patrol craft, afloat forward staging bases (AFSBs), and MCM ships as they work with GCC partners to :secure territorial waters and energy infrastructure. GCC partners and other allies factor their own strategic and operational plans on the presence of US naval power, and air and missile defences. Without these capabilities inside the Gulf, those allies and partners will be forced to re evaluate their strategies and operational concepts.
Naval tactics against Iranian threats
Properly structured and organized naval strike forces work as a unit at the tactical level to defend against and defeat Iranian threats. They can do this effectively inside the Gulf, even as Iran has been steadily trying to enhance its A2AD capabilities. In a tactical confrontation with a US naval force inside the Gulf, Iran would likely try to inflict a serious blow against a major US naval combatant to raise the human cost and support an information campaign designed to make the cost of US presence in the Gulf too expensive for political decision makers to pay.
A strike force operating inside the Arabian Gulf can use its organic integrated defensive and offensive capabilities to defeat, not just mitigate, potential Iranian threats, as well as relying on position, maneuver, and established logistical support for its persistent presence. The CSG is the focal point for aggregated naval forces that use mutually reinforcing tactics and capabilities to maintain escalation dominance and control the initiative to defeat layered anti-access threats.
Fixed-wing TACAIR is an asymmetric US advantage based on a history of investment decisions and tactical developments. USN airpower is "the" answer to FAC and FIAC threats. It engages and disrupts the threat at range, while rotary-wing aircraft (which can be USN/USMC/USA) of the CSG or ARG-MEU form the second ring of defence in depth of the CVN. Lastly, the surface escorts also engage the surface threat and any leakers that could threaten US high value assets.
The carrier's Aegis escorts, with their anti-air capabilities (integrated C2 system, missiles, and radars), will be able to engage and defeat air attacks on the strike force and its CVN, amphibious ships, or CLF ships. Those same ships, operating as surface action groups {SAGs) outside of the CSG-Ied strike force
could face opposing fast attack craft armed with ASCMs with greater range and they may lack the ISR
and TACAIR umbrella provided by joint air assets.
Iranian mine threats are addressed first by the strike force's organic ISR capabilities (air, and surface) and their connectivity to joint and national ISR assets. Developing situational awareness of the Gulf and the operating patterns of Iranian regular and unconventional mine threats provides the potential for early strikes against those assets.
The strike force also works as a one combined arms force to defeat undersea threats, employing rotary wing assets from throughout the CSG to work with P-3s, US and allied submarines, and national assets to conduct ASW against diesel submarines.
This combined arms concept can be put into action inside the Gulf by a strike force that uses position and maneuver to its advantage. A stand-off posture and TACAIR power expose any potential Iranian air, surface, or sub-surface attack vectors to disruption and defeat by concentrated naval power that can take advantage of ISR cueing. The CSG can also use its maneuver capability to complicate Iranian targeting, and force Iranian ISR to navigate through US and coalition air and surface screens to determine location. Speed and maneuver also help mitigate the still unproven Iranian ballistic missile threat, should Iran try to use those nascent capabilities after other attack options have been defeated.
Conclusions
If US naval forces were to respond to higher tensions by leaving the Gulf, the calculation that risk to force would be dramatically lowered may be true, but it would be at the cost of even higher risks to the naval, joint, and national mission. The balance between these two risks is unfavorable for leaving the Gulf.
CSG-Ied naval forces inside the Gulf provide unique capabilities to accomplish the full spectrum of missions within a joint operating environment. The CSG-Ied force is integral to working with and protecting allied partners throughout the joint campaign. Without the credible presence of US naval forces, commercial traffic in the Gulf would face the choice of operating under increased risks and costs, ceasing operations in the Gulf, or accommodating Iranian interests.
The assured access of naval forces guarantees that these missions will be performed if shore-based assets face limited access or authorities by nations, or if they are threatened by ballistic missiles, or if force protection issues limit operations.
The current and future security environment is likely to result in a situation where naval forces at sea are the pre-dominant US military presence in the region. Those forces can operate effectively in the Arabian Gulf. They can operate as an integrated, combined arms force with mutually reinforcing offensive and defensive capabilities to: mitigate existing Iranian threats to the force, enable the establishment of sea control, and support power projection throughout the Gulf.
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Daniel J. Whiteneck is a Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses in the CNA Corporation. His assignments at CNA have included carrier strike group deployments, numbered fleet staffs, and scientific analyst positions with multiple OPNAV offices. The opinions expressed in the article are those of the author and do not represent CNA or the Department of the Navy.
