Whither Air-Sea Battle?

I share Lazarus’s concerns regarding the decision to fold Air-Sea Battle into the new Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (or JAM-GC if you will). Disregarding JAM-GC’s ambiguously-worded name, I might feel differently about the move in general had a reasonably-clear definition of the concept been released last week. The absence of such a definition makes it difficult to understand whether this new concept truly encompasses the threat sets and operational-strategic challenges that gave rise to Air-Sea Battle in the first place. It also makes it more difficult to assess how JAM-GC might flow from or otherwise inform overarching strategic concepts for dealing with competitors and potential adversaries.

This goes beyond Air-Sea Battle’s fate. Beginning in January 2012, the Joint Staff publicly declared that Air-Sea Battle was a means of implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). Unlike Air-Sea Battle’s authoritative documentation, the JOAC document publicly and unambiguously itemized specific capabilities and doctrinal tenets necessary for the Joint force to gain access to and establish freedom of maneuver within future combat theaters in spite of intense opposition by highly capable adversaries. Much serious thought concerning how the U.S. military should be configured for deterrence of major conventional wars has flowed from the parsing of JOAC.

It is not clear whether JAM-GC and JOAC are duplicative, or whether the former is intended to absorb (or render obsolete) the latter. This ought to be publicly addressed by those in a position to do so. The implications of these uncertainties and ambiguities risk affecting how Congress, not to mention leaders and opinion elites in allied/partner as well as potential adversary countries, ultimately interpret the apparent change in direction. The full details of JAM-GC need not be disclosed; they certainly were not for JOAC. Nevertheless, as we observed with Air-Sea Battle, the story the Defense Department and the services tell regarding future concepts for deterrence (and war-waging if necessary) matters immensely in terms of the support they can attract for making the requisite investments of national treasure and prestige.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

The Navy is Getting Its Money's Worth With New Advertising Campaigns

Here's the latest.  Very solid.  I like where they're going with this.

Renaming Air/Sea Battle a Poor, Parochial Decision

A Very "Joint" Air Sea Battle (from 2013)

     The Pentagon’s 08 January choice to rename the Air/Sea Battle concept is a poor choice that will negatively affect the ability of the Navy and Air Force to modernize their forces for 21^st century combat. It is an attempt by the U.S. Army to insert itself into an operational construct for which it is neither equipped nor trained in which to participate. Finally, this decision demonstrates a compelling need to reform the aging Defense Department organization created by the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986. This reform legislation was designed to empower joint military institutions to make the best decisions for national security outside parochial service concerns. This name change illustrates that service-driven parochialism is alive and well and well in the Pentagon, and is aided and abetted by joint bureaucrats intent on shaping all problems with the same joint tools, whether appropriate or not.

     The U.S. Navy and Air Force are desperately in need of new equipment to wage war in difficult 21^st century anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments. Both services need new aircraft, (manned or unmanned), to replace aging Cold War platforms. The Navy needs new missiles in order to engage opponents outside A2/AD envelopes. The naval service has conducted an active information campaign to inform members of Congress and the general public as to the importance of seapower in ensuring U.S. economic and physical security. The Chief of Naval Operations’ “SailingDirections” and later "Navigation Plans" specifically identified a need to “communicate our intent and expectations both within and outside the Navy,” and "strengthen alliance relationships and partnerships." The Air/Sea Battle term is one that easily explains service intentions to a wide global audience. Renaming this concept with the awkward joint term “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons” (JAM GC) will not resonate with the average U.S. citizen, whose support is vital for continued military funding. Such terms make joint bureaucrats in the deep warrens of the Pentagon’s mezzanine level happy, but will not draw the vital public support necessary for strong legislative action.

The Air and Naval Power behind the Concept

     The joint moniker and apparent Army intrusion in an otherwise Naval and Air Force activity represents an unneeded diversion of U.S. Army efforts. The ground force again appears ready to abandon vital lessons learned from a long, hard counterinsurgency campaign in order to preserve its funding relative to the other services. After the Vietnam War the Army quickly disbanded its counterinsurgency (COIN) forces in favor of a return to conventional expeditionary warfare as represented by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat on the plains of Germany. Counterinsurgency lessons learned were left in the dustbin of Army history as the service embraced Air/Land battle for both operational relevance and funding concerns. While this doctrinal change was useful in many ways toward developing present, effective expeditionary warfare concepts, its failure to make COIN an institutional part of the Army handicapped the service for wars since 2003. When the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq degenerated into insurgencies, the Army was forced to re-learn lessons very similar to those painfully gained over the course of the Vietnam War. The Army would best serve the nation’s interests in the wake of the Southwest Asian conflicts by solving the 50 year old problem of how to have both effective expeditionary and COIN capabilities in its organizational structure rather than attempting to couple itself to Air/Sea battle.

Noted defense reformers Senator Goldwater and General Jones

     Finally, the name change illustrates the increasing need to reform the aging, Cold War- era provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act. This reform legislation was designed to empower joint organizations to make national security decisions independent of parochial service needs. Now, the need to maintain a “joint” face on all military operations has created its own ossified, parochial structure.  The efforts of one or more services to create solutions to national security needs are stifled and suppressed by joint bureaucrats seeking to preserve their own institutional authority. This situation of “joint uber alles” is just one of the problems with the quarter-century old Goldwater Nichols structure. Its transfer of the business of strategy from central, service-based systems that produced successful products like Air/Land Battle and the 1980’s-era Navy Maritime Strategy to regional Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) may have been permissible in a post Cold War environment free of peer competitors with global reach.  This decentralized system is no longer possible in the 2nd decade of the 21st century. The global impact of post 9/11 terrorism; the rise of China; and the return of a revanchist Russia (among many concerns); make this 1986-era construct a prime candidate for significant Congressional reform.

     Renaming the well-known Air/Sea Battle concept with an awkward, unfamiliar joint term serves no one well. It forces the Navy and Air Force to change their public modernization campaigns. It is a distraction for an Army that should be preparing for its next expeditionary and COIN operations rather than trying to re-enter the coastal defense business. Finally, it shows that both service and joint bureaucratic parochialism persist within the Department of Defense despite the provisions of Goldwater Nichols. Congress should take action to restore easily identifiable names to military concepts in need of public support. It should direct the Army to concentrate on its traditional service requirements rather than compete with the Navy and Air Force in an operational arena for which it is not equipped. Finally, Congress should look at potential reforms to the dated Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. It should restore the abilities of services to create strategic and operational solutions to global military needs beyond the purview of individual regional commanders. 

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense Weekly Read Boards

Navy:

"Small Combatant Effort Cranks Up," by Christopher Cavas (Defense News, 01/12/15)

"Funding New Submarines Outside the Navy?" by Hugh Lessig (Daily Press, 01/12/15)

"Sea Control and Surface Forces: The Theoretical Foundation," by Jon Solomon (Information Dissemination, 01/13/15)

"Navy Decides to Buy V-22 Ospreys for Carrier Delivery," by Richard Whittle (Breaking Defense, 01/13/15)

"Navy Unveils New Surface Warfare Strategy," by Kris Osborn (Military.com, 01/14/15)

"If It Floats, It Fights: Navy Seeks Distributed Lethality," by Sydney Freedberg (Breaking Defense, 01/14/15)

USMC:

1.     USMC's new drawdown plan spares 3 battalions

2.     Defense One: State of the Marines

3.     Female Marines now 0-26 on officer infantry course

4.     Marine Corps Leaders Warn Troop Cuts May Go Too Far

5.     Sgt. Maj. Ronald Green selected as 18th SMMC

6.     Hagel says Marines will return to maritime roots

7.     Marines prep for unpredictable amphibious operations

8.     Report: DoD Wants Marine Force to Stay at Spain Base

More information on Type 071 class and the new 054A

Most recently, China's 18th Flotilla to Aden visited Portsmouth UK for 5 days visit. This flotilla consisted of a Type 054A, a Type 071 and a Type 903A AOR.

There were some photos released, but I think the most interesting part for me was how large Type 071 really is. Here are a couple of photos of its hangar and flight deck.



Based on a picture of the description of the ship, it's said to be able to carry 6 Z-8 helicopters in the hangar, which is 2 more than what i previously thought. Based on these photos, I think that's probably do-able once they are folded. The flight deck can easily launch multiple Z-8/9s. The same description also says that this ship can hold 4 Type 726 hovercraft in the well deck and carry a maximum of 65 amphibious assault vehicles. Now in practice, we've never seen more than 1 Type 726 hovercraft in the well deck, since they only have 3 of them in service. We've also never seen more than 2 Z-8s and 1 Z-9 on a Type 071, since naval helicopters are also in short supply with Chinese navy at the moment. I would imagine the maximum capacity of 65 AAVs is in a configuration where all of the well deck space and compartments in front of it are used to hold the AAVs. This also compares favorably to the number of vehicles that can be carried on a San Antonio class. No mention was made of how many troops could be carried, but it did mention a crew size of 156 people with 23 officers. That seems to be a pretty small number when one considers how many crew members are on each Type 056 ship (which is 1/10 the size). It did mention that helicopters can be used within 200 km of the ship. Hovercraft can be launched 60 km out from target and AAVs can be launched 20 km out from target. Other than that, it's similar in dimension to San Antonio class.

Also, a new variant of Type 054A joined Chinese navy recently with the East Sea Fleet. It's interesting that this new Type 054A took probably 8 months longer than usual to join service because of the changes incorporated in the shape including the new variable depth sonar and the new Type 1130 (11 barrel) CIWS, which should really improve the ASW and close-in air defense of this ship. It was speculated that the longer commissioning period is due to delays in the variable depth sonar development. Either way, this improved variant has now joined service and the next 3 units of this variant should also join service sometimes this year. After that, it's likely that we will need to wait sometimes before the next class of frigates to come out. In many ways, I think Type 054A class exceeded Chinese Naval requirements and the class has been wildly successful in modernizing Chinese navy. All of the major flotilla would have at least 2 Type 054A series ships by the end of its production run. I think it doesn't make sense to build next class after Type 054A for a few years. There are still many Type 053 ships that will need to be retired or transferred to coast guard. With all the Type 056 ships joining service, there really isn't any reason to keep any Jianghu class ships around. Even the earliest Jiangwei class should be decommissioned in the next few years.