Bryan Clark and Bryan McGrath to Testify on Navy Surface Forces April 15

This Wednesday at 2PM I will be give testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee on the role of Surface Navy Forces in Presence, Deterrence, and War.

If you want to watch in person, the hearing is in the Rayburn Building, Room 2212.  If you want to watch on the web, there is a link on this page. 

The other witness testifying is Bryan Clark from CSBA, usually known in Washington as "the smart Bryan".

Weekly Read Board--USN

Upcoming Events

Th	1030-1200: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean

Scuttlebutt (News)

·         New US Navy Fleet Goal: 308 Ships The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan has been revised upward from 306 ships to 308; a 12th LPD 17-class amphibious transport dock and a third Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) have been added to the plan.

·         Flurry of Contracts Spark US Navy Shipbuilding. The past few days have been good for a number of the US Navy's shipbuilders. 

·         Navy to Conduct First Aerial Refueling of X-47B Carrier Drone The refueling will happen as the UCLASS program faces stiff criticism from prominent members of Congress who continue to push for a stealthy, long-endurance, penetrating strike platform.

·         Joint exercises put U.S. Navy at Russia's doorstep The destroyer Jason Dunham entered the Black Sea on April 3 in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, a series of NATO drills launched in response to conflict in Ukraine.

·         China Unveils Three New Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines The Type-093G is reported to be an upgraded version of Type-093.  With a teardrop hull, the submarine is longer than its predecessor and has a vertical launching system able to fire supersonic anti-ship missiles.

Now Hear This (Opinions)

·         Where Is Unmanned Carrier Aviation Heading? Rep. Forbes argues that a long-range penetrating strike platform is the unmanned aircraft that the carrier and its air wing need most. 

·         The US Navy Doesn’t Need an Expensive Aircraft Carrier Drone CAPT Robert Newson, a military fellow (NSW) at CFR, argues that the Navy needs a lower-cost, expendable unmanned system. 

·         Reports of the Death of the Aircraft Carrier are Greatly Exaggerated (video) Bryan McGrath argues at the Naval War College that the aircraft carrier remains the most effective platform for projection power.

Deep Dives (Analysis)

·         Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan to Congress for Fiscal Year 2016 The U.S. Navy’s Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2016 issued on April, 3 2015.

Fact of the Week:  The Navy’s new plan raises the average shipbuilding rate slightly over what it has been in recent years, though far from the highs of the 80s.  The average shipbuilding rate from 1982-1990 was 16.8 per year, from 1991-2001 it was 6.18, from 2002-2015 it was 7.2 and from 2016-2045 it will be 8.8 per year. 

Cutter progress in Chinese shipyards

I last wrote about China's expansion of civilian maritime force here. Due to recent requests, I'm doing an update. Please note that as with all else Chinese shipbuilding related, the various programs do change and some new builds may have been mixed. This is my best attempt at summarizing what has happened in the past 2 years.

In the first part of that last post, I wrote about the expansion of CMS (Chinese Maritime Surveillance) provincial branches. From the table in that section, 36 cutters of 1500 ton, 1000 ton and 600 ton class were built for various provincial flotilla of CMS. Much of the building and launching activities happened in 2013 and 2014. HP shipyard, which builds most of the larger cutters, have delivered all of the cutters that they were contracted to build by middle of 2014. WC shipyard seems to have completed its share too. Even the smaller shipyards seem to have finished most if not all of their ships. So at this point, it looks like the provincial expansion have completed.

After this first expansion of provincial fleet, the Chinese Maritime Surveillance, now under the Coast guard, is undergoing a further expansion as mentioned in the second part of that post. That program consists of 2 12000 ton cutters to be built by JN shipyard, 4 5000 ton cutters to be built by WC shipyard, 4 4000 ton cutters to be built by HP shipyard and 10 more 3000 ton cutters to be built by HP and WC shipyard. Most likely, RFPs were sent out to the various shipyards around the country, but only a few shipyards in China are capable of building these larger cutters. The 2 12000 ton cutters were launched at JN shipyard this past few months and they are probably the first major cutter projects that JN shipyard has worked on. They are given the designations Haijing-2901 and 3901. It's unclear if more of this class will be built. The 4000 ton class cutters have been all delivered by HP shipyard as Haijing-1401, 2401, 3401 and 3402. It looks like those 3000 ton class cutters have now all been launched and commissioned into service with Coast guard. 3 of them are with the North Sea Flotilla, 4 with East Sea Flotilla and remaining 3 with South Sea Flotilla. In addition, works have been under way for the 5000+ ton class ships cutters with 3 of them (Haijing-1501, 2501, 3501) launched in the past few months at WC shipyard.

All of the work by HP shipyard were completed by the end of 2014, whereas WC is still in the middle of completing the 5000 ton class cutters and just most recently completed work for 3000 ton class cutters. All of this is somewhat surprising, because WC shipyard had taken the lion share of cutter constructions in the past, while HP is new to the game. I think the experience that HP gained from the 054A and 056 class projects really improved their ability in delivering ships on time. They are now rewarded with large orders for both naval ships and cutters. Back in 2013, CMS had joined the coast guard along with FLEC and customs as part of a consolidation of China's large maritime surveillance programs. Before that point, only the coast guard ships were allowed to be installed with naval gun. As part of this consolidation, all the newer large cutters for various arms of the consolidated Coast Guard are installed with naval gun. With all the maritime issues that China has with its neighbours, I think the ability to install naval and machine guns on these cutters is definitely a reason that pushed for the consolidation of the 4 agencies.

On top of the work for CMS, FLEC also had money to expand its fleet with 3000 ton and 1000 ton cutters. Since FLEC also merged into the coast guard, I found it hard to hard to determine which of the newer cutters are for its orders. There are a couple of new 3000 ton class cutters launched at both HP/WC shipyards like 3301 and 2301 that seem to fit the profile.

Of the 2 smaller agencies that consolidated, HaiGuan (Chinese customs) had an order for 3 1500-ton class cutter with electric propulsion and 9 600 ton class cutters. The 1500 ton class cutters are to be built by HP shipyard. The first of which was launched last year and has now been painted with Haijing-44104. The 600 ton cutters are built by Guijiang shipyard. Guijiang shipyard handles a large quantity of Coast guard's 600 ton class cutters. They were the first to built Type 618 and improved versions of Type 618 cutters for the old Chinese coast guard. They have continued to built Type 618B cutters for the new consolidated coast guard.

Since the last update, the majority of the programs have been completed or well under way. The old CMS agency has been delivered with most of the ships it had ordered, whereas FLEC still seems to be waiting for all of its ships. The new consolidated Coast guard agency have since started new programs. A year ago, they started projects for Type 818 patrol vessels (3000 ton class) and Type 718 cutters (2000 ton class), HP shipyard signed for 4 of the Type 818 and 5 of Type 718. It sounds like Hudong, guijiang and Zhejiang are also participating in these 2 programs. WC shipyard's involvement was not clear, although my guess is that it will be building them too. So, the Chinese coast guard build up is continuing over the next few years, but probably at a slower pace than the past 2 years.

Conventional Deterrence by Denial and the Baltics

RAND’s Terrence Kelly published an excellent opinion piece at U.S. News & World Report last month outlining analysis-derived requirements for a NATO conventional deterrent in the Baltics:

Unclassified RAND war games indicate that Russian forces could overrun local defenders and the light U.S. and NATO units currently able to respond within as few as two days. While the capitals and a small number of key points could be held for some time, Russian forces could seal the border between Lithuania and Poland, prevent reinforcement by sea, and confront NATO with a fait accompli.

Once secured, these territorial gains would be defended by heavy ground forces occupying the conquered states, along with very capable Russian anti-air and anti-ship defenses on Russian territory. Any serious attempt to liberate Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would entail attacks to suppress these systems.

If a Russian invasion of the Baltic states could not be deterred or defeated, the North Atlantic Council and the U.S. president would be faced with a very unpleasant choice: conduct a costly counteroffensive and risk nuclear escalation, or abandon the Baltics to renewed subservience to Moscow. Such a catastrophic failure to uphold the mutual defense responsibilities of NATO could cripple or even destroy the North Atlantic alliance, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s primary goals. It is therefore of paramount importance to deter Russian aggression before it happens.

Unless one is sure that Putin’s Russia would not take these steps - a dangerous gamble, given Moscow’s recent track record - the United States and its NATO allies need to be able to deter, and if need be defeat, Russian aggression in the Baltics.

Kelly suggests that the standing peacetime deployment of one armored BCT in each of the Baltic states, supporting (but undefined) tactical air forces, and Division and Corps-level Headquarters to exercise unitary command and control over this combined arms forward defense would be sufficient to prevent Russia from achieving a limited but decisive territorial fait accompli. Based on this force’s size, it would do this presumably through delay and disruption. The U.S. Army arguably does not possess enough armored BCTs to carry the entire weight of this presence, though, while simultaneously meeting its other global contingency readiness commitments. As a result, the BCTs would likely have to be composed of forces contributed by multiple NATO countries. This underscores the importance of a unitary NATO approach to exercising command and control over this frontline deterrent.

Kelly does not comment on the degree to which existing NATO air forces deployed in Central and Eastern Europe might require permanent peacetime augmentation (presumably using U.S.-based squadrons). He does note that rolling back a Russian onslaught would require surge reinforcements, and given the state of European NATO members’ ground and air forces it’s hard to escape the conclusion those reinforcements would largely need to come from the U.S. This begs the question of how a modern analogue to REFORGER would be conducted. This would hardly be a small endeavor; even more so if debarkation air and sea ports or cross-continent supply lines came under fire from Russian long-range conventional strike weaponry.

He next details the tradeoffs between deterrent force positioning and posturing options. One path would be to warehouse heavy equipment in the Baltics, with crews flown in from the U.S. and other NATO allies to deploy this gear in the field in the event of a crisis. Such an approach might be rationalized as a signal of ‘flag-planting reassurance’ to the Baltic allies that is ‘less provocative’ to Russia than a standing manned heavy deterrent. Kelly correctly points out that the likelihood of dispatching crews to these stockpiles in time to mount an effective defense would depend almost entirely on detecting, correctly interpreting, and rapidly acting upon warnings of war—a sequence of events for which history and human psychology suggest there is little cause to be optimistic. He also correctly observes that these concentrated stockpiles would be highly vulnerable to Russian conventional first strikes, and by implication would be crisis-destabilizing.

Kelly follows by noting that standing ground forces based in (as well as equipment prepositioned in) Central Europe would be comparatively less exposed to the first strike threat, but would face the risk of not being able to deploy eastward fast enough to thwart a fait accompli thrust. This would effectively foreclose NATO options to pursue a defensive strategy of delay/disruption, never mind assured defense. Hence, Kelly concludes that a standing heavy presence in the Baltics—or in Poland at minimum—makes for the only credible ground force positioning and posture for deterrence by denial.

There is no doubt in my mind that some heavy ground forces contributed by NATO’s principal members would need to be positioned in the Baltic states in order to latently back constabulary forces responding to ‘plausibly-deniable’ offensive operations by Russian special forces or ‘civilian’ proxies. In the event of a conventional Russian ground offensive, these forces would be central to arresting the thrust’s progress while simultaneously incurring the commitment tripwire effect. Beyond that, it is reasonable to investigate options for splitting a standing deterrent’s positions between the Baltics and Poland in ways that increase their maneuver space as well as survivability against a first strike.

There is a broader deterrent-designing challenge, however, in that Russia could hypothetically escalate horizontally via offensive operations against other European regions in order to prevent NATO from concentrating combat power in Poland and the Baltics. While any such ground offensives would likely be fairly limited in scope, they would nevertheless hardly be inconsequential from the victims’ standpoint. Recent research published by the Royal United Services Institute’s Igor Sutyagin suggests much of the combat-ready Russian Army is tied down supporting operations in Ukraine, though. If Sutyagin’s analysis is accurate, and assuming Russian forces are not disengaged from the Ukrainian conflict anytime soon, then it seems Russia would be hard-pressed over the near-term to field enough combat-ready ground forces for major protracted anti-NATO offensives. This amplifies the potential credibility of delay/disruption-centric forward deterrents in the Putin regime's eyes, as it would heighten the likelihood of a protracted and risk-laden clash with NATO. These deterrent forces would certainly help backstop the 'first responder' constabulary forces needed to prevent 'non-linear war' fait accomplis.

Russia might have comparatively greater horizontal escalation flexibility in the aerospace and maritime domains. For example, Russia might conduct air and missile strikes or sea denial operations against NATO’s Black Sea members. Or perhaps Russia might conduct air and missile strikes, localized sea denial operations, small-scale amphibious assaults, or small-scale overland incursions against Norway or non-NATO Scandinavia. Some localized use of submarines or missile-carrying aircraft against NATO’s trans-oceanic and intra-theater sea lanes might also be possible. Depending on the strategic circumstances, Russia might even escalate both horizontally and vertically via long-range conventional aerospace strikes against Western European or North American NATO members. And of course, the possibility of Russian brandishing or use of theater nuclear weapons must be considered.

A fuller picture of a European conventional deterrent therefore ought to outline what kinds of tactical air forces are necessary to support ground forces, where those air forces should be positioned, what kinds of specialized aircraft (examples: AEW, JSTARS, electronic warfare aircraft, long-range bombers, tankers, etc.) would be necessary to support tactical air operations, and what the in-theater basing approaches would be to increase tactical air force survivability (examples: hardening, distributed operations using austere satellite fields and flexible command and control, etc.). Bases and ground maneuver forces will also require mobile air and missile defenses as well as electronic warfare support systems in the field in order to degrade Russian attacks. Defense of strategic targets against cruise missile attacks needs to be addressed. A approach for protecting the flow of logistics to forward forces additionally needs to be defined. Lastly, the roles of navies and coastal defense forces need to be outlined. The potential roles of Baltic Sea-bordering NATO members’ navies would be quite different from NATO members who border the Atlantic.

Kelly provides an outstanding foundation for examining NATO conventional deterrence requirements for the Baltics. His thoughts will serve as a starting point for the examinations of the other questions that I hope to write later this year.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

“Raid Breaker” and the Restoration of U.S. Navy Electronic Warfare Prowess

It’s pretty widely known that radars, voice and data communications, GPS signals, and the like can be jammed. It’s another thing entirely to experience intense (or subtle) jamming firsthand; to be forced to operate ‘degraded’ without seamless external connectivity or a clear and trustworthy situational picture.  

It’s also pretty widely understood that one’s radio and radar transmissions can be detected at considerable distances by an opponent. It’s another thing entirely to review a 'hygiene' report detailing all the exploitable radiofrequency emissions friendly signals intelligence assets detected seeping out of one’s unit or battleforce, with each essentially representing a self-inflicted crosshair.

This is why regular, rigorous, and realistic combat training under conditions of electromagnetic opposition is so critical to developing force readiness for modern war. How else are crews going to learn how to fight-through intense electronic attacks? How else are they going to learn how to safely perform complex and dangerous operations with active sensors turned off and all but the most directional of communications paths silent? How else are they going to learn how to play their individual roles in neutralizing an adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance-strike apparatus?

As I’ve pointed out many times previously, the U.S. Navy possessed these exact competencies as recently as 25 years ago. We not only let the skills atrophy, but we also forgot as an institution how much we had achieved. Today, if you want to gain a glimpse at how good we once were at operating in severely contested electromagnetic environments, just about the only unclassified sources are the works of Norman Friedman, Mark Clemente, and Robert Angevine.

This amnesia is starting to recede, however. Despite the fact that one of ADM Greenert’s focal points as CNO has been advocacy for restoring the fleet’s electronic warfare prowess, until recently there just haven’t been many voices in the field grade officer ranks and below publicly echoing his calls. That’s what makes LCDR Jack Curtis’s excellent piece at The Bridge a few weeks ago so noteworthy. Curtis first details the U.S. Navy’s Cold War-era electronic warfare competence, then makes a compelling case that today’s fleet is neither conditioned nor organized to ‘fight in the dark.’ He also points out many of the inherent vulnerabilities of the myriad communications pathways we’ve come to take for granted over the past two decades. While I think it’s important to note that some basic approaches to force-level networking at sea are far less vulnerable to exploitation than others, I strongly agree with Curtis that naval forces employing even highly-directional line-of-sight or low probability of intercept communications pathways must be prepared for the possibility of degraded, compromised, or severed connectivity. He’s absolutely correct that this preparation demands a force command and control doctrine rooted in the philosophy of command by negation, plus a training regime that cultivates the requisite skillsets. I’d add that one of the most important of those skills is the ability to operate in spite of jamming and deception against electromagnetic sensors.

The calls to restore the fleet’s electronic warfare capacity are also starting to come from executive DOD leadership. Although electronic warfare didn’t receive marquee attention in the 'Third Offset’ initiative's kickoff statement last fall, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work made a choice reference to the Navy’s Cold War-era electronic warfare feats in his November 2014 CFR speech:

“We also need to get back in the game of demonstrating. This drives me crazy. In the Cold War, we used to demonstrate—and demonstrations were very powerful, both to assure our allies and to deter adversaries. Nifty nugget exercises. We would take carrier battle groups, go [EMCON], and we'd shut down, and we'd try to get across the Atlantic Ocean without the Soviets seeing it. And we got pretty good at it.

We did it all the time. And we would light up when we got to a fjord in Norway and said, "Here we are." And these demonstrations were a very, very important part of our global posture. And we want to get back to doing that.”

Fast forward to the DEPSECDEF’s speech at the McAleese/Credit Suisse Defense Programs Conference last month:

“So the first aspect of the Third Offset Strategy is to win a guided munitions salvo competition.  If you cannot do that, and if you cannot convince your adversary that you will dominate in that competition, then they may feel emboldened to pull the trigger, and they may feel that they can forestall us in projecting power into a theater.  A larger salvo of guided munitions generally will defeat a smaller salvo of guided munitions.  So, this competition we have to think through.

Winning that competition will keep our adversaries off-balance.  The punch of the third offset strategy is:  How are we going to change what we are going to do once we get into a theater and solve that first competition?  That is unknown.  We are still trying to figure that out.

But if anybody here -- remember the assault-breaker ACTD in the 1975s which led us to the second offset strategy?  We need a “Raid Breaker.”  We need a demonstration called Raid Breaker which can demonstrate that if someone throws a salvo of 100 guided munitions, we'll be able to ride it out.  It doesn't have to be a kinetic solution.  Hell, I don't really want a kinetic solution.  That gets into an imposing cost strategy on us.  It's got to be something else.  So if anybody in this room has an idea for Raid Breaker, believe me, we'd like to hear it.

Another big area of concern is the electromagnetic spectrum.  Electronic Warfare (EW) is often regarded as a combat-enabler.  Our adversaries don't think so.  They believe it is an important part of their offensive and defensive arsenal.  And it's going to be in the forefront of any initial guided munitions salvo exchange.  For relatively small investments, you get an extremely high potential payoff.  And our competitors are trying to win in the EW competition.

Now, we still have a lead, I think.  That lead is diminishing rapidly.  I worry about it.  Today, I'm signing a memo that establishes an Electronic Warfare Programs Council which starts to take a look at all of our investments across the Department and makes strategic recommendations to the Secretary and I on how we change that portfolio.  This was a recommendation of the Defense Science Board and I thought it was a good one.”

He leaves no question in my mind that electronic warfare is at the heart of any ‘raid breaker’ concept. I couldn’t agree more.

To be clear, electronic warfare on its own would not be sufficient to defeat an adversary’s ability to hurl long-range guided munitions at U.S. forces—especially at sea. Kinetic weapons would still play important roles in offensive sweeps and outer-layer defenses against an adversary’s warships and aircraft. Kinetic weapons would also be needed in inner zone defensive backstops. Kinetic weapons might additionally be useful in suppressing an adversary’s striking forces’ operational tempos (such as sortie/salvo sizes and rates) via U.S. strikes against their bases and supporting logistical infrastructure. But all of these kinetic aspects of a ‘raid breaker’ concept would still lean heavily on the use of electronic warfare against the adversary’s surveillance/reconnaissance apparatus. Just about any operation deep within a contested zone, let alone a strike deep within an adversary's territory, would depend heavily on comprehensive electronic warfare support. Which makes it all the more noteworthy that the DEPSECDEF said what he did.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.