Thinking About Cyber and Networking Resiliency

I’m well over a month late writing about the July 2015 issue of USNI Proceedings. Simply put, it contains three of the finest pieces about operating under cyber-electromagnetic opposition I’ve read in a long time. I’ll be talking about two of them today and the third one later this week.

First up is LCDR Brian Evans’s and Pratik Joshi’s outstanding article “From Readiness to Resiliency.” Evans and Joshi note that past Navy cyberdefense efforts primarily focused on unit-level compliance with information assurance measures such as firewall configurations, network configuration management and behavior monitoring, physical security protections, and regular ‘hygiene’ training for users. While these kinds of measures continue to be critically important in that they deny adversaries ‘cheap and easy’ attack vectors for exploiting Navy networks and systems, the authors observe that no cyberdefense can hope to keep an intelligent, determined, and adequately resourced adversary out forever. According to the authors, last fall the Navy’s nascent Task Force Cyber Awakening concluded (correctly I might add) that the Navy’s systems, networks, and personnel must able to continue operating effectively, albeit with graceful degradation, in the face of cyberattacks. In other words, they must become resilient.

Evans and Joshi essentially outline a concept for shipboard “cyber damage control.” They describe how the longstanding shipboard material readiness conditions X-RAY, YOKE, and ZEBRA can also be applied to shipboard networks: crews can proactively shut down selected internal and external network connections as tactical circumstances warrant, or they can do so reactively if cyber exploitation is suspected. The authors outline how crews will be able to segment networks and isolate mission-critical systems from less-critical systems, or isolate compromised systems from uncompromised systems, much like damaged compartments can be isolated to prevent the spread of fire, smoke, or flooding. The authors go on to discuss how damage isolation must be followed by repair efforts, and how knowledge of a system’s or network segment’s last known good state can be used to recognize what an attacker has exploited and how in order to aid restoration. It stands to reason that affected systems and network segments might additionally be restorable by crews to a known good state, or at least into a “safe state” that trades gracefully degraded non-critical functionality for sustainment of critical functions.

It’s important to keep in mind, though, that resilience requires more than just technological and procedural measures. When I was an Ensign on USS First Ship in 2001, many crewmembers would tell me of the “Refresher Training” at Guantanamo Bay that Atlantic Fleet ships went through up until budget cutbacks ended the program in the mid-1990s or so. At REFTRA, the assessors would put ships through exacting combat drills in which chaotic attacks, major damage, and grievous casualties were simulated in order to expose crews to the most stress possible short of actual battle. According to some of the senior enlisted I served with, it wasn’t unusual for the assessors to “cripple” a ship’s fighting capacity or “kill off” much of a watchteam or a damage control party to see how the “survivors” reacted. Some ships were supposedly tethered to Guantanamo for weeks on end until the assessors were convinced that the crews had demonstrated adequate combat conditioning—and thus a greater potential for combat resilience. This kind of training intensity must be restored, preferably by shipboard leaders themselves, with the 21^st Century addition of exposing their crews to the challenges of fighting through cyberattacks. Perhaps a scenario might involve intensive simulation of system malfunctions as a pierside ship rushes to prepare to sortie during an escalating crisis. Or perhaps it might involve simulated malfunctions at sea as “logic bombs” or an “insider attack” are unleashed. Evans and Joshi allude to the cyber-conditioning angle in the fictional future shipboard training drill they use to close their article. One hopes that Task Force Cyber Awakening is in fact exploring how to develop the psychological aspect of resilience within the fleet.

This leads nicely into the July issue’s other excellent technical article on network resilience, CDR John Dahm’s “Next Exit: Joint Information Environment.” CDR Dahm argues that even if the Defense Department were to successfully consolidate and standardize the services’ information infrastructures within the most hardened of citadels, this Joint Information Environment (JIE) would still only be as combat-effective as the security of the communication pathways connecting that citadel to force in the field. He relates a fictional saga in which a near-peer adversary wins a limited war by severing the U.S. military’s satellite communications pathways as well as the oceanic fiber optic cables connecting Guam and Okinawa to the internet. He correctly notes that the “transmission layer” connecting deployed U.S. forces and theater/national intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets with the JIE presents the most vulnerable segment of the entire JIE concept. He alludes to the fact that a force that is dependent upon exterior lines of networking is essentially setting itself up for ruin if an adversary lands effective physical, electronic, or cyber attacks against any critical link in the communications chain. He closes by observing that “the communications necessary to support a cloud-based network architecture cannot simply be assumed,” with the implication being that the JIE concept must be expanded to encompass the transmission layer if it is to be successful in a major war.

We know that just as there can never be such a thing as an impregnable “information citadel,” there is no way to make any communications pathway completely secure from disruption, penetration, or exploitation. We can certainly use measures such as highly-directional line-of-sight communications systems and low probability of intercept communications techniques to make it exceedingly difficult for an adversary to detect and exploit our communications pathways. We can also use longstanding measures such as high frequency encoded broadcast as a one-way method of communicating operational orders and critical intelligence from higher-level command echelons to deployed forces. But both reduce the amount of information flowing to those forces to a trickle compared to what they are used to receiving when unopposed, and the latter cuts off the higher echelon commander from knowledge that the information he or she had transmitted has been received, correctly interpreted, and properly implemented. And neither method is unequivocally free from the risk of effective adversary attack. What’s needed, then, is a foundation of resilience built upon a force-wide culture of mission command. That may be outside the JIE concept’s scope, but it will be integral to its success.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Victory Parade and Chinese Politics

Most recently, China had a Victory parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of war against Japan. As part of this parade, China rolled out its latest ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, armored vehicles, UAVs, helicopters, fighter jets and special missions aircraft. All of the displayed weapon systems are believed to be in service. For the first time, China publicly displayed DF-21D and DF-26, which are the ballistic missiles designed for attacking moving targets like a carrier. Certainly, I have posted numerous blog entries in the past regarding China’s ASBM program and the challenges around it, so this has always been an area of interest for PLA followers. We have now seen these ASBM missiles on display and know that it is in active service. What we don’t know is how good China is at finding a fast moving carrier group in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, tracking it and then engaging it. Certainly for a missile DF-26 which will have longer range and higher re-entry speed than DF-21D, the engineering challenge of finding carrier upon re-entry and maneuvering to hit something that can move at greater than 30 knots is very daunting task. They also displayed DF-5B, which is China’s first public display of an ICBM with multiple nuclear warheads. The parade also displayed the DF-10A LACM (land based version of KD-20 LACM) and various other short and medium ranged ballistic missiles. The second artillery certainly had a field day at this military parade. Comparing this to the pictures from China’s military parade in 1984, it was quite interesting how backward they were back then. It still had the same nationalistic tone and show of strength from all the Chinese leaders.

Behind all of this, it’s a time of uncertainty and worry for the current Chinese leadership. China’s major leaders of past and present were all there (even ones I didn’t realize was still alive) to present a united front. By this point, most people have seen the crash of Chinese stock market. The Chinese economy has also slowed down a lot by this point. Nobody can predicate what will happen there or anywhere else, but these parades are used to show the power and accomplishments of the communist party and distract people from the worries of economic and other problems. I’ve read numerous articles on the politics of recent events. While I’m not sure about their accuracy, it does paint a picture where the younger generation of leaders is still battling the older generation in their efforts to carry out reforms. China’s previous paramount leader Hu Jintao was quite limited in his power due to the continued influence of his predecessor Jiang Zemin. It seemed like the leadership of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang would get more freedom in their efforts to bring a more market based economy to China since taking control 2 years ago. Reading about their pilot free trade zone in Shanghai, the attempted deleveraging of the credit bubble and wider trading band of RMB, I have gotten the feeling that Li Keqiang has some pretty good ideas about resolving some of the problems in the Chinese economy. In the past couple of month with the worsening stock market and rapidly slowing economy, you can really see a lot of his moves getting reversed. (If you listened to any of Donald Trump’s speech recently, you would hear about the greatest one-day devaluation of RMB of 2%.) To clear up certain misconceptions before we continue: China does have its own foreign exchange market similar to EBS, which allows RMB to be freely traded within the 2% daily band for entities inside China. It just has capital control preventing money from easily flowing outside the country (like Brazil, Korea, India and numerous other nations), so does not appear free-floating to outsiders.

Throughout PRC’s history, elderly members of the politburo have been more reluctant toward reform efforts. Even when the all-powerful Deng Xiaoping was pushing his reforms in the 80s, other party elders like Chen Yun and Li Xiannian limited Deng’s efforts as soon as troubles started. The most reform minded Chinese leaders of their day Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were pushed out and humiliated after the student protests of 1987 and then the infamous 1989 TianAnMen Square protests. In a functional economy, we have the boom and bust cycle where credit expand during the boom and contract during bust causing problems in the economy. The bust part of cycle allows the inefficiencies and ailments of the economy to be removed. It is natural for any reform and deleveraging economic efforts to cause a period of economic and social problems. The last time China really allowed the bust to happen is during the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and 1998 when the inefficient state owned enterprises were allowed to fail. At the time, unemployment rate, early retirement and crime rate skyrocketed in the country. The FaLanGong movement arose during this period. Since then, China enjoyed 10 years of good economic growth, a slowdown in 2008 and another 6 years of economic growth. While this was happening, it has been accumulating unsustainable amount of debt and credit creation.

In May of 1989, Zhao Ziyang, who was nominally China’s president at the time, told the visiting Soviet leader Gorbachev that he was not really in charge of China in real decision-making. After taking over in 1987 from Hu, Zhao needed to survive 10 years against the pressures of the conservatives inside the politburo, but lasted less than 2 years after refusing to participate in crushing the student movement. Since then, most of the reform efforts have been economically related and is badly needed in China right now. If reform minded leaders inside the day-to-day leadership get pushed every time there is a setback and become blamed by the elders for economic problems, it’s hard for me to see how this new generation of leaders can get anything done while Jiang Zemin and Li Peng are alive and functioning. Looking beyond China’s display of military power in this parade, China’s biggest threat to the world is an economic crash that slows down its major trade partners and vacation destinations.

For the Want of an RMMV, Should Modular Mine Warfare be Lost?

RMMV aboard USS Independence (LCS 2)

     There have been a number of recent complaints from Congress and the Director, Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) regarding the poor performance of the Remote Mine hunting System’s (RMS) Remote Multimission Vehicle (RMMV). Some LCS critics have seized on this poor performance as another reason to cancel the LCS program, or to at least divorce mine warfare from the LCS program. These critics are ignoring the lessons of post World War 2 attempts by the United States Navy to field dedicated mine warfare platforms. They also forget that the LCS mission modules were always meant to be adjustable based on the given threat and host seaframe weight restrictions. As the saying goes, “there are many ways to skin a cat,” and there are equally many ways to go about conducting mine warfare. The Navy is pursuing the right course in making mine warfare a modular capability that can be deployed from LCS and other platforms. The problems with the RMMV suggest that Congress should better fund the Navy’s overall mine warfare capability.

     In the 70 years since the end of the Second World War the United States has twice attempted to create a dedicated force of mine warfare ships to support global naval operations. Neither effort has been fully successful. The first such endeavor was the construction of the 53 Aggressive minesweeper, ocean class (MSO’s) in the wake of the October 1950 amphibious assault at Wonson during the Korean War. By the late 1970’s however, this first postwar mine warfare force was poor condition. A planned modernization program on the fleet of 65 ships was curtailed to 13 units.[1] There was little specific training and enlisted men assigned aboard the MSO’s usually provided training on mine warfare to incoming officers.[2] The Commander of Naval Mine Warfare Command in 1985, Commodore Duke Cockfield, was quoted in the Navy’s All Hands magazine as saying, “If you go back to the 1970’s, mine warfare was in serious trouble.”[3] Finally, significant minesweeping operations such as the post-Vietnam War clearance of naval mines from Haiphong Harbor as part of the agreement ending the war were conducted by mine sweeping CH-53 helicopters rather than surface ships. Despite this success, overall U.S. mine warfare capabilities were at a low eb.

     The Reagan administration began a U.S. Navy surface ship mine warfare renaissance with the authorization for construction of 31 new mine warfare ships of the Avenger class mine countermeasures ships (MCM) and the Cardinal (later Osprey) class coastal mine hunter ships (MHC).[4] Construction was slow due to a general loss of mine warfare ship construction expertise in U.S. shipyards, and the Avenger class average cost grew to $260 million dollars a unit (in 2009 dollars) by the time they were complete and in active service.[5] Initial units of the MCM class were in service in time to participate in mine hunting and clearance actions during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. While mines claimed no Allied ship losses, significant damage was incurred by the cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59) and USS Tripoli (LPH 10) due to hitting World War 1 design contact mines.

     The continued construction of both the MCM and MHC classes through the 1990’s appeared to have renewed the U.S. surface mine warfare capability, but this force is now aging as the MSO’s were in the 1970’s. In fact, the whole of the U.S. mine warfare capability, including surface ships, helicopters and explosive ordnance detachment (EOD) capabilities are, in the words of mine warfare expert Dr. Scott Truver, “brittle” and have historically accounted for less than 1% of the Navy’s program for funding and operations.[6] The Osprey class MHC’s have already been retired in the decade of the 2000’s. The last MCM is scheduled to leave service in 2024, and the MH-53E Sea Dragon minesweeping helicopters will depart active duty in 2025.[7]

USS Coronado (LCS 4) and JHSV 3 USNS Millinocket

     The Navy has obviously learned an important lesson in that dedicated mine warfare ships is not the best way to preserve a mine warfare capability. The service has committed to making the surface component of its mine warfare a modular vice platform specific capability. Multiple surface platforms may eventually deploy variants of the LCS mine warfare module. The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) is one such ship, and recent exercises have explored the idea of outfitting the ship with an expeditionary mine warfare capability. Other ships with the space for the autonomous air, surface and subsurface platforms associated with the mine warfare modular might also deploy all or parts of this capability.

     This modular package of systems was always intended to be flexible and able to add or remove equipment based on the current threat. If the RMS and associated RMMV are not capable of meeting critical performance parameters, then other systems such as unmanned surface (the Minehunting Unmanned SurfaceVehicle (MHU) and Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (C-USV) or subsurface (MK 18Mod 1 Swordfish and Mod 2 Kingfish Unmanned Underwater Vehicles) systems may fill its position in the LCS mine warfare module (weight restrictions permitting). It is also worth noting that nothing in Dr. Gilmore's 03 August 2024 letter to OUSD, AT&L condemns the LCS program, or the concept of modularity for mine warfare. Specifically:

 “The reliability of existing systems is so poor that it poses a significant risk to both the up coming operational test of the LCS Independence-variant equipped with the first increment of the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission package, and to the Navy's plan to field and sustain a viable LCS-based mine hunting and mine clearance capability prior to fiscal year (FY)20.”[8]

     Mine warfare must continue to move past manpower intensive, ship specific capabilities to modular, automated systems. Surface ship mine sweeping is an intensive, very physical process that quickly saps a crew's endurance. There is good reason behind the aphorism of “hunt when you can and sweep when you must”. Mine sweeping operations on U.S. MCM ships involve the whole crew; often in “port and starboard” (six hours on and six hours off) watches that could last for up to a week. This operation also places highly trained sailors in the midst of an active mine field in order to accomplish their mission. Mine hunting in order to clear a swept channel through a mine field can be accomplished entirely through unmanned units like the RMMV, and other automated surface and subsurface platforms. Sweeping is best left for post-conflict clearance operations like that to clear Haiphong harbor in 1973, the Suez Canal in 1974 and the Persian Gulf in 1991 and 2003.

     The LCS remains the right platform to host the bulk of the surface ship mine warfare capability. An LCS-based capability frees the mine warfare capability from over a century of confinement aboard small, slow, short-legged ships often incapable of operations outside the shallow littoral zones of the world’s oceans. Furthermore, it ends the period of mine warfare as an arcane; little understood concept of naval warfare beyond those few sailors assigned to dedicated mine warfare platforms. The planned large force of LCS and FF variants has the potential to introduce the mine warfare module to a larger joint and multinational audience. A modular mine warfare capability can become just as common as helicopter-based antisubmarine warfare.

AN/SLQ-48 MNV

     Finally, it should be remembered that the RMS and its associtated RMMV have been in development since the 1990’s. Many RMMV’s are over 10 years old and their advanced age may play a role in their less than satisfactory performance. Poor RMMV performance may also be indicative of the poor funding state of Navy mine countermeasures in general since the mid 1990’s when the MHC class entered active service. Current fleet mine hunting capabilities remain resident in the aging AN/SLQ-48 Mine Neutralization Vehicle (MNV) whose tether to its host ship platform is 3500 feet in length.[9] The RMMV has no tether as does the older MNV and may still offer a significant improvement in fleet mine countermeasures capability beyond current legacy systems.[10]

     Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy has been a neglected discipline for nearly two decades. The change to a modular capability from its previous platform-centric model can liberate the mine warfare discipline from its century-long confinement aboard small, slow ships with little survivability. Problems with one system of the modular capability should not distract Congress or the Navy from making the important change to surface naval mine warfare.

    

                

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[1] Tamera Moser Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures,Washington D.C., The United States Navy Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1991 p. 97.

[2] Ibid, p. 98

[3] http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/archpdf/ah198502.pdf, p. 26.

[4] Melia, pp. 117, 118.

[5] https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/07-17-smallcombatants.pdf, p. 6 (author: Dr. Eric J. Labs, supervised by Dr. J. Michael Gilmore and Matthew Goldberg)

[6] Truver, p. 47.

[7] Ibid, p. 48.

 [8] J. Michael Gilmore, Letter to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and      Logistics (OUSD, AT&L) Frank Kendall, subject: Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV) and Remote Minehunting System (RMS) Reliability, 03 August 2015.

[9] Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems, 5^th Edition, Annapolis, Md, U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006, p. 821

[10] http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/ms2/documents/RMS-brochure.pdf

The Use of Simulators and “Synthetic” Environments for Advanced Tactical Training

Jon's note: so my one-week August hiatus turned into a month-long break. Family and work obligations will always take precedence. I managed to write a few weeks worth of new pieces over the last few days, though, and I hope to maintain that pace for the remainder of the summer and early fall.

In late July, USNI News reported that the Navy will build a training center at NAS Fallon that will include simulators for three Aegis cruiser Combat Information Centers (CIC), two E-2D Hawkeyes, and eight F/A-18s. These simulators will be linked such that aircrews and CIC watchstanders will be able to “fight” training scenarios as an integrated force. Additional ship and aircraft simulators will be added over time. Eventually, a datalink will be introduced that enables actual aircraft flying on Fallon’s training ranges to inject themselves into the scenarios being run on the simulators.

A facility like this can never fully replicate the complexities of operating at sea. Simulators are getting better and better at representing the intricacies and variability of real-world radiofrequency and acoustic conditions, but there’s nothing quite like the real thing. Moreover, land-based synthetic training can only partially capture the operational constraints—and crew performance effects—caused by varying weather conditions.

Land-based (and pierside) synthetic training, however, will fill at least two critically important niches in developing our naval forces’ advanced tactical proficiency. First, a crew that isn’t at sea can focus its training attention entirely on the fight. The tactical foundation it gains inside or linked with the simulators is thus already strong when its battleforce begins its underway workups. As less underway time will likely need to be spent on basic skills refreshment, more underway time will be available for advanced scenarios and experimentation. Considering the fact that funding for underway periods will likely continue to be highly constrained in the coming years, and considering the high overseas demand for our inadequately-sized fleet’s ships and aircraft, land-based advanced tactical training will allow the Navy to extract maximum value from each underway opportunity it receives.

Second, this synthetic training will allow crews to operate under tactical conditions and employ tactics that they simply could not do (or for security reasons would not want to do) at sea in peacetime. As I’ve noted previously:

“Some doctrinal elements or tactics that are considered war-critical, as well as tactical situations too complex to generate in forward theaters, can be practiced in home operating areas. In-port synthetic training can also be used for these purposes; it has the added benefits of enabling more frequent and intensive training than may be possible at sea…” (Pg. 106)

The Navy’s Director of Air Warfare, RADM Mike Manazir, alluded to this in the USNI News article on the Fallon facility:

“I can’t train to that highest level in clear air. I’m not allowed to use those modes in clear air. We typically have called those war-reserve modes, and if you go out on a range and you use a war-reserve mode there is a chance that anybody watching could collect information on that war-reserve mode…In this way, in a [virtual-constructive] environment, we can use all of those capabilities…I can give them the worst day of their life that we hope they would never see during deployment…The operation of their missiles and their weapons systems will adequately show what kind of jamming they’re going to see.”

Unit and group-level synthetic training, whether at facilities like Fallon or via pierside training environments in homeport, will allow the Navy to condition its crews for operating under intense and protracted cyber-electromagnetic opposition without safety risks to actual fleet assets. Moreover, it allows those crews to practice, experiment with, and innovate electromagnetic maneuver warfare doctrine and tactics using tools that—if smartly architected—will do much to reduce the risk of disclosure to potential adversaries. That’s a big deal.

Aggressive use of synthetic land-based or pierside tactical training can never completely replace at-sea tactical training. But if synthetic training is designed and executed in ways such that it tightly complements at-sea training, the benefits to fleetwide tactical proficiency and combat conditioning could be immense.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Secretary Mabus, Fleet Size, and Facts

We are treated in this morning's interwebs to a robust defense of his tenure as Secretary of the Navy by Mr. Mabus, one in which he asserts “I have this funny thing about facts,” he laughed in his office on the Pentagon’s E-Ring, surrounded by paintings of classic warships. “I like to get facts into the equation.”  This focus on facts is a good thing, but as Daniel Patrick Moynihan taught us, everyone is entitled to his or her own opinions; they are not entitled to their own facts.

Basic web research places the size of the fleet on this day (September 1, 2024) at 273.  Similar research places the official fleet size measured on the date closest to Mr. Mabus' assumption of office at 285 (September 30, 2024).  This represents--as George Costanza would say--shrinkage.  The fleet is 4.4 % smaller by hull count than it was when Mr. Mabus assumed office.

The next fact worth considering is the Secretary's oft repeated citation of ships "under contract" as a way to point to laudable work he has done to reverse the fleet's decline even as ship retirements  accelerate it.  "Under contract" is to some extent, a term of art, as the largest single ship type bound up in his number is the LCS.  Essentially, the Navy signed pricing agreements with the two prime contractors which held the shipbuilders to certain price levels.  These agreements did not obligate the Navy to actually BUY those ships. That process remains subject to annual procurement schedules,  rather than under a multi-year procurement scheme for the class, something Congress has been loathe to permit (and which would justify the term "under contract").

As I write elsewhere today, one need only go back to the year 2007--just before Secretary Mabus assumed office--for a useful comparison of not only today's fleet but what the fleet of tomorrow should look like.  In that year--before the Arab Spring ignited North Africa, before ISIS began its murderous rise, before the Obama Administration's Asian focus, and most importantly, before China and Russia re-ignited great power competition, the Navy sent the Congress a plan for an 11 Carrier, 313 ship Navy.  Eight years and a dramatically different security environment later, the Navy plans an 11 Carrier, 308 ship Navy.  Putting aside a slavish adherence to ship counts for just a moment and thinking about the Navy the country needs to protect its security and prosperity, it is difficult to imagine that the Navy described in 2007 was over-specified for the 2015 and beyond security environment, but based on the logic of this Administration and its latest shipbuilding plan, that appears to be the case.  To be clear, the previous sentence was opinion, not fact.

One final opinion, but one substantially based on fact.  Secretary Mabus has done a superb job of holding the line on fleet size, as the pressures for it to fall further and faster have been immense.  He has been particularly effective in the second term in properly framing the role of Seapower in America's future.  But as they say in "Game of Thrones"--Winter is Comng.  Putting aside the long term cost of recapitalizing the SSBN force, historical averages for annual shipbuilding do not support the plan submitted to Congress, and likely do not support maintaining even this insufficiently-sized Navy.  Add to it the costs of SSBN(X), and the future is bleak. Winter is coming.

Bryan McGrath