"Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High End Conflict"

The Hudson Center for American Seapower is proud to announce the general release of our new report on the future of the aircraft carrier entitled "Sharpening the Spear:  The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High End Conflict."

A pdf version can be obtained at this link.

We will have a roll-out event for this report this coming Thursday on Capitol Hill.  Few available spots remain.

Below is the Youtube video of the event--apologies in advance for sound quality.

It's Time to Consider Raiding, Again

Jon Solomon's note: When we think of expeditionary operations, we tend to picture the insertion of a ground force to seize and hold some territory for a relatively long period of time. My SPA colleague Jonathan Altman points out below, though, that short-duration raids can be just as strategically useful under the right circumstances. In this piece he examines the potential use of small-scale raids as a means of signalling and compellence outside of major war. I've asked him to write a follow-up piece as his time permits examining larger-scale raids in major war, as I believe that such operations in some scenarios might be highly useful for disrupting or rolling back an adversary's localized maritime denial capabilities. 

The term “raiding” seems like an anachronism upon first reflection. For the average person, it's as likely to conjure up images of Vikings as anything else, and even serious students of military history are challenged to come up with a more recent example than WWII of an effective raid (discounting small scale Special Forces actions in the Middle East). Nonetheless, in the current security environment, where large scale maritime and land forces can be held at risk by A2/AD systems, and inter-state disputes seem to be increasingly playing out on the lower rungs of the escalation ladder, raiding operations hold terrific promise. Compared to a ‘permanent’ insertion of ground forces in some area, brief hit-and-run raids offer increased flexibility and decreased resource needs—as well as options under certain circumstances for plausible deniability. These inherently interconnected qualities and their attendant impact on conflict management suggest a future in which the practice of raiding is likely to once again become an indispensable tool for planners and policymakers alike.

A quick note on definitions is needed. For the purposes of this discussion, a “raid” is defined as a military operation by amphibious and/or airborne forces to temporarily seize enemy territory for some operational purpose. Raids in this article should be considered to be solely directed against territory-holding actors (normally recognized nation-states but a limited set of sub-state actors would also fit such as ISIS or FARC in Columbia) on a scale from a platoon to battalion size effort. Most counter-terrorist operations are accordingly outside the focus of this paper. Larger scale raids that could enable or buttress full scale military campaigns will be covered in a follow on post as these are qualitatively different operations from the smaller-scale raids described in this one.

Because they are by definition intended to be temporary actions and need not incorporate many personnel, smaller-scale raids can often be plausibly deniable. While certainly some media may correctly identify the raid as such before it is complete (especially if the raid lasts longer than a few hours), at least broadly speaking, with respect to the public and third party nations many raids should be generally deniable. This confers tremendous advantages in conflict management.

First, deniability allows the raiding nation to avoid criticism from third parties while sending a desired message of resolve and/or punitive punishment to the state or substate actor being raided. It is likely that the nation being raided will at least have an idea of who is conducting the raid and why based on the target selected, which should be enough for them to understand what brought on the attack. In this sense raiding is an excellent medium to encourage compellence, where an adversary is given a face-saving method to deescalate a conflict without being forced to publicly admit they've been compelled. Consider a scenario where the United States wished to compel a rogue nation not to continue on a path of supporting terrorism. A raid could be used against a target of military significance or symbolic value to the rogue nation's support of terrorism, whereby its seizure and/or destruction by “unknown” forces would directly retard their efforts and convey a level of seriousness that sanctions or diplomatic censure simply cannot. The willingness to spill blood through a plausibly deniable attack against a symbol of an adversary's offending behavior cannot be overstated as a demonstration of earnestness.

On a related note, the deniability of a raid also assists in ending conflicts at the lowest possible levels of escalation because it allows an adversary to potentially save face. Without a smoking gun linking the raid to a nation, the targeted nation will have a better chance of tamping down internal pressure to respond to the raid, providing an off ramp to additional escalation. Again, even if an adversary was aware of who conducted the raid with a reasonable degree of certainty, so long as they do not want war and can keep that information from firing up a domestic base then de-escalation is feasible. In any case, the nature of a raid’s target (against which actor, what sort of specific target, etc.) can be calibrated to minimize the chance of starting of a tit for tat raiding exchange. While not a certainty, de-escalation is a much more likely outcome from a deniable action than one that is not.

The other key quality associated with raids is their flexibility. While the size of a raid will vary inversely with its deniability; this too can be used to a nation’s advantage. Want to offer an adversary an escalation off-ramp? A smaller-scale raid makes sense. Want to send a message of resolve not just to the targeted adversary but also a deterrence message to other potential adversaries? Then a larger-scale raid probably is a better fit. Raids are also flexible in their duration and objectives. A longer raid may send a different message than a shorter one, and the choice of objective can be a message unto itself. For example, deliberately limited objectives may be used to showcase capabilities that could be used in a much more destructive fashion should offending actions continue, while more ambitious efforts may be used to show a commitment to not only threaten that which the adversary holds dear but also demonstrate that the raider is already prepared to (publicly) risk as many lives as it takes to stop the targeted nation. While the difference in messages is subtle, the ability to calibrate them so carefully gives raiding enormous messaging utility.

Operationally speaking, raids are a more useful tool than others because they require only a limited logistics tail and lend themselves to the element of surprise. Since raids by definition do not intend to hold territory permanently and last at most a matter of days, the supplies and supporting forces needed to execute them are comparatively minimal. One only needs a method of raiding force insertion, some small amount of supplies to support the operation, and perhaps some combined arms supporting fires if the circumstances dictate. Since the scale of resources is relatively small (for short operations raiders may simply carry on their bodies all that they need), it is likely that the preparations for a raid can be kept secret, and a range of platforms not available to larger operations can be used. For example, “white shipping” (unmarked, non-military flagged ships) or relying exclusively on airborne insertion and exfiltration can be effective in facilitating successful raids. Beyond supply needs, because a raid by definition is a relatively small operation, the number of people and computer networks needed to plan and execute the raid can also be small, making the potential for adversary discovery of the raid before the fact much less likely. Thus because the preparations for a raid can be done in a highly secure manner, raids are much more likely to maintain the element of surprise than other military operations with similar objectives; thereby lowering the risk to the raiders themselves and amplifying the chance of mission success.

Looking out to a future where inter-state conflict continues to take place at lower levels of the escalation ladder, and where obfuscating one's own military actions will be important to achieving national objectives, raiding would seem to be an essential part of a military planner's toolkit. Raids convey national level resolve at a minimum risk of friendly loss of life, and provide an adversary with either escalation off-ramps and/or clear direction that a behavior will not be allowed to continue. It's time to think about raiding less from an historical lens and instead consider how it can best be used for strategic effect in the modern world.

Jonathan Altman is a Program Analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. who holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Korbel School at the University of Denver and an undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict

On October 8, Hudson Institute's Center for American Seapower will release its report on the future of the aircraft carrier entitled Sharpening the Spear:  The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict.  House Armed Services Committee, Seapower and Projection Forces Sub-Committee Chairman Randy Forbes (R-VA) will headline a lunch-time briefing and panel event.  Register online at the Hudson Institute's registration page.  

Here is a summary of the event:

Event Details
The aircraft carrier has served as the lynchpin of American naval power for eight decades. However, given their cost and mounting Anti-Access/Area Denial threats, many observers have questioned whether it is worthwhile to continue to build large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In a new report, Hudson Institute’s Center for American Seapower provides a comprehensive analysis of the future of the aircraft carrier. Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict examines the role of Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) in high-end conflict, identifying capabilities and vulnerabilities, and offering innovative recommendations for policymakers and military strategists in terms of concepts, capabilities, and capacities. The report concludes that while many criticisms of the platform have merit, the unmatched flexibility and adaptability of the aircraft carrier will continue to make it a critical Navy contribution to joint U.S. warfighting capabilities.

On October 8th, Hudson will release the report at an event in the Rayburn House Office Building. Congressman J. Randy Forbes (R-VA) will give keynote remarks on the role of the carrier in future warfighting. Bryan McGrath, deputy director of the Center for American Seapower, will give an overview of the report’s key insights, and Seth Cropsey, director of the Center for American Seapower, will moderate a panel on the importance of the carrier in American military strategy. The panel will feature Ronald O’Rourke, specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service; Robert Martinage, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; and Timothy A. Walton, co-author of the report and principal at Alios Consulting Group.

Kindly RSVP by Friday, October 2nd. Advance registration is required and a light lunch will be served.


SPEAKERS

Congressman J. Randy Forbes (R-VA)
Congressman J. Randy Forbes is Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. He has represented Virginia’s 4th District in the U.S. House of Representatives since 2001.

Seth Cropsey
Seth Cropsey is Director of the Center for American Seapower at Hudson Institute. He is a co-author of Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict.

Bryan McGrath
Bryan McGrath is Deputy Director of the Center for American Seapower at Hudson Institute. He is a co-author of Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict.

Timothy A. Walton
Timothy A. Walton is Principal at Alios Consulting Group and a co-author of Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict.

Ronald O’Rourke
Ronald O’Rourke is Specialist in National Defense at the Congressional Research Service.

Robert Martinage
Robert Martinage is Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

PROGRAM

Registration and Lunch
11:30 am — 12:00 pm
Introduction by Seth Cropsey
12:00 pm — 12:10 pm
Remarks by Congressman Randy Forbes
12:10 pm — 12:25 pm
Study Brief by Bryan McGrath
12:25 pm — 12:40 pm
Panel Discussion
12:40 pm — 1:30 pm
Audience Q & A
1:30 pm — 2:00 pm

This event will be recorded and posted
on hudson.org after it concludes.

How Many Carriers Does America Need?

Seth Cropsey, Tim Walton, and I tackle this and many other questions in a forthcoming report from the Hudson Center for American Seapower.  More information to follow, but we'll do a release event on the Hill 8 October midday.

Here's a little taste of what you'll hear from The Hill.

What Walter Pincus Gets Wrong

Carly Fiorina has surged to near the top of the GOP Leaderboard on the strength of two positive debate performances.  In last week's offering, she used about a minute of the time she was allocated to lay out some of the high points of her thinking about national defense.  In response, the Washington Post's Walter Pincus had a piece out yesterday that methodically takes her to task.  Let me now return the favor.

I will take quotes from Mr. Pincus' piece and expound upon them.

"Having proposed major steps to make the U.S. military “the strongest military on the face of the planet” — which it already is — she never said how the government would pay for her proposals."

While I agree with Mr, Pincus that the U.S. military is the world's premier force, this position does not necessarily mean that it is well-formed or postured for the future.  Ms. Fiorina and most of the other GOP candidates believe there are steps that should be taken to improve and enlarge the force--with which Mr. Pincus apparently disagrees.  That he takes her to task for how she would pay for her proposals is a fair charge--to a point--but surely he must have noticed the number of people on the stage and the degree to which Ringmaster Tapper was cutting people off.


Focus instead on her next point: “What I would do, immediately, is begin rebuilding the 6th Fleet.”As Stars and Stripes, the Pentagon’s newspaper, diplomatically put it the day after Fiorina spoke: “Her meaning wasn’t immediately clear — the U.S. 6th Fleet is less a collection of ships than a command structure for operating American warships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Moreover, the fleet is one of the few growing military commands in Europe.”Fiorina could have noticed that, beginning in March, the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and its strike group of five ships, consisting of about 6,000 sailors and Marines, began a planned tour of the 6th Fleet area and that four destroyers were being based at a U.S. Navy facility in Rota, Spain.

Lots to unpack here.  First, Mr. Pincus is on thin ice pointing to the TR's -- or any other carrier for that matter -- passage through the Med on the way to the CENTCOM AOR.  Indeed, EUCOM derives some value from these transits, but that is exactly what they are--transits.  The propensity of insecurity to break out on the rim of the Med between these transits continues to be inconvenient to the relevance of his thinking.  As for Stars and Stripes pedantry (approvingly cited by Mr. Pincus), while the Sixth Fleet is indeed a command structure, the forces under its command are dramatically fewer than they once were, and pointing to it as "growing" is interesting only from the standpoint of it having really nowhere else to go but up.

Another Fiorina proposal was to “conduct regular, aggressive military exercises in the Baltic states.” Has she ever inquired about “Baltops,” an annual military exercise in the Baltic Sea and surrounding land areas run by the U.S. military since the 1970s? The 43rd one was held with much publicity in June, with 17 countries and 5,600 ground, naval and air force personnel taking part. Activities took place throughout the Baltic Sea and in Poland, Sweden and Germany.

Pincus is correct in citing BALTOPS as an example of such an exercise, but he is assuredly cherry-picking from the most recent example--which was indeed impressive and representative of the kind of exercise that SHOULD be routinely conducted, as Fiorina states.  What Pincus does not provide is any sense of the degree to which BALTOPS had dramatically declined in size and scope over the years.

In Pincus' defense, what Ms. Fiorina is suggesting in terms of force buildup would indeed cost more than we are currently spending on defense.  Logically, she or any other candidate will have to provide voters with some sense of where the money to do so will come from.  But his insistence that doing so should have been part of a sixty second soundbite in the midst of a food-fight of a debate is off the mark.