2015 Year in Review for Chinese navy/air force

As the end of 2015 draw near, I’d like to take a look at all the important PLA stories of 2015. There are both numerous air force and naval stories. Compared to previous years, there were more news coming out of air force than navy this year as J-20, J-10, flankers and C-919 project all had significant progress.

The major focus of this past few months have been the progress of J-20 project. After 4 new prototypes came out last year with significant changes from the J-20 demonstrators, there was not much happening this year until September of this year when prototypes No. 2016 came out followed by prototype No. 2017 in November. The latest prototype showed slightly reshaped canopy and a new ejection seat, but is generally the same as the earlier prototypes. With these 2 prototypes, there are rumours of 2 more prototypes No. 2018 and 2019 coming out to speed up the testing phase. That has yet to happen, but we have seen what appears to be the first Low Rate Initial Production J-20 showing up most recently with the appearance of No. 2101. Unlike the prototype ones, it is painted entirely in yellow primers. The prototypes are typically sent to CFTE for flight-testing. If No. 2101 is the first LRIP model, then it will probably get sent with the rest of its batch to FTTC for expanding the flight envelope, testing out usage of new systems, developing combat tactics and training manual for J-20 pilots. The first J-10 squad was also established in FTTC before the 44th regiment received J-10. At the current pace, it’s definitely possible for J-20 to achieve IOC or some level of combat capability by 2017. Compared to PAK-FA, I think J-20 is now actually quite a bit ahead. The only major concern for this program is that WS-15 engine is still several years from entering service, so will be quite underpowered for the first few years. At the current time, J-20 is probably testing with AL-31FN Cep 3 engine (that are used for J-10C). Some of the missiles being developed for weapon bay may not be ready yet, but other programs like PL-10, miniature PGMs should be. Not much seemed to have happened with FC-31 project this year, but it has appeared in numerous air shows. For 2016, I will be watching out to see how many LRIP J-20s come out and the expanded test program for the J-20 prototypes. It will also be interested to see if a second FC-31 prototype comes out next year.

At the same time that J-20 has been moving forward, the production of J-10 series have started to pick up again. J-10B development has in my opinion been delays due to CAC focusing on J-20 project, but production level has been pretty good since 2014. There were about 53 J-10Bs produced in block 1 and they have all joined service. Block 2 production has since started and reached at least in the mid 20s. They are supposedly built to the J-10C standard with AESA radar (instead of PESA like J-10B) and numerous other electronic improvements. We are still unsure of all the regiments that have received J-10B/C, because photos normally have their numbers blurred out. Huitong’s blog currently has listed FTTC, 2nd division, 19th division and 21st division as having J-10B/C regiments. From what I have seen, FTTC received J-10Bs first and the old J-10A 2nd division regiment has been receiving J-10Bs. Also, it’s interesting that we have been seeing numerous J-10Bs (without the J-10C improvements) flying with Taihang engine. So I think it is possible that we will see both J-10B with Taihang and J-10C with AL-31FN Series 3 engine produced next year. Based on the recent production numbers, China probably needs to place another AL-31FN order soon.

China also had some more movements with its larger aircraft programs. It received the second refurbished IL-78s from Ukraine (out of 3 on order) and more of the refurbished IL-76s. We also continue to hear more on development of Y-20 and its engines (WS-18 and WS-20). The development of Y-20 will probably complete by 2017 based on its current progress. As I wrote about many times before, PLAAF has large requirement of Y-20 for transport, tankers and special missions platform. I’m sure the LRIP for Y-20 will begin next year, but it’s hard to say when they would be able to ramp up its production to the point where it no longer needs to import IL-76/78s. At the same time, China unveiled the first C919 airliner this year and also finally completed flight certification of ARJ-21. At this point, it seems like C919 is already a great improvement in almost every aspect over ARJ-21. However, it’s going into the market against an extremely capable A320NEO series and B737 MAX series. It does not seem to have any real advantage over those 2 series and will not enter service earlier. In most of China’s domestic routes, it should be competitive with those 2, so I would expect it to capture a good number of orders once it completes flight certification. The big challenges ahead will be to obtain FAA/EASA certification, achieve export orders, ramping up production and completing all of this with minimal delays. This is a tremendous undertaking, but COMAC would be getting a lot of valuable experiences if it can achieve all of that.

Another area of aviation that China has done well on this year is in the field of UAVs. The CH-3/4 UCAVs have been exported to numerous countries (at least Nigeria, Iraq, Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia). It has already been used in conflicts against ISIS and Yemen rebels. China had been displaying numerous miniature (50 kg) PGMs and ground attack missiles in weapon shows along with CH-4 UAVs and these have now been tested in real war action. So from these action, it’s likely that CH-4 will get more export orders in the coming years. The WingLoong series has also achieved export orders with UAE and with PLA. Along with these MQ-1 like UCAV program, China is also developing numerous larger UAVs and UCAVs. Those programs are likely developed just for domestic usage and not marketed for exports. It’s unclear how many of these programs will actually see production.

For the Chinese navy, the major ticket item is its aircraft carrier program. Throughout this year, more and more photos came out from Dalian rumoured to be modules of the first domestic aircraft carriers. At this point, I think most Chinese navy watchers would agree that this is the first domestic carrier (aka Project 001A). Over 2016, one of the main areas to follow would be the progress of this first carrier. Over the past year, the intensity of CV-16 exercises seemed to be picking up. Over this past year, Shenyang AC has been producing more production versions of J-15s. There are at least 15 of them now from 100 to 114 and all of them probably have flown off CV-16. In the most recent exercise, at least 6 of them were shown on deck at the same time and as many as 10 were probably on CV-16 in this exercise. That’s a definite step forward in carrier operations from earlier this year and previous years. On top of having more J-15s on board, having more types of combat aircraft and helicopter on board operating at different weather conditions and at nighttime are the next steps in improving carrier operation. Chinese naval aviation has a long way to go in developing its combat capability, so will be sure to continue to see its progress next year. I think it’s also interesting that we have yet to see photos of CV-16 leading a large flotilla with numerous escorts like 052C/D and 054A, so that’s also something to look to see in 2016. The Chinese navy has to do all of this with very little help from other carrier operating navies around the world, so it has been deliberately ramping up operation for the past 3 years. It may take several more years to see the things I’ve listed here.

The rest of the surface fleet programs have also been progressing well like previous years. The 4 new 052C ships have now all joined service as No. 150 to 153. Two more 052Ds (No. 173 and No. 174) have also joined service. The main gun PJ-38 has also recently did a comprehensive round of firing tests. The 052Ds are equipped with the latest VLS, multi functional radar, variable depth sonar and PJ-38s, so they represent quite a major improvement in capabilities over 052C despite sharing the same hull. There are probably at least 5 more 052Ds from JN shipyard and 2 more from Dalian shipyard that are under construction. We will probably also start seeing progress of 055 in one of these shipyards next year. Amongst the 054As, a couple of more joined service this year and more modules have also appeared. They are also installed with the new VDS. The production of 054As has already exceeded what was expected originally, allowing the older Jianghu ships and the 4 Jiangwei ships to be decommissioned. It will be interesting to see how many more 054As ships are built when many have expected PLAN to move production to a newer 054 variant. Similarly, Type 056 corvettes have also continued to be produced in large numbers this year and they are expected to replace the roles of Type 037s in patrol, sub chasers and ASuW. And finally, the 4th Type 071 recently joined service as No. 988.

Aside from the surface combatants, the replenishment fleet has also seen a huge boom this year. Most recently, the 40K+ ton displacement Type 901 AOR was launched. This type of shape is significant, because it’s expected to be the primary AOR for China’s future carrier fleet. It is much larger than China’s existing Type 903 class of AORs. Also, it is powered by gas turbines instead of diesel engines on the Type 903 AORS, allowing for much higher speed to keep up with the rest of carrier fleet. It also has more resupply gantries located in the middle of the ship than Type 903, which allows for underway refueling with more ships. At the same time, both HD and GSI shipyard have continued to build and commissioned Type 903A ships. There were 3 Type 903A (No. 960, 966 and 963) have joined service this year. There are at least 2 other one launched and another building. The Type 904 large store ships also had a lot of activity this year. There were 2 Type 904B ships (No. 961 and 962) that joined service year. These additional ships are probably there to supply the increasing amount of activity that China has in South China Sea and East China Sea. So overall, this was a really active year for China’s replenishment fleet. A couple of the older replenishment ships will probably retire over the next couple of years, but the increasing number of large ships joining into service will allow for greater power projection capabilities and also supplying near by islands.

Finally, China’s coast guard fleet construction activity has continued this year with some of the largest cutters joining service. There were 12000-ton class, 5000-ton class, 4000-ton class and numerous 3000-ton class cutters getting launched and commissioned. A lot of ships seem to have conflicting roles, but they were originally created for different agencies and for provincial bureaus. I think that most of the programs are nearing conclusion at the moment. Until the next 5-year plan gets developed with similar number of projects, we probably will not see this same level of expansion for a while.

As a whole, an interesting year with news from both the navy and air force. I will be looking to follow up on most of these programs next year.

SECNAV Gets a Memo

In a stinging rebuke to Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter issued a

memorandum Tuesday that is noteworthy not only for its content, but also for its tone. Its prominence in the public domain raises questions about Mr. Mabus' future within the Department of Defense.

The heart of the issue is something that readers of this blog and navalists in general have been chewing on for a few years now, and that is the question of capability vs. capacity. During the first Obama term, Secretary Mabus was teamed with Under Secretary of the Navy Bob Work, a man of gigantic talent and deep strategic insight. Work has always downplayed fleet size as a measurement of anything of real importance, and he found a natural ally in the then CNO, Admiral Greenert, in putting forward the “Payloads over Platforms” mantra.  Mr. Work’s departure for the private sector in the second term seemed to unshackle Mr. Mabus, who dramatically raised the rhetoric behind shipbuilding and the importance of a larger fleet. This emphasis also coincided with Chuck Hagel’s tenure as Secretary of Defense, which was not marked by particularly dynamic strategic thinking.

Work’s return to government as the Deputy Secretary of Defense (and Ash Carter’s eventual return as SECDEF) signaled rough times ahead for Secretary Mabus, especially in a pressurized budget environment. The simple truth is that Mr. Mabus has not chosen to concentrate his efforts as Secretary on two very important influence groups—the OSD staff, and Capitol Hill. And over the past year or so, OSD began to more and more prominently discuss “posture” as opposed to “presence”, even as SECNAV continued to reinforce the importance of numbers.  Posture is more of a nebulous term than presence; presence is a component of it, but so is capability, and forward basing, and employment patterns. Posture undercuts presence by insinuating that the Navy does presence for the sake of doing presence, and that is a luxury that could no longer be afforded.

And so in the annual process of submitting the Navy program, Mr. Mabus failed to account for the changed environment vis-à-vis OSD. It is difficult to imagine that a memo as strongly worded as this came out of the blue; it is likely that there were significant negotiations between the Navy and OSD at the staff level. What appears to have happened is that an initial program submission was criticized by OSD with “suggested” changes, and that those changes were insufficiently accounted for in the final program submission. And it was to this level of non-response that Secretary Carter ultimately responded.

There are several key elements of the memo worth discussion, but none more important than the third paragraph, which reads in part “…our military is first and foremost a warfighting force, and while we seek to deter wars, we must also be prepared to fight and win them. This means that overall, the Navy’s strategic future requires focusing more on posture, not only on presence, and more on new capabilities, not only on ship numbers.”

I interpret this statement (and the thinking behind it) as saying that “in a pressurized budgetary environment, conventional deterrence is of relatively less importance than warfighting”, and one can see this reflected in the items taken from the budget (lesser capable ships) and what is added to the budget (munitions, upgrades to the submarine force, and strike fighter capacity). 

I am of two minds on this conclusion. First, as a Seapower advocate, I find myself rejecting the false choice between deterrence and war-fighting. The fleet must be balanced for both, and the rhetoric coming from OSD leads one to believe that budgetary restrictions have caused them to unbalance the Navy program with a thumb on the scale of warfighting. The nation can afford both, and the case must be made to ensure that the Navy receives the resources to do both. But that is not the budget environment we are in today, and so the consultant in me sees rationality and coherence in the OSD position.

Additionally, as a former Surface Warfare Officer, I am disappointed in the cuts to the shipbuilding program, but am buoyed by a number of important directives in this memo concerning surface electronic warfare, SM-6 missile procurement, DDG modification adds and construction rate, and TLAM upgrades. Now if we could just get moving faster on a higher performance ASUW weapon (even higher than a modified TLAM), we’d be talking.

What struck me most about this memo was its almost parental tone of disappointment. I told a friend yesterday that it sounded like a letter a young man would get in college from his father when he had serially overspent his allowance. One rarely sees THIS level of bluntness in correspondence between the policy elephants. Which brings me to the most shocking part of this memo—that it wasn’t classified or limited in its distribution in ANY way. Either OSD utterly failed to appreciate the gravity of the memo and simply overlooked its control, or there was a desire for it to be leaked to the media. And while I generally tend to follow the rule of “when faced with a choice between villainy and incompetence in a bureaucracy, choose incompetence”, in this case it appears that the darker view applies.

I do not know Secretary Mabus and so cannot imagine how he has reacted to this memo. But I have had some exposure to folks who work at such lofty levels, and this kind of repudiation—especially after six and a half years of service—is unlikely to go over well. I would not be surprised if Mr. Mabus decides to resign his office, a casualty of the fiscal environment and his refusal to recognize how the landscape had shifted around him. 

Bryan McGrath

An American General Staff Must Remain a Heretical Thought

     Congressional hearings on the provisions of the thirty year old Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 have the potential to substantially improve defense decision-making and move the nation toward a 21^st century defense organization. They have also allowed old, discredited concepts to surface in a time where not all recognize their potential for harm. One of these is the idea of an American “General Staff” that would supposedly be an improvement over the current Joint Chiefs of Staff system. Historically, the General Staff has been a product of continental, authoritarian regimes focused on operational and tactical land warfare, and not one of democratic nations with global interests. A U.S. version of this organization has been proposed in similar forms since 1941, and has not improved with age. In the post World War 2 period, the idea of an American General Staff has been used as a means of ensuring or usurping military control within the U.S. military and U.S. civilian government organization. Centralization of military decision-making has never yielded good results and even the relatively modest Goldwater Nichols reforms have led to several significant poor outcomes since 1986. A plurality of inputs in defense decision-making, as practiced by the Allied powers during the Second World War, and in the early and middle Cold War, is well proven as a system to ensure maximum review and vetting of strategic defense decisions. As the nation looks to get more out of its shrinking defense establishment, the implementation of a General Staff represents a retrograde movement toward increased despotism in defense organization.

     The concept of a single chief-general staff is the product of the military times and operational geography of Sweden’s Gustavus Adolphus (1594-1632) and Frederick the Great of Prussia (1712-1786). It achieved its high water mark in the Wars of German Unification from 1864 to 1870 when the Prussian Army and troops of allied German states defeated the armies of Denmark, the Austrian Empire and the French Empire of Napoleon III in a series of short wars. Over the course of these conflicts the Prussian Army “Great General Staff” became both a planning staff for the Prussian Army, but also a clearinghouse for best practices in operational and tactical warfare. General Staff officers alternated between staff and operational assignments in order to maintain their currency in the state of ground warfare. The Prussian General Staff became a German one after unification in 1871 and continued to improve upon its proven methods. Under the influence of the General Staff the German Army achieved arguably the best operational and tactical performance of all combatant armies in the World Wars.

     Despite this achievement, the General Staff concept contained significant flaws that manifested themselves as early as the German unification wars. After defeating the Austrians in the major battle of Koinggratz, the Prussian Chief of Staff von Moltke and the King Wilhelm wanted to march on and capture the Austrian capital of Vienna. Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who did not want a wider war, narrowly persuaded the King and his generals to avoid making Austria a permanent enemy with such a step. In the 1870 Franco-Prussian War Bismarck was unsuccessful in convincing the King and his generals to not lay siege to and bombard Paris, or demand reparations in the form of territory submission. The Prussian siege caused the collapse of the French government and the taking of Alsace Lorraine a semi-permanent condition of hostility between the two states that contributed to war in 1914.

     The German General Staff was an Army organization and even as Germany’s strategic horizon’s expanded in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries, it made no attempt to expand its geographic or operational concepts beyond its central European origins. It did not foster the same cooperation with the new Imperial German Navy that it demanded from Army commanders and political leaders. Its Nazi-era joint doppleganger, the Obercommando der Wehmacht (OKW), was organized in an equally rigid manner as its Army predecessor. It was supposed to duplicate the Army general staff on a joint level, but it remained more a facilitating vehicle for Hitler’s own ideas instead of an independent planning organization. Its one possibility to shine was in the 1940 Norway campaign, but inter-service bickering in the planning process caused Hitler to assume overall command and micromanage the nominal joint and ground force commander, General von Falkenhorst though the OKW Operations staff in Berlin.[1] The Allied combined Chiefs of Staff, by contrast, operated by discussion and consensus building rather than command fiat and were able to orchestrate truly joint operations through more informal channels of cooperation.

     The idea of an American “General Staff” began with a proposal by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy for such an organization in June 1941.  It was unanimously opposed by the service chiefs and service secretaries. The most significant support came from Brigadier General Dwight Eisenhower, then servings as Army Wars Plans Division Director. Eisenhower claimed that, “the principles of strategy and employment of forces were the same for all services.”[2] Eisenhower’s statements seem to harden the stance of the Navy, who fundamentally disagreed with this assertion. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall agreed with the Navy that any “functions of the Chief of a Joint General Staff,” would, “deal with assembling, coordinating and briefing military information to the President” rather than supreme command.[3]

     After the war the services resumed their usual competition for scare resources. The Army chose this moment to re-introduce the general staff concept for consideration. Army leadership was especially concerned that their service would lose out in postwar budget battles to the “more glamorous Air Force and Navy if a single military department headed by an overall Chief of Staff was not in place.”[4] Other factors alongside budget battles had also emerged to perhaps favor the general staff concept. There was great pressure on the U.S. military services to integrate their command and control functions after several investigative committees blamed the surprise Pearl Harbor attack on failures in Army and Navy cooperation. The prevention of an atomic surprise attack was also a significant concern in the general public.[5] The Army, notably Generals Marshall in public and Eisenhower in private, recommended a unified national military structure with the military service departments much reduced in authority. The Army’s most “radical” element was the introduction of a Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, now styled as the “Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces” who would act as the overall commander of the nation’s military forces. That officer would be provided with a full General Staff to carry out his responsibilities. Overall, it appeared that the Army scheme, known as the Collins Plan by its designated presenter General J. Lawton Collins, would, “would remove the civilian secretary from any significant influence not only on matters concerning appropriations, but on those concerning military strategy.”[6] Eisenhower to his credit later recommended removing the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces from the chain of command and making him instead the President’s principal military adviser as a compromise in the maintenance of overall armed forces harmony.[7]

     There was also support for a General Staff based on the statements of the surviving German military leadership.While the Nazi system was universally despised, the surviving German Generals were able to create a myth that they were operational geniuses who if not controlled by Hitler could have won the war with meager resources. The emerging Cold War restricted access to the Soviet view which suggested German incompetence at all levels of warfare, and in its absence the idea of a general staff on perhaps the German model gained currency in the West.

     The idea of an Army-organized and operated General Staff was anathema to senior naval officers for many of the same reasons it had been in 1941. Army officers did not fundamentally understand the nuances of naval warfare. Furthermore, the leadership of the services that emerged in 1945 had fought two very different wars. Army leaders such as Eisenhower and General Omar Bradley had fought a primarily land campaign in Europe long after the German Navy or Air Force had much influence on their operations. Navy leaders like Admirals Chester Nimitz and future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) Admiral Arthur Radford had fought a primarily sea and air war in the Pacific that was briefly punctuated with ground force operations much smaller in comparison with those of Europe. Neither group had fought a truly joint war, although the Army leadership vehemently maintained that they had and that the Navy had not done so in the Pacific.

      Navy Secretary James Forrestal feared the consequences of unification for both the Navy and for the “national security” of the United States in general.[8] In cooperation with his long time friend and business partner Ferdinand Eberstadt, he recommended a postwar concept of defense organization that maintained unified command in geographic operational environments while preserving a corporate, decentralized authority in Washington. Eberstadt argued that, “separate organizations engendered healthy competition and high morale.”[9] Navy leadership agreed and believed that, “A Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Committee system, in which decisions about how best to allocate military forces to accomplish national goals would be made through compromise following a thorough airing of competing service viewpoints, which would provide the most realistic solution.”[10] President Truman supported the Army’s plan and was very unhappy that his Navy Secretary was advancing an alternate organization concept.[11] The Army plan at first had significantly more support than the Navy’s, but despite strong testimony in its favor by Marshall and Eisenhower, the Navy’s concept won the day and the National Security Act of 1947 largely reflected the Eberstadt report’s recommendations.

    Eisenhower remained dissatisfied by the corporate military organization he inherited in 1952 and again set about creating a general staff system. Unlike 1947, however, Ike envisioned a Chairman and JCS that responded to his direction much as his Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Europe (SHAEF) and later NATO staffs did when the President was still in uniform. His 1953 Reorganization Plan 6, which survived a significant challenge in the House of Representatives, further increased the power of the Chairman by authorizing him to manage the Joint Staff. It also increased the size of the Defense Department and added a number of new Deputy Secretaries. When this system did not prove strong enough for Eisenhower’s liking, he began a second round of reform that resulted in the landmark 1958 reform package that effectively removed the JCS from the chain of command altogether, and further strengthened the Joint Unified and Specified Commanders. Eisenhower failed to get his desired increase in the size of the Joint Staff and Congress still inserted into the legislation a clause that stated, “The joint staff shall not be operated or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority.”[12]

     While Eisenhower was not able to impose a general staff system, his efforts essentially created one where the President could serve as his own supreme commander with direct access to combatant forces through the Unified Commanders. Eisenhower brooked no dissent from his service chiefs once he made a decision and imposed loyalty tests on his JCS appointees, notably General Maxwell Taylor and Admiral Arleigh Burke.[13] While Ike’s goal remained “unity of command”, he set a precedent where the JCS began an essentially military relationship with the President, as opposed to one of military officer and civilian leader. Admiral Burke later regretted this change and suggested that had the service chiefs been more forceful and “pounded the table aggressively” when they disagreed with the President, poor national security outcomes like the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 could have been prevented.[14] Eisenhower’s system may have been ideal for a former 5 star coalition military commander, but his successors were not so eminently qualified to operate his system of unified command.

     The succeeding Kennedy administration began its relationship with the Joint Chiefs on a sour note as a result of what Burke described as a failure to “pound the table.” Kennedy was later quoted after the Bay of Pigs disaster as saying to one author, “The first advice I am going to give my successor is to watch the generals and avoid feeling that just because they were military men their opinions on military matters were worth a damn.”[15] This feeling of distrust continued over the course of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Secretary of Defense McNamara and his systems analyst acolytes sought to organize the military around operational missions rather than by service or geographic area.[16]  Conflict over entry into and conduct of the Vietnam War further divided successive Presidents and civilian defense leaders from the uniformed leadership of the armed forces. These conflicts continued through the 1970’s. The period of 1945-1986 was one of continual battle over which branch of government; Congress or the President would exercise the most control over the uniformed military.

    A much modified version of the General Staff concept returned with the 1980’s defense reform movement that culminated in the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. In this reform effort, members of Congress unhappy with the outcome of the Vietnam War, and failures in special operations missions from 1975-1983, supported by Congressional staffers that had been McNamara-trained analysts combined forces against the post 1958 JCS system. These reformers argued for a powerful, “non parochial” uniformed military leadership, a military organized around missions as recommended by Mr. McNamara in the 1960’s and an enlarged and empowered Department of Defense to again combat the supposed threat of “lack of civilian control.” As in 1958, the reform movement that led to the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 achieved some noteworthy success, but failed to attain its long sought desire for a supreme military commander leading a mission-focused force. The 1985 “Defense Organization, The Need for Change” report to the Senate Armed Services Committee details these goals. This report, named for its principle author (and former Program Analysis and Evaluation (PAE) analyst James Locher), recommended 12 specific changes to DoD organization including the disestablishment of the JCS and its replacement with a council of retired four star officers, as well as organization of the armed forces along mission lines.[17] Locher would later characterize the more modest reforms of Goldwater Nichols as the true and only aims of the Goldwater-based reorganization effort, but curiously Senator Goldwater never said as much in any of the biographical efforts he supported or in his own autobiography.

     Reformers gained much ground, but were again defeated in their attempt to achieve overwhelming victory by another Navy-led opposition effort. Navy Secretary John Lehman mounted an aggressive campaign within both the Reagan administration and Congress against the legislation on constitutional and historical grounds. Supported by the Navy and Marine Corps service chiefs as well as the other service secretaries and  Chiefs of Staff, Lehman condemned the general staff concept, whether active duty or retired officer in membership as against the very successful Anglo-American concepts of cooperative joint leadership that had been successful since the Second World War. Although he failed to deter Congress from reform measures, his opposition effort prevented any of Locher’s proposals from actually entering law.

     Although Congress supported the Goldwater Nichols Act with overwhelming support more characteristic of a resolution honoring someone’s birthday rather than a major policy decision, the legislative branch ended up as a loser in terms of which civilian authority would effectively control the nation’s defense establishment. While Congress retained control of budgetary affairs, its decision to expand both the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Department of Defense put more overall control in the hands of the executive branch.

    There was some buyer’s remorse after 1986 over the creation of a powerful Chairman. Fears that a powerful Chairman could become a “man on horseback” capable of threatening the democratic process first appeared during the chairmanship of General Colin Powell. General Powell, however, merely made full use of the new powers granted his office, and as someone who observed this period once told the author, “if General Powell was attempting to operate beyond the authority of his office, he would have been immediately fired by then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney.” Successive Presidents have appointed Chairmen with less desire than General Powell to carve out independent military opinions. Clearly a powerful military figure and presumably a general staff serve at the pleasure of the President and are not likely to emerge as an independent center of power without the authorization of the political branches.

     While the Goldwater Nichols Act did not result in a General Staff, it has been responsible for several poor outcomes in national security decision-making since 1986. Acting on his expanded powers as a combatant commander, Central Command commander General Norman Schwartzkopf signed an armistice with the Iraqi regime following the success of Operation Desert Storm. As part of this agreement he allowed the Iraqi regime to operate helicopters that later successfully put down a Shiite revolt the U.S. had encouraged.[18] Had the revolt been successful the U.S. might have obviated the need for a Second Gulf War in 2003. That conflict featured a much smaller and less diverse coalition force for the mission of ending the regime of Saddam Hussein than that of Gulf War 1. Comparisons between the allied forces arrayed for each Iraq operation were inevitable. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki and former CJCS (then Secretary of State) Colin Powell both questioned the intentional reduced size of the coalition entry force. Shinseki suggested a much larger force would be needed to, “maintain safety in a country with "ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems."[19] Powell was also concerned about the smaller size of the coalition force and that its supply lines would be excessively long.[20] Both however were successfully rebuffed thanks to the command arrangements instituted by the Goldwater Nichols Act whereby service chiefs and even cabinet officials have no official authority over operational military commanders. When the Iraqi counter-insurgency war began to founder in mid to late 2006, President Bush sought ways to improve U.S. military performance in the war torn nation. The eventual U.S. troop surge was not a product of the Joint Staff, U.S. Central Command, or the myriad of Department of Defense offices assigned to the Iraq war effort, but instead one produced by retired officers, academics and think tank analysts. Furthermore, it was planned by an ad hoc group of Army and Marine Corps colonels rather than the Joint or CENTOM staff. A diversity of choice in the marketplace of defense ideas still seems to produce the best decisions.

          Defense reforms from those of Eisenhower’s through the Goldwater Nichols Act have created a widening chasm between military leaders focused on increasingly operational solutions and political leaders cut off from the realities of military efforts. Unity of command at the tactical and operational level has been a hallmark of Western military effort since the days of the Roman Legions. That unity of effort, however, is not desired at the summit of strategic thinking. The marketplace of defense ideas as described by Forrestal and Eberstadt must be in place to ensure optimum best military solutions to strategic concerns.

     The battle between the U.S. executive and legislative branches for control of the U.S. military; the issue at the center of all U.S. defense reorganization reform efforts since 1945 has fundamentally upset the balance between strategy and operational art. The imposition of a unitary chain of command beginning at the highest levels of government has turned the marketplace of defense ideas into a Soviet GOSPLAN style command economy of thought. In this condition the U.S. military has increasingly turned to operational art as a substitute for real strategic thinking. An elite U.S. general staff, disconnected from the wider body of defense intelligentsia would merely “double down” on the concept of operational art and further limit the choices of political leaders. If the recent effects of the Goldwater Nichols Act are any guide, further centralization and contraction in the overall body of those persons engaged in truly strategic thinking will further impair the U.S.’s ability to achieve political military success in the increasingly unstable post-Post Cold War world.

    This author has the utmost respect for those advocating a General Staff as the solution to U.S. military decision making, but suggests the verdict of history is decidedly against them. Eisenhower decided to remove the JCS from the chain of command and hobbled their ability to serve as independent military advisers to the whole of govt. McNamara (supported by Kennedy and Johnson), further weakened the powers of the chiefs, set up the organizations that conducted the ultimately unsuccessful Vietnam effort, and altered the acquisition process to the current, Soviet 5 year plan system. Senator Goldwater and his fellow 1980’s reformers removed the remaining influence possessed by the service chiefs in operational affairs,  promoted the CJCS to ad hoc member of the President's cabinet (reducing that officer's "bona fides" as an impartial military adviser), and further decentralized the business of strategy by empowering the COCOM's as regional proconsuls. It all leads back to political leadership, and yet they insist on blaming the service chiefs and other uniformed military, or the "system"; a product of the last 70 years created by the political classes.

     Instead of a General Staff, Congress should act to restore a balance to the U.S. defense establishment. It should return the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a position of “first among equals” as the billet was before 1986. The JCS as a collective body rather than a single officer would be best able to present the executive branch with a truly military viewpoint free of pressure from the politically appointed Secretary of Defense. It should also return the service secretaries to the business of strategic military thought; their proper role in the Liberal Western tradition. The marketplace of defense ideas has increasingly one of empty shelves. A U.S. General Staff would further attenuate and perhaps close the market for good.

   

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[1] Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1939-1945, Lanham, MD, Scarborough Publishing, 1978, pp. 193, 194.

[2] Jeffrey Barlow, From Hot War to Cold, The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945-1955, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2009, p. 64.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Barlow, p. 87.

[5] David Jablonsky, War by Land Sea and Air, Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command, New Haven, Con, Yale University Press, 2010, p. 142.

[6]Jablonsky, p. 148.

[7] Jablonsky, pp. 150, 151.

[8] Jablonsky, p. 143 (Forrestal coined the term “national security” in Congressional testimony.)

[9] Jeffrey Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal, A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949, College Station, TX, Texas A&M University Press, 1991, p. 107.

[10] Barlow, p. 87.

[11] Ibid, pp. 89, 90.

[12] Jablonsky, p. 297.

[13] Ibid, pp. 247, 248.

[14] Arleigh A . Burke, interview by John T. Mason Jr., February 1973, interview 4, transcript, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Ks

[15]  Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1978, p. 524.

[16] Paul Ryan. First Line of Defense, The U.S. Navy Since 1945, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 1981, p. 31.

[17] http://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/goldwater/id/2160, pp. 11, 12, last assessed 11 December 2015.

[18] Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The General’s War, The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1995, pp. 446-450.

[19] http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-02-25-iraq-us_x.htm, last assessed 11 December 2015.

[20] Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier, New York, Harper Collins, 2004, pp. 394, 395.

Dr. Janine Davidson for Under Secretary of the Navy

Dr. Janine Davidson

On Tuesday, December 15, the Senate Armed Services Committee will meet to consider the nomination of Dr. Janine Davidson as the Under Secretary of the Navy. I have every confidence that she will make an exceptional Under Secretary, and I urge the Senate to confirm her nomination with dispatch.

It may strike some readers as odd that someone with the political views that I have would publicly advocate confirmation of a first team member of the Democratic Party national security apparatus. And while it is not a completely a natural impulse, it is in this case, as I have known and worked with Dr. Davidson for nine years. In that time, I have come to admire her competence, her command of the facts, and her no-nonsense toughness. As I consider her nomination to this post and the fact that it has been empty for nearly two years, I find myself wondering why it was that it took so long to settle on such an excellent choice.  She is exceptionally talented, fully qualified, and additionally, a good friend.

The days of Service Under Secretaries being appointed largely as a reward for political loyalty are over. As the Chief Operating Officer of the Service, the position requires a great deal of vision, a deep knowledge of the Pentagon Bureaucracy, and a fundamental understanding of the Service mission and importance to national defense. I have personally seen each of these qualities in Dr. Davidson—up close. A former Air Force pilot, this early mistaken career choice by the daughter of a Navy Officer can be chalked up to the fumbling of an NROTC recruiter who informed a young Davidson that she could not fly in the Navy. History now has a chance to be righted, and this skilled leader can help guide the Navy at a time when such guidance is sorely needed.

I look forward to her confirmation hearing, and then when the Senate has rendered its good judgment, to working with her to improve American Seapower.

Bryan McGrath

Electronic Warfare's Place in Distributed Lethality: Testimony to HASC Seapower and Projection Forces

Jon's note: Below is my prepared statement from Wednesday's hearing. I apologize for being on hiatus here for so long. I'm at a loss for free time to write at present due to family and work obligations, but I hope that I'll have more flexibility later this winter.

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces

Prepared Statement of Jonathan F. Solomon

Senior Systems and Technology Analyst, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc.

December 9^th, 2015

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency. These views have not been coordinated with, and are not offered in the interest of, Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. or any of its customers.

Thank you Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member Courtney and all the members of the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee for granting me the honor of testifying today and to submit this written statement for the record.

I am a former U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer (SWO), and served two Division Officer tours in destroyers while on active duty from 2000-2004. My two billets were perhaps the most tactically-intensive ones available to a junior SWO: Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer and AEGIS Fire Control Officer. As the young officer responsible for overseeing the maintenance and operation of my destroyers’ principal combat systems, I obtained an unparalleled foundational education in the tactics and technologies of modern naval warfare. In particular, I gained a fine appreciation for the difficulties of interpreting and then optimally acting upon the dynamic and often ambiguous “situational pictures” that were produced by the sensors I “owned.” I can attest to the fact that Clausewitz’s concepts of “fog” and “friction” remain alive and well in the 21^st Century in spite of, and sometimes exacerbated by, our technological advancements.

My civilian job of the past eleven years at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. has been to provide programmatic and systems engineering support to various surface combat system acquisition programs within the portfolio of the Navy’s Program Executive Officer for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS). This work has provided me an opportunity to participate, however peripherally, in the development of some of the surface Navy’s future combat systems technologies. It has also enriched my understanding of the technical principles and considerations that affect combat systems performance; this is no small thing considering that I am not an engineer by education.

In recent years, and with the generous support and encouragement of Mr. Bryan McGrath, I’ve taken up a hobby of writing articles that connect my academic background in maritime strategy, naval history, naval technology, and deterrence theory with my professional experiences. One of my favorite topics concerns the challenges and opportunities surrounding the potential uses of electronic warfare in modern maritime operations. It’s a subject that I first encountered while on active duty, and later explored in great detail during my Masters thesis investigation of how advanced wide-area oceanic surveillance-reconnaissance-targeting systems were countered during the Cold War, and might be countered in the future.

Electronic warfare receives remarkably little attention in the ongoing debates over future operating concepts and the like. Granted, classification serves as a barrier with respect to specific capabilities and systems. But electronic warfare’s basic technical principles and effects are and have always been unclassified. I believe that much of the present unfamiliarity concerning electronic warfare stems from the fact that it’s been almost a quarter century since U.S. naval forces last had to be prepared to operate under conditions in which victory—not to mention survival—in battle hinged upon achieving temporary localized mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum over the adversary.

America’s chief strategic competitors intimately understand the importance of electronic warfare to fighting at sea. Soviet Cold War-era tactics for anti-ship attacks heavily leveraged what they termed “radio-electronic combat,” and there’s plenty of open source evidence available to suggest that this remains true in today’s Russian military as well.[i] The Chinese are no different with respect to how they conceive of fighting under “informatized conditions.”[ii] In a conflict against either of these two great powers, U.S. maritime forces’ sensors and communications pathways would assuredly be subjected to intense disruption, denial, and deception via jamming or other related tactics. Likewise, ill-disciplined electromagnetic transmissions by U.S. maritime forces in a combat zone might very well prove suicidal in that they could provide an adversary a bullseye for aiming its long-range weapons.

To their credit, the Navy’s seniormost leadership have gone to great lengths to stress the importance of electronic warfare in recent years, most notably in the new Maritime Strategy. They have even launched a new concept they call electromagnetic maneuver warfare, which appears geared towards exactly the kinds of capabilities I am about to outline. It is therefore quite likely that major elements of the U.S. Navy’s future surface warfare vision, Distributed Lethality, will take electronic warfare considerations into account. I would suggest that Distributed Lethality’s developers do so in three areas in particular: Command and Control (C²) doctrine, force-wide communications methods, and over-the-horizon targeting and counter-targeting measures.

First and foremost, Distributed Lethality’s C² approach absolutely must be rooted in the doctrinal philosophy of “mission command.” Such doctrine entails a higher-echelon commander, whether he or she is the commander of a large maritime battleforce or the commander of a Surface Action Group (SAG) consisting of just a few warships, providing subordinate ship or group commanders with an outline of his or her intentions for how a mission is to be executed, then delegating extensive tactical decision-making authority to them to get the job done. This would be very different than the  Navy’s C² culture of the past few decades in which higher-echelon commanders often strove to use a “common tactical picture” to exercise direct real-time control, sometimes from a considerable distance, over subordinate groups and ships. Such direct control will not be possible in contested areas in which communications using the electromagnetic spectrum are—unless concealed using some means—readily exploitable by an electronic warfare-savvy adversary. Perhaps the adversary might use noise or deceptive jamming, deceptive emissions, or decoy forces to confuse or manipulate the “common picture.” Or perhaps the adversary might attack the communications pathways directly with the aim of severing the voice and data connections between commanders and subordinates. An adept adversary might even use a unit or flagship’s insufficiently concealed radiofrequency emissions to vector attacks. It should be clear, then, that the embrace of mission command doctrine by the Navy’s senior-most leadership on down to the deckplate level will be critical to U.S. Navy surface forces’ operational effectiveness if not survival in future high-end naval combat.

Let me now address the question of why a surface force must be able to retain some degree of voice and data communications even when operating deep within a contested zone. As I alluded earlier, I consider it highly counterproductive if not outright dangerous for a higher-echelon commander to attempt to exercise direct tactical control over subordinate assets in the field under opposed electromagnetic conditions. But that doesn’t mean that the subordinate assets should not share their sensor pictures with each other, or that those assets should not be able to spontaneously collaborate with each other as a battle unfolds, or that higher-echelon commanders should not be able to issue mission intentions and operational or tactical situation updates—or even exercise a veto over subordinates’ tactical decisions in extreme cases. A ship or an aircraft can, after all, only “see” on its own what is within the line of sight of its onboard sensors. If one ship or aircraft within some group detects a target of opportunity or an inbound threat, that information cannot be exploited to its fullest if the ship or aircraft in contact cannot pass what it knows to its partners in a timely manner with requisite details. In an age where large salvos of anti-ship missiles can cover hundreds—and in a few cases thousands—of miles in the tens of minutes, where actionable detections of “archers” and “arrows” can be extremely fleeting, and where only minutes may separate the moments in which each side first detects the other, the side that can best build and then act upon a tactical picture is, per legendary naval tactical theorist Wayne Hughes, the one most likely to fire first effectively and thus prevail.[iii]

This requires the use of varying forms of voice and data networking as tailored to specific tactical or operational C² purposes. A real-time tactical picture is often needed for coordinating defenses against an enemy attack. A very close to real-time tactical picture may be sufficient for coordinating attacks against adversary forces. Non-real time communications may be entirely adequate for a higher-echelon commander to convey mission guidance to subordinates.

But how to conceal these communications, or at least drastically lower the risk that they might be intercepted and exploited by an adversary? The most secure form of communications against electronic warfare is obviously human courier, and while this was used by the U.S. Navy on a number of occasions during the Cold War to promote security in the dissemination of multi-day operational and tactical plans, it is simply not practicable in the heat of an ongoing tactical engagement. Visible-band and infrared pathways present other options, as demonstrated by the varying forms of “flashing light” communications practiced over the centuries. For instance, a 21^st Century flashing light that is based upon laser technologies would have the added advantage of being highly directional, as its power would be concentrated in a very narrow beam that an adversary would have to be very lucky to be in the right place at the right time to intercept. That said, visible-band and infrared systems’ effective ranges are fairly limited to begin with when used directly between ships, and even more so in inclement weather. This may be fine if a tactical situation allows for a SAG’s units to be operating in close proximity. However, if unit dispersal will often be the rule in contested zones in order to reduce the risk that an adversary’s discovery of one U.S. warship quickly results in detection of the rest of the SAG, then visible-band and infrared pathways can only offer partial solutions. A broader portfolio of communications options is consequently necessary.

It is commonly believed that the execution of strict Emissions Control (EMCON) in a combat zone in order to avoid detection (or pathway exploitation) by an adversary means that U.S. Navy warships would not be able to use any form of radiofrequency communications. This is not the case. Lower-frequency radios such as those that operate in the (awkwardly titled) High, Very High, and Ultra High Frequency (HF, VHF, and UHF) bands are very vulnerable because their transmission beams tend to be very wide. The wider a transmission beam, the greater the volume through which the beam will propagate, and in turn the greater the opportunity for an adversary’s signals intelligence collectors to be in the right place at the right time. In order to make lower-frequency radio communications highly-directional and thereby difficult for an adversary to intercept, a ship’s transmitting antennas would have to be far larger than is practical. At the Super High Frequency (SHF) band and above, though, transmission beamwidth using a practically-sized antenna becomes increasingly narrow and thus more difficult to intercept. This is why the Cold War-era U.S. Navy designed its Hawklink line-of-sight datalink connecting surface combatants and the SH-60B helicopter to use SHF; the latter could continually provide sonarbuoy, radar, or electronic support measures data to the former—and thereby serve as an anti-submarine “pouncer” or an anti-ship scout—with a relatively low risk of the signals being detected or exploited. In theory, the surface Navy might develop a portfolio of highly-directional line-of-sight communications systems that operate at SHF or Extremely High Frequency (EHF)/Millimeter-wave (MMW) bands in order to retain an all-weather voice and data communications capability even during strict EMCON. The Navy might also develop high-band communications packages that could be carried by manned or unmanned aircraft, and especially those that could be embarked aboard surface combatants, so that surface units could communicate securely over long-distances via these “middlemen.” Shipboard and airframe “real estate” for antennas is generally quite limited, though, so the tradeoff for establishing highly-directional communications may well be reduced overall communications “bandwidth” compared to what is possible when also using available communications systems that aren’t as directional. Nevertheless, this could be quite practicable in a doctrinal culture that embraces mission command and the spontaneous local tactical collaboration of ships and aircraft in a SAG.

High-directionality also means that a single antenna can only communicate with one other ship or aircraft at a time—and it must know where that partner is so that it can point its beam precisely. If a transmission is meant for receipt by other ships or aircraft, it must either be relayed via one or more “middleman” assets’ directional links to those units or it must be broadcast to them using less-directional pathways. Broadcast is perfectly acceptable as a one-way transmissions method if the broadcaster is either located in a relatively secure and defensible area or alternatively is relatively expendable.  An example of the former might be an airborne early warning aircraft protected by fighters or surface combatants broadcasting its radar picture to friendly forces (and performing as a local C² post as well) using less-directional lower-frequency communications. An example of the latter might be Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) launchable by SAG ships to serve as communications broadcast nodes; a ship could uplink to the UAS using a highly-directional pathway and the UAS could then rebroadcast the data within a localized footprint. Higher-echelon commanders located in a battlespace’s rearward areas might also use broadcast to provide selected theater- and national-level sensor data, updated mission guidance, or other updated situational information to forward SAGs. By not responding to the broadcast, or by only responding to it via highly-directional pathways, receiving units in SAGs would gain important situational information while denying the adversary an easy means of locating them.

Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) radiofrequency communications techniques provide surface forces an additional tool that can be used at any frequency band, directional or not. By disguising waveforms to appear to be ambient radiofrequency noise or by using reduced transmission power levels and durations, an adversary’s signals intelligence apparatus might not be able to detect an LPI transmission even if it is positioned to do so. I would caution, though, that any given LPI “trick” might not have much operational longetivity. Signal processing technologies available on the global market may well reach a point, if they haven’t already, where a “trick” works only a handful of times—or maybe just once—and thereafter is recognized by an adversary. Many LPI techniques accordingly should be husbanded for use only when necessary in a crisis or wartime, and there should be a large enough “arsenal” of them to enable protracted campaigning.

Finally, I want to briefly discuss the importance of providing our surface force with an actionable over-the-horizon targeting picture while denying the same to adversaries. The U.S. Navy is clearly at a deficit relative to its competitors regarding anti-ship missile range. This is thankfully changing regardless of whether we’re talking about the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), a Tomahawk-derived system, or other possible solutions.

It should be noted, though, that a weapon’s range on its own is not a sufficient measure of its utility. This is especially important when comparing our arsenal to those possessed by potential adversaries. A weapon cannot be evaluated outside the context of the surveillance and reconnaissance apparatus that supports its employment.

In one of my earlier published works, I set up the following example regarding effective first strike/salvo range at the opening of a conflict:

Optimal first-strike range is not necessarily the same as the maximum physical reach of the longest-ranged weapon system effective against a given target type (i.e., the combined range of the firing platform and the weapon it carries). Rather, it is defined by trade-offs in surveillance and reconnaissance effectiveness…This means that a potential adversary with a weapon system that can reach distance D from the homeland’s border but can achieve timely and high-confidence peacetime cueing or targeting only within a radius of 0.75D has an optimal first-strike range of 0.75D…This does not reduce the dangers faced by the defender at distance D but does offer more flexibility in using force-level doctrine, posture, plans, and capabilities to manage risks.[iv]

Effective striking range is reduced further once a war breaks out and the belligerents take off their gloves with respect to each others’ surveillance and reconnaissance systems. The qualities and quantities of a force’s sensors, and the architecture and counter-detectability of the data pathways the force uses to relay its sensors’ “pictures” to “consumers” matter just as much as the range of the force’s weapons.[v] Under intense electronic warfare opposition, they arguably matter even more.

For a “shooter” to optimally employ long-range anti-ship weaponry, it must know with an acceptable degree of confidence that it is shooting at a valid and desirable target. Advanced weapons inventories, after all, are finite. It can take considerable time for a warship to travel from a combat zone to a rearward area where it can rearm; this adds considerable complexities to a SAG maintaining a high combat operational tempo. Nor are many advanced weapons quickly producible, and in fact it is far from clear that the stockpiles of some of these weapons could be replenished within the timespan of anything other than a protracted war. This places a heavy premium on not wasting scarce weapons against low-value targets or empty waterspace. As a result, in most cases over-the-horizon targeting requires more than just the detection of some contact out at sea using long-range radar, sonar, or signals collection and direction-finding systems. It requires being able to classify the contact with some confidence: for example, whether it is a commercial tanker or an aircraft carrier, a fishing boat or a frigate, a destroyer or a decoy. An electronic warfare-savvy defender can do much to make an attacker’s job of contact classification extraordinarily difficult in the absence of visual-range confirmation of what the longer-range sensors are “seeing.”

A U.S. Navy SAG would therefore benefit greatly from being able to embark or otherwise access low observable unmanned systems that can serve as over-the-horizon scouts. These scouts could be used not only for reconnaissance, but also for contact confirmation. They could report their findings back to a SAG via the highly-directional pathways I discussed earlier, perhaps via “middlemen” if needed.

Likewise, a U.S. Navy SAG would need to be able to degrade or deceive an adversary’s surveillance and reconnaissance efforts. There are plenty of non-technological options: speed and maneuver, clever use of weather for concealment, dispersal, and deceptive feints or demonstrations by other forces that distract from a “main effort” SAG’s thrust. Technological options employed by a SAG might include EMCON and deceptive emissions against the adversary’s signals intelligence collectors, and noise or deceptive jamming against the adversary’s active sensors. During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy developed some very advanced (and anecdotally effective) shipboard deception systems to fulfill these tasks against Soviet sensors. Unmanned systems might be particularly attractive candidates for performing offboard deception tasks and for parrying an adversary’s own scouts as well.

If deception is to be successful, a SAG must possess a high-confidence understanding of—and be able to exercise agile control over—its emissions. It must also possess a comprehensive picture of the ambient electromagnetic environment in its area of operations, partly so that it can blend in as best as possible, and partly to uncover the adversary’s own transient LPI emissions. This will place a premium on being able to network and fuse inputs from widely-dispersed shipboard and offboard signals collection sensors. Some of these sensors will be “organic” to a SAG, and some may need to be “inorganically” provided by other Navy, Joint, or Allied forces. Some will be manned, and other will likely be unmanned. This will also place a premium on developing advanced signal processing and emissions correlation capabilities.

We can begin to see, then, the kinds of operational and tactical possibilities such capabilities and competencies might provide U.S. Navy SAGs. A SAG might employ various deception and concealment measures to penetrate into the outer or middle sections of a hotly contested zone, perform some operational task(s) of up to several days duration, and then retire. Other naval or Joint forces might be further used to conduct deception and concealment actions that distract the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance resources (and maybe decision-makers’ attentions) from the area in which the SAG is operating, or perhaps from the SAG’s actions themselves, during key periods. And still other naval, Joint, and Allied forces might conduct a wide-ranging campaign of physical and electromagnetic attacks to temporarily disrupt if not permanently roll back the adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance apparatus. Such efforts hold the potential of enticing an adversary to waste difficult-to-replace advanced weapons against “phantoms,” or perhaps distracting or confusing him to such an extent that he attacks ineffectively or not at all.

The tools and tactics I’ve outlined most definitely will not serve as “silver bullets” that shield our forces from painful losses. And there will always be some degree of risk and uncertainty involved in the use of these measures; it will be up to our force commanders to decide when conditions seem right for their use in support of a particular thrust. These measures should consequently be viewed as force-multipliers that grant us much better odds of perforating an adversary’s oceanic surveillance and reconnaissance systems temporarily and locally if used smartly, and thus better odds of operational and strategic successes.

With that, I look forward to your questions and the discussion that will follow. Thank you.

 

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[i] For example, see the sources referenced in my post “Advanced Russian Electronic Warfare Capabilities.” Information Dissemination blog, 16 September 2015, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2015/09/advanced-russian-electronic-warfare.html

[ii] For examples, see 1. John Costello. “Chinese Views on the Information “Center of Gravity”: Space, Cyber and Electronic Warfare.” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 15, No. 8, 16 April 2015, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43796&cHash=c0f286b0d4f15adfcf9817a93ae46363#.Vl4aL00o7cs; 2. “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015.” (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 07 April 2024), 33, 38.

[iii] CAPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr, USN (Ret). Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2^nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2000), 40-44.

[iv] Jonathan F. Solomon. “Maritime Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks.” Naval War College Review 66, No. 4 (Autumn 2013): 113-114.

[v] See my posts 1. “21st Century Maritime Operations Under Cyber-Electromagnetic Opposition, Part II.” Information Dissemination blog, 22 October 2014, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2014/10/21st-century-maritime-operations-under_22.html; and 2. “21st Century Maritime Operations Under Cyber-Electromagnetic Opposition, Part III.” Information Dissemination blog, 23 October 2014, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2014/10/21st-century-maritime-operations-under_23.html