Ron O'Rourke, Chris Cavas, and Eric Labs consented to appear with me on a panel at the Surface Navy Association 2016 Symposium--with VADM Lee Gunn ably moderating.
Monday, January 18, 2024
Friday, January 15, 2024
Thoughts on the Farsi Island Incident January 12
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1) Even 48 hours after the initial incident it doesn't even appear CENTCOM or the Pentagon has a full accounting of the details of exactly what happened. People who have been telling the narrative since the incident first occurred are sure to be proven wrong, since they have almost certainly been guessing as to causes and motives. In the end, it is starting to look to be exactly what it looks like... a bunch of young sailors lost because of reliance on technology and/or machinery that failed. There is also, potentially, a training issue here related to navigation and leadership.
2) Those who are claiming the US Navy should have shot their way out of the standoff - when it appears the US Navy sailors actually involved appeared to have convinced themselves their ships were inside Iranian waters - make very interesting and yet terrible arguments for shooting at Iranians. Farsi Island may be a disputed Island in the Persian Gulf, but there is an IRGC naval base on that island and presence in the first rule of ownership. If the Iranian Navy, or Russian Navy, or any Navy drifted armed boats into US waters off Kings Bay, I suspect the US Coast Guard and/or US Navy would be very quick to point guns and be active in detaining the drifters.
3) I am unable to see any strategic advantage the US would have gained by fighting Iran inside the 3 mile zone of Iranian territory, and I am unable to see any strategic consequence to the US by not fighting Iran inside the 3 mile zone of Iranian territory. However, had the US Navy tried to shoot their way out of that situation, the strategic consequences would have been significant, and not just how it relates to Iran. Such a violent action would have given China a valid example to act the same way in disputed places in the South China Sea. If the US Navy is going to lead the global commons based on our interpretation of the rules at sea, the LT who apologized (and everyone on the political right is flogging) just forwarded America strategically. I note it is primarily the parochial arguments from people whose expertise lies in other military services like the Army who have completely ignored the details like global rule sets at sea who have been the loudest to shout at the Navy in this incident. With all due respect, this is an incredibly parochial and shortsided overreaction of the incident, because the National Review can and should do better than finding an Army guy - Bing West (whom I know and respect but wtf...) when it comes to a complex naval incident. This isn't the Pueblo, nor is it the Korean War. There will be no museum in Iran, and both the boats and the crews were returned.
4) This is one of those difficult issues that, in my mind, separates serious people who care about serious strategic issues the US faces in the 21st century and demagogues who see conspiracy and opportunity in every political crisis. If you are a partisan who sees a conspiracy, go away. For the rest of us, there are serious naval issues here that need serious answers. These are a few of the initial questions that should be considered.
- Is the maintenance of the riverine command boats contracted to the point the onboard crew was unable to repair the problem? The crew of only 5 sailors per boat suggests to me that something might be off with the manpower and maintenance procedures surrounding these very capable chess pieces of naval equipment. The RCB is made to fight in the Persian Gulf, but a broken RCB isn't going to win.
- This is a teaching moment if there ever was one, and as an incident this appears to represent a textbook case study on the reasons why the Navy needs more, not fewer, Commands for junior officers. It may be the opinion of some hard core political demagogues who have over a decade of tactical success combined with over a decade of strategic failure that this incident is somehow a defeat for America, but each new fact that emerges from this incident suggests to me this may be a case of procedural failure far beyond the scope of a LT... but when shit happened, strategic acumen by the officer in charge (LT) is potentially emerging as a feature in handling a bad situation and not making it worse. The facts are still unknown, and we may not know for sure for awhile, but regardless of what the facts are in the end I see this as a very teachable moment that favors the argument for early Command as often as possible for junior officers.
- I have no problem with high profile diplomatic incidents like this between the US Navy and Iran, as long as for each incident the actions of the US Navy is aligned with the strategic aims of the United States. If the US Navy had attacked the IRGC inside the territorial waters of Farsi Island to defend their boats, this would be a major strategic setback for the US. Had the incident occurred outside the territorial waters of Iran and the US Navy not fought back; that would also be a strategic setback for the US. Right now it appears the US Navy sailors on the scene did everything right.
- The only way to produce a genuine strategic failure from this incident is to unfairly punish those involved, in other words... if the Navy wants better commanders, handle early career mistakes the right way. Tell me how any of those 10 sailors are somehow worse off for this incident. If legitimate mistakes were made, deal with it appropriately, but pinning blame for things out of their control would be a failure of leadership, and in my mind an unforgivable sin.
- At the end of the day, this was a real diplomatic test of the US and Iran who under the recent agreement are partners in Iran's nuclear energy ambitions. The outcome is very positive for the United States. I don't trust the government of Iran, but I am yet to see anything from this incident that suggests to me Iran has has been inappropriate. If you're the American Idiot who doesn't think it was appropriate for the US Navy sailors to have their hands on their heads at any point in the engagement near the IRGC base on Farsi Island, try drifting your private armed boat into the US Navy area of Kings Bay or Norfolk or New London and pretend like there is a snowballs chance in hell you will get out of there without your hands on your head. You will have your hands on your head, or if you point a gun back at the US Navy or US Coast Guard, you will be shot dead by very serious people who protect that location and will be pointing guns at you. You don't even have to be an Iranian for that outcome to occur, nor will you need an Iranian flag on your boat, a US flag will result in the same action. Wake up people, don't let the silly season control your ability to think with objectivity.
I look forward to learning what really happened, because at the end of the day we have a well armed naval craft in the middle of the Persian Gulf with a serious mechanical problem that couldn't be quickly resolved apparently combined with some incredibly bad navigation from two crews who somehow found their way to the only piece of land between their departure location and destination that could create a diplomatic problem. When you swim past all the political bullshit, the serious naval specific issues on the table leave a lot of serious questions that deserve serious answers.
Monday, January 11, 2024
GAO Wrong on LCS Survivability
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| USS Fort Worth Arrives in Singapore, December 2014, Military.com |
GAO has secured much of its evidence for
LCS’s lack of survivability from a Total Ship Survivability Trial (TSST)
conducted on USS Fort Worth (LCS 3)
in October 2014.[1] TSST focuses on the crew
training necessary to conduct the damage control to restore the ship’s
operational capability while it remains in a combat environment. LCS would
obviously not fare well in such testing for two reasons. First, a substantial
portion of the equipment that could be damaged in an attack and the additional
personnel that operate that equipment are not physically present on the current
sea frames. They are resident in the yet to be fully developed mission modules.
Any present TSST of LCS would be partially incomplete. Second, LCS is not
designed to restore battle damage and immediately return to the fight, as are higher
capability warships. It was conceived to survive damage and withdraw as
necessary.[2]
GAO acknowledges the limits of the LCS
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and notes the Navy’s 2012 change in the
foundation of survivability from ship “characteristics” to “capabilities.”[3]
The agency persists, however, in aiming its report on the sea frame’s physical
damage control aspects; its characteristics, rather than its capabilities to
avoid or prevent attack, such as its installed active and passive defense
systems.[4] It
continues to reference a 2004 Navy measurement of survivability in describing
LCS that is no longer used by the Navy. GAO notes the deletion of three design
features of survivability from previous LCS designs due to weight/cost
considerations. Given that the sea frame’s armament is unchanged, it seems that
these missing elements were characteristics and not capabilities. Finally, GAO
seems to suggest that the Navy deliberately changed the LCS CONOPS in order to,
“To compensate for any gaps in the
ship’s survivability and lethality capabilities.”[5]
The
Navy altered its survivability
description for good reason. The principal threats faced by surface
warships have significantly changed in the last two decades. The proliferation
of capable cruise missiles, submarine torpedoes, and naval mines represents a
significant threat to any ship less than 600 feet in length and 10,000 tons
displacement. These limits encompass the entire U.S. Navy surface combatant
force (excepting the Zumwalt class
destroyer.) Damage to U.S. Navy surface ships in the last several decades has
been limited to small cruise missiles such as the Exocets that damaged the USS Stark in 1987 and the relatively small influence and contact mines
that crippled the USS Princeton in
1991 and nearly sank the USS Samuel B.
Roberts in 1988. Current versions of these weapons are larger, faster and
much more capable. The recent Russian cruise missile salvo (at least 26
missiles) fired against land targets in Syria from a
flotilla of small warships suggests the level of threat faced by U.S.
warships.[6]
Surface combatants no longer carry armor and are fully dependent on their
installed active and passive defense systems to avoid, decoy or shoot down such
weapons. While damage control remains important, survivability must not be
fully predicated on a ship’s physical characteristics. The Navy’s measurement
of survivability properly changed in response to the change in the threat to
surface ships from a new generation of larger and more capable cruise missiles,
and improved torpedoes and mines.
GAO’s assessment of the lethality of LCS suffers from the same problems
associated with its survivability measurements. The agency agrees that LCS
completed interim testing of its surface warfare (SUW) package in April 2014,
but then said that testing was incomplete due to the lack of both sea frames
being tested (a valid point), but also because not all SUW requirements could
be met. That should not be a surprise considering the evaluated SUW package was
an interim fitting and not the ship’s final operational capability module.
Testing cited by GAO, and done by the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E) further states that the testing of the SUW package was,
“insufficient to provide statistical confidence that LCS can consistently
demonstrate this level of performance.”[7]
How much testing of an interim package is required to attain statistical
confidence and how much would this testing cost or limit the ship’s operational
employment? DOT&E in fact requires the LCS program to re-test an entire
mission package if even one component (however small) is changed. LCS is
dependent on the ability to rapidly field new mission packages in response to
different tactical and operational circumstances. The testing regime of the
analysis community would seem to limit this important LCS capability.
The threat environment facing the LCS has changed significantly since
the program was announced in November 2001. The Navy has attempted to respond
to this change by modifying the sea frame, mission modules and ship’s CONOPS to
meet the changing threat environment. The analysis community, as represented by
GAO and DOT&E seems trapped in the relatively stable Cold War and post-Cold
War era where slow, predictable, incremental change was managed through an
ever-expanding test and evaluation regime. LCS, with many of its most lethal
capabilities in separate mission modules, and/or still under development will
not likely meet the requirements of the 1960’s-era analysis community until its
mission modules are fully developed. The ability of LCS to rapidly adjust its capabilities
in response to new threats will remain limited with such stringent testing
requirements accompanying each mission package change.
GAO’s unhappiness with LCS should come as no surprise. A short review of
the last 40 years of surface warship construction suggests that the agency has
little love for any particular platform. It has severely criticized the Perry class frigate for survivability
issues[8];
the Spruance class destroyer for a
lack of lethality[9]; and the
Ticonderoga class cruiser for lack of
AEGIS testing and room for growth.[10]
GAO has a point in suggesting that capability-based survival of warships
needs evaluation beyond modeling and simulation. Live fire tests on naval
platforms were the normative method of predicting survivability from the 1920’s
through the end of the Cold War.[11]
The number of hits a vessel could sustain was an adequate predictor of its
survival as an operational contributor in combat. The development of more powerful weapons, the evolution of very
effective active and passive defense systems and the accelerated fragility of
surface combatants in supporting them have changed these time-honored
evaluation criteria. Those active and passive systems are now the equivalent of
what armor was to combatants of the early 20th century. While these
systems have been tested through modeling and simulation, the only real way to
examine their effectiveness is through expensive live fire exercises against a
target ship with active systems including surface to air missiles, guns and
electronic countermeasures. This last recommendation is a useful contribution
from the GAO report, but the office must recommend such testing for all surface
combatants and not just LCS.
Evaluation of LCS using Cold War-era methodology is
not an accurate measurement of the class’ survivability or lethality. GAO has a
long history of criticizing surface combatant programs, and the office’s present
dislike of LCS should be no surprise. GAO should recommend that all
surface combatants be tested according to their capabilities and not just their
characteristics. Finally, GAO should re-evaluate the survivability of LCS to take into account its modular design.
Friday, January 1, 2025
Some New Year's Thoughts On Aircraft Carriers
The year past was an important one for the Navy and its power projection centerpiece, the large, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Dr. Jerry Hendrix and I got things off to a rollicking start in January with an old-school debate about carriers at the Naval Academy, my think-tank released a study that makes the case for the necessity of the carrier in the high end fight--a view 180 degrees out of the prevailing narrative of China's A2AD arsenal rendering the carrier obsolete, and Hendrix rounded out the year with a superb study of how the carrier's "retreat from range" had indeed fed the narrative just referenced.Along the way, the Senate Armed Services Committee led by its Chairman Senator John McCain (R-AZ) performed a necessary and critical oversight role in relentlessly urging the Navy to reduce the cost of the carrier and improve its acquisition performance. Additionally, Senator McCain sent the Navy and other organizations off to evaluate alternative carrier designs, because he asserts, "we simply cannot afford to pay $12.9B for a single ship." Those evaluations will hit the street in 2016, which is incidentally the year the nation's newest carrier USS GERALD R FORD (CVN 78) is due to be commissioned.
Having so publicly defended the aircraft carrier in 2015, I begin 2016 by asserting that I am not an aircraft carrier advocate, just as I am not a destroyer advocate, or a maritime patrol aircraft advocate (both of which I will defend with the same tenacity as I do the CVN). No, I am a Seapower advocate, and because I continue to cling to the increasingly outdated notion that our Navy and Marine Corps perform the equally strategically important functions of preventing AND conducting war, I will continue to defend the aircraft carrier's centrality in a balanced fleet capable of performing both of these functions.
So to get the year off on the right foot, a few thoughts to baseline what is likely to be another year of churn on this topic.
- It's the Air Wing, Stupid. While I disagree with Senator McCain's pronouncement that we "...cannot afford to pay $12.9B for a single ship" (see below), the plain, ugly truth is that if the FORD Class cost $9B, its utility in deterring the wars we must not fight (and the wars that we therefore cannot lose) would not be any more apparent. To put it another way, whether we spend $12.9B or $9B or $5B--the money will be ill-allocated unless the main battery of the carrier evolves to meet the threat. By that, I mean that the air wing must evolve (as it has consistently for seven decades) to provide long range stealthy strike, sea control, ISR, and organic refueling, if even the first dollar allocated in carrier construction is to be worthwhile. Jerry Hendrix report above, and the one we did at Hudson (also cited) make this point forcefully. Without this evolution (and a timely evolution at that), the carrier will indeed become what its critics have predicted for decades, an expensive anachronism. And as the Hudson study asserted, the carrier--with an upgraded air wing--is likely to provide essential and unique combat capability in high end scenarios under consideration. But only if the air wing evolves.
- What Should a Carrier Cost? Many critics of the FORD Class take aim squarely at its cost, most recently estimated by the Navy at $12.9B. My response to them is, what should it cost? What should a floating, nuclear-powered air base, that moves...at 40 plus knots....for fifty years...cost? Against what are you comparing it? No other bit of military kit is as complex or as useful as the aircraft carrier, and very few examples of military hardware last as long. Are we so unduly influenced by its acquisition cost that we lose the ability to adequately assess the long term return on investment? Also, since we buy a carrier once every five years, about a third of one percent of every dollar spent on defense in those five years are spent on CVN's. Are the above benefits not worth a third of a percent? We are entering a new era of great power contention, and the post-Cold War model of defense spending is insufficient. We need to begin building up to meet the challenges of this new competition, and while we must continue to do everything we can to drive excess cost out of acquisition programs, perspective and understanding of what is required to meet this challenge is necessary. Viewing an asset with the capability and flexibility of the CVN--even at its current cost--as "unaffordable" is simply inconsistent with the demands of the future.
- You Can't Go Backward, You Won't Do Better, and Steel and Space are Cheap. Chairman McCain's direction to the Navy to go back to the drawing board and to study alternative carrier designs is a useful and necessary task, one that forces what is a characteristically hidebound organization to examine its presumptions and prove its assertions. Similar inquiries have been forced upon the Navy in the past, as the Hudson study above recounts. Each time, however, two consistent themes arise in the analysis. Bigger is better, and nuclear power is preferable to fossil fuels. Size and propulsion are directly related to the performance of the ship/air wing system, as measured by a diverse series of metrics including sortie generation, aircraft size accommodation, range, and mission diversity. Because steel and space are relatively cheap, the additional size gained in a larger carrier creates disproportionately large increases in performance. Put another way, if the Navy is presented with a design for an aircraft carrier that costs 2/3 of what the FORD costs AND can deliver 2/3 of its performance (or better)--it should consider buying it. You can substitute any ratio into the previous sentence, and my view would be the same. The trouble is, such a carrier does not appear to exist. If this nation simply wants to spend less on its aircraft carriers because it believes them to be too expensive, than our leaders need to step forward and declare that they are content with buying proportionally less capability. Some have suggested simply dropping back, retooling, and building NIMITZ class carriers again beginning in the 2020's. Such a path should be considered among the various options. My gut tells me that the cost of such a move, coupled with a decrease in ship/air wing performance that would occur, would be nonsensical in comparison to continuing to build FORD Class carriers and benefiting from the historic constant dollar decline in cost of ships in serial production.
- Competition For Hulls Would Be Nice, But It Is Not Going To Happen With Our Current Industrial Base. Building large, complex surface ships is done at frightfully few places in the United States. Building large complex surface ships from which fixed wing aircraft can be launched and recovered is done at two places in the United States. Building large, complex nuclear-powered surface ships from which fixed wing aircraft can be launched and recovered is done at one place in the United States. While I take a backseat to no one in my support for the benefits of competition in free markets, I am unconvinced that any attempt to inject hull-based competition into the carrier program will have any impact on cost--except to increase it. If the United States decided that it needed additional shipbuilding capacity in order to produce a competed, conventionally powered aircraft carrier, it would almost certainly have to invest billions of dollars into capital improvements at an existing yard that isn't owned by the one company that owns both yards currently capable of doing so (Huntington Ingalls Industries at its Newport News, VA and Pascagoula, MS yards). The cost of capitalizing a second nuclear powered aircraft carrier building yard would be enormous. Putting aside the prohibitive costs of competing hulls, were we to push for a conventionally powered variant simply to reduce total costs, we run into the problems cited above in #3. To the extent that competition CAN be pushed back into the CVN program, it is going to largely reside in the Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) that the shipbuilder is provided with, and competition for these items demands that the horrible mistakes in early CVN 78 program management and oversight not be repeated. The 2002 decision to inject over a dozen unproven technology upgrades into the first hull (CVN 78) rather than across the first three, dealt this program early blows from which it is only now recovering. Congress must continue to hammer the Navy on the twin/related problems of immature designs and concurrency, while ensuring that as much competition is injected into the furnishing of mature capability.
- The Burden is On the Critics to Show The Extensibility of Their Views. If someone were to come forward with a fleet architecture that either diminished or eliminated the importance of the CVN while maintaining the balance of conventional deterrence and warfighting that exists in the current fleet, I would walk away from the CVN in a heartbeat. But like the proportionally capable/cheaper aircraft carrier, such a fleet architecture does not currently exist. The perturbations from the current fleet architecture either diminish warfighting in order to plus up deterrence, or (as we see from the letter above from SECDEF to SECNAV) they diminish deterrence in order to plus up wafighting. I do not believe that the current fleet architecture is the ONLY one that could accomplish the required balance between conventional warfighting and deterrence. But in my view, any competing approach MUST demonstrate in some reasonable manner that it maintains such a balance, or that such a balance is no longer required or desired.
Ok, release the hounds. There are a few things to chew on as we all consider how to best contribute to the robust debate underway in our area of collective interest. Happy New Year.
Monday, December 28, 2024
Forfeiting the Away Game: The Surface Navy’s Diminished Range
The following contribution comes from Matthew Cosner.
The Navy’s Small Surface Combatants lack the long-range cruising capabilites needed for the Pacific theatre.
Distance and the Pacific Theatre
The recent Department of Defense Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy affirms the importance of the Pacific theatre to national and international security, and establishes it as the primary maritime theater. Among other requirements, the strategy stresses the need for “…operational flexibility and maximizing the value of U.S. assets despite the tyranny of distance.”1
The ‘tyranny of distance’ and its impact on the Pacific theater cannot be overstated. The Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) occupies over half of the world’s surface and a similar percentage of its population.2 Naval bases are separated by thousands of nautical miles (nm), with ship transits measured in multiple days or weeks as shown in Figure 1.3
The strategy devotes several pages to how the US military will support the Pacific Pivot by “… investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely across the region.”4 For the Navy, the list of capabilities is impressive and includes: “…replacing the aircraft carrier USS GEORGE WASHINGTON in 2015 with the newer USS RONALD REAGAN; sending our newest air operations-oriented amphibious assault ship, the USS America, to the region by 2020; deploying two additional AEGIS-capable destroyers to Japan; and home-porting all three of our newest class of stealth destroyers, the DDG-1000, with the Pacific fleet.”5 The strategy indicates that over 60% of naval and overseas air assets will be homeported in the Pacific by 2020.6
Improving offensive capability for the Pacific and other theatres has been a key topic of discussion, notably the recent direction from Surface Navy leadership to add weapons payloads in support of the ‘Distributed Lethality’ concept.7 Yet very little discussion has taken place on whether the platforms it intends to acquire possess the range to overcome the Pacific’s ‘tyranny of distance’. New weapons grab headlines, but they are irrelevant if the platform lacks the range to get them to the fight. This tension in ‘platforms’ versus ‘payloads’ is not new: much of the Navy’s focus in the decades leading up to the Second World War was in ensuring its warships had not only modern weaponry, sensors, and armor, but also oil-burning powerplants and oversized fuel loadouts for an expected long-range naval conflict against Japan.8
Threats to Pacific Bases
If presented a map of the PACOM AOR, the General Board which guided Fleet development prior to the Second World War might intuitively recognize the challenges. Political boundaries, country names, allies, and likely aggressors have all changed; geography has not. Explaining how the revolution in precision strike systems has ‘redrawn the map’ would be more difficult.
A detailed discussion of Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) threats is well beyond the scope of this analysis. Suffice to say, land-based weapons such as the Chinese DF-21 ballistic missile (range of up to 1,070 nautical miles (nm)), and the H-6K land-based bomber equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (range of up to 1,780 nm) place many existing US and allied naval bases in the region within strike range.9 Figure 2, taken from the Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC (2015), shows the published ranges of Chinese conventional strike systems.10
Redrawing the Map
Adversary precision strike capability has redrawn the map in the Pacific. Secure basing within close proximity to the Asian landmass can no longer be guaranteed. As an illustration of the problem, Table 1 below shows a selection of naval bases and the two-way distance (transit and return) from the bases to two likely points of contention in the South China Sea: the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.11 The far column notes whether the bases lie within the threat envelope of Chinese strike systems.12
As can be seen, the naval bases which are closest to these likely flashpoints are also well within the potential adversary’s ability to hold-at-risk. In a South China Sea crisis, should China conduct or threaten to conduct conventional strikes against existing ‘close-in bases’, the Navy may need to operate from ‘distant bases’ with voyage distances approaching or even exceeding 4,000 nm.
Analyzing Battle Force Cruising Characteristics
It is clear from the paragraphs above that the Navy, if it chooses to remain relevant in the Pacific, faces a significant distance challenge. In order to illustrate changes in Surface Combatant range over time and how this may impact future scenarios in the Pacific, two comparisons were conducted. The first examines the average unrefueled range, cruising speed and other metrics for the Large Surface Combatants from the years 2000-2030. The second does the same for Small Surface Combatants.
Range analysis was accomplished via a weighted average, taking into account the capabilities of each ship class ‘weighted’ by the number of ships in the inventory during a given year. Additional analysis was conducted to determine what percentage of the force were capable of the previously established 4,000 nm cruising range. Ship performance data was collected from multiple sources including the Naval Vessel Register13 ; Navy fact files14 ; and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) Fiscal Year 2014 report.15 Force structure information was extracted from: the Naval Vessel Register; Navy’s Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2016 (March 2015)16 ; and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan (October 2015).17
It should be noted that significant uncertainties in both ship capabilities and future force structure permeate this dataset, leading to the following assumptions:
Large Surface Combatants, 2000-2030
The Navy does not provide a standard definition for a Large Surface Combatant in its Annual Shipbuilding Plan, although the CBO describes its roles and missions as follows:
Small Surface Combatants, 2000-2030
The Navy has only recently begun using the term Small Surface Combatant, and has not provided a standard definition in its Annual Shipbuilding Plan. The CBO describes a Small Surface Combatant as follows:
Table 3 shows the data from 2000-2030 for Small Surface Combatants. In 2000, the mode speed (i.e. most frequently occurring) is 18 kts - since the most common ships are the relatively fast OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class FF. This falls to 14 knots by 2030 for an overall decrease of 4 kts (22%). This reduction is attributable to LCS emphasis on short-range/tactical “sprint speed” over long-range/operational “cruising speed” of the PERRY class FF. A counter-intuitive finding is that the widescale introduction of a “fast, agile, focused-mission platform…”25 yields a future Small Surface Combatant force that at Pacific-scale cruising distances will be significantly slower than its predecessors.
Average range in 2030 falls well short of what was achievable in 2000. The driver is the introduction of the FREEDOM LCS, which according to DOT&E, has a shorter cruising range than the ship classes it replaces (AVENGER and CYLONE). The FREEDOM class accounts for half of the Small Surface Combatants by 2030, and its introduction drags range down considerably. Total reduction in average range over the thirty-year period is 794 nm (-23%). More than half of Small Surface Combatants were capable of cruising ranges of 4,000 nm in 2000-2010; none will be capable of 4,000 nm cruising ranges in 2015, 2020 or 2030.
Operational and Logistical Implications
It is difficult to accept that this steady reduction in Small Surface Combatant cruising capability supports the Navy’s strategic objectives - particularly a Navy which according to some views its mission as providing “…combat capable forward presence (i.e. the away game).”26 A Navy whose principal forward presence assets (LCS) lack the range to operate at relevant distance from base, and are significantly slower than the frigates they replaced does not appear to prioritize “the away game” in the Pacific.
Range provides flexibility and options. If the Navy remains committed to its shipbuilding plan, it may well transform from a Fleet that could choose to station itself forward or remain at arm’s length as conditions dictated, to a Fleet which due to its limited cruising range has little choice but to routinely station itself forward. This short-legged Fleet must either base itself within the adversary’s strike envelope and risk exposure to a decapitating first strike; or rely upon refueling support from a globally committed and already overtaxed Combat Logistics Force (CLF) to “buy back” what it lacks in cruising range.
The introduction of the LCS may lead to a “bifurcated” Battle Force, in which the Small Surface Combatants, because of their limited range and speed, are relegated to the sidelines in a Pacific-scale conflict. As an example: it is unclear how an LCS cruising at 14 kts can provide as an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) escort for a Fleet Replenishment Oiler at 20 kts.27 Similarly, given that an LCS would have to refuel approximately every 2,000 nm, its presence may actually complicate the ASW escort commander’s task by adding another “hungry mouth” to refuel. As a Fleet commander, the only reasonable option may be to substitute Large Surface Combatants (i.e. destroyers) for Small Surface Combatants (i.e. LCS) in the vital ASW escort role - when in earlier times a longer-ranged frigate could have sufficed.
Recommendations for Leadership
Collect empirical data on the cruising capability of both LCSs. Navy has committed to acquiring an additional twenty-four LCS of two variants (twelve FREEDOMs and twelve INDEPENDENCE). 28 Yet according to both DOT&E and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) there is a profound lack of empirical data regarding the performance of either ship types. 29,30 This knowledge gap should be remedied as soon as practical by evaluating both LCS types capability to operate at Pacific-scale distances (i.e. 4,000 nm).
Modify the current LCS acquisition plan. Preliminary test data on a FREEDOM class variant predicted cruising capability which fell short of the LCS threshold requirement (3,500 nm at 14 kts); and thus well short of the even longer ranges expected in Pacific operations.31 If operational testing of the INDEPENDENCE class shows that it can achieve this threshold, consideration must be given to altering the somewhat arbitrary ‘50/50’ split of FREEDOMs and INDEPENDENCEs. However, if the INDEPENDENCE does not prove capable of the required ranges, consideration should be given to pausing further LCS production and determine if engineering changes can feasibly increase their range.
Reestablish the initial LCS range requirements for the LCS-FF. The initial LCS concept of employment emphasized “forward deployment vice forward basing”, and placed a premium on “self-sustaining” operations.32 As such, the initial threshold cruising range requirement for LCS was 4,300 nm at 16 kts - fairly close to the cruising capability of the legacy PERRY class FF. This was subsequently reduced by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to 3,500 nm at 14 kts.33 Today, there remains uncertainty as to whether the FREEDOM or INDEPENDENCE will meet the 3,500 nm requirement - which this analysis has shown may be insufficient for the Pacific. Consideration should be given to reestablishing the 4,300 nm at 16 kts requirement for the modified LCS-FF. In addition, further decisions to increase the “lethality and survivability” of the LCS-FF should be examined against the impact on cruising range.
Recognize that platforms matter, and that the Pacific requires platforms purposefully designed for long distance operations. The current mantra of ‘payloads over platforms’ misses the mark. Platforms do matter. The Navy must come to terms with the fact that the LCS platform (seaframe) is ill-suited for operations in the vast Pacific. There is evidence that this realization may be taking place: comments from Seventh Fleet during the initial deployment of USS FREEDOM (LCS-1) expressed uncertainly on the ship’s utility, and stated to GAO interviewers that it might better be employed in the much smaller Fifth Fleet area of responsibility.34
It is perhaps too late to drastically redesign the LCS for the Pacific. However, the proposed LCS replacement (LCS(X)) - which according to the Navy’s Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2016 will not enter the Fleet until 2035 - should be assessed against Pacific-scale scenarios to determine its required cruising capabilities.35 Navy preference for variants of the current LCS designs should not steer the outcome; the study focus should be on rationally and objectively identifying a clean-sheet or existing design that meets the requirements. Continuing on the current path of adapting the LCS - envisioned decades earlier for operations in the short-ranged littorals - will prove expensive, time consuming, and unlikely to lead to the warship the Navy needs for the Pacific Pivot.
[1] “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 2015.
[2] “PACOM Issues and Challenges”, Brief, USPACOM, Accessed at http://www.slideshare.net/MatthewPopkin/pacomassessment
[3] Figure 1 from “2015 Index of Military Strength”, Heritage Foundation, Accessed at http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/
[4] “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy”.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] See “Distributed Lethality”, Rowden et al, USNI Proceedings, January 2015.
[8] See “Agents of Innovation”, John Kuehn, Naval Institute Press, 2009.
[9] Threat ranges per the “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC, 2015”. Department of Defense, 2015.
[10] Graphic from the “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC, 2015”. Department of Defense, 2015.
[11] Transit distances per Google Earth.
[12] Threat ranges per the “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC, 2015”.
[13] http://www.nvr.navy.mil/
[14] http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact.asp
[15] “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015.
[16] “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2016”, OPNAV N8, March 2015.
[17] “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan”, Congressional Budget Office, October 2015.
[18] http://defense.about.com/od/Navy/a/Ddg-1000-Zumwalt-Class-Destroyer.htm
[19] http://www.deagel.com/Destroyers-and-Cruisers/DDG-1000-Zumwalt_a000550001.aspx
[20] “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid. “DOT&E still has no data to assess the core mission capabilities of the Independence class variant seaframe.”
[23] “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan”, Congressional Budget Office, October 2015.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Navy Fact File, Littoral Combat Ships, accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1650&ct=4
[26] See “What’s Driving the Navy?” Sears et al, December 1, 2015, Accessed at http://www.informationdissemination.net/
[27] Navy Fact File, Fleet Replenishment Oiler, accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4400&tid=600&ct=4
[28] “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, November 6, 2015.
[29] See “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015.”
[30] “Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions”, GAO 16-201, December 2015.
[31] “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015. LCS-3 predicted range of 1,981 nm.
[32] “Littoral Combat Ship Concept of Employment Update”, http://faculty.nps.edu/jekline/docs/LCS%20CONOPS%20brief%2011-15pt1.ppt.
[33] “Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments”, GAO-14-749, July 2014
[34] Referenced in GAO-14-749 “Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments”, Government Accountability Office, July 2014.
[35] For a discussion on the proposed CBA, see “The Need for a Small Surface Combatant CBA”, Information Dissemination, October 2015.
The Navy’s Small Surface Combatants lack the long-range cruising capabilites needed for the Pacific theatre.
Distance and the Pacific Theatre
The recent Department of Defense Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy affirms the importance of the Pacific theatre to national and international security, and establishes it as the primary maritime theater. Among other requirements, the strategy stresses the need for “…operational flexibility and maximizing the value of U.S. assets despite the tyranny of distance.”1
The ‘tyranny of distance’ and its impact on the Pacific theater cannot be overstated. The Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) occupies over half of the world’s surface and a similar percentage of its population.2 Naval bases are separated by thousands of nautical miles (nm), with ship transits measured in multiple days or weeks as shown in Figure 1.3
The strategy devotes several pages to how the US military will support the Pacific Pivot by “… investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely across the region.”4 For the Navy, the list of capabilities is impressive and includes: “…replacing the aircraft carrier USS GEORGE WASHINGTON in 2015 with the newer USS RONALD REAGAN; sending our newest air operations-oriented amphibious assault ship, the USS America, to the region by 2020; deploying two additional AEGIS-capable destroyers to Japan; and home-porting all three of our newest class of stealth destroyers, the DDG-1000, with the Pacific fleet.”5 The strategy indicates that over 60% of naval and overseas air assets will be homeported in the Pacific by 2020.6
Improving offensive capability for the Pacific and other theatres has been a key topic of discussion, notably the recent direction from Surface Navy leadership to add weapons payloads in support of the ‘Distributed Lethality’ concept.7 Yet very little discussion has taken place on whether the platforms it intends to acquire possess the range to overcome the Pacific’s ‘tyranny of distance’. New weapons grab headlines, but they are irrelevant if the platform lacks the range to get them to the fight. This tension in ‘platforms’ versus ‘payloads’ is not new: much of the Navy’s focus in the decades leading up to the Second World War was in ensuring its warships had not only modern weaponry, sensors, and armor, but also oil-burning powerplants and oversized fuel loadouts for an expected long-range naval conflict against Japan.8
Threats to Pacific Bases
If presented a map of the PACOM AOR, the General Board which guided Fleet development prior to the Second World War might intuitively recognize the challenges. Political boundaries, country names, allies, and likely aggressors have all changed; geography has not. Explaining how the revolution in precision strike systems has ‘redrawn the map’ would be more difficult.
A detailed discussion of Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) threats is well beyond the scope of this analysis. Suffice to say, land-based weapons such as the Chinese DF-21 ballistic missile (range of up to 1,070 nautical miles (nm)), and the H-6K land-based bomber equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (range of up to 1,780 nm) place many existing US and allied naval bases in the region within strike range.9 Figure 2, taken from the Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC (2015), shows the published ranges of Chinese conventional strike systems.10
Redrawing the Map
Adversary precision strike capability has redrawn the map in the Pacific. Secure basing within close proximity to the Asian landmass can no longer be guaranteed. As an illustration of the problem, Table 1 below shows a selection of naval bases and the two-way distance (transit and return) from the bases to two likely points of contention in the South China Sea: the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.11 The far column notes whether the bases lie within the threat envelope of Chinese strike systems.12
As can be seen, the naval bases which are closest to these likely flashpoints are also well within the potential adversary’s ability to hold-at-risk. In a South China Sea crisis, should China conduct or threaten to conduct conventional strikes against existing ‘close-in bases’, the Navy may need to operate from ‘distant bases’ with voyage distances approaching or even exceeding 4,000 nm.
 |
| Table 1 Two-Way Distance and Threats to Bases |
Analyzing Battle Force Cruising Characteristics
It is clear from the paragraphs above that the Navy, if it chooses to remain relevant in the Pacific, faces a significant distance challenge. In order to illustrate changes in Surface Combatant range over time and how this may impact future scenarios in the Pacific, two comparisons were conducted. The first examines the average unrefueled range, cruising speed and other metrics for the Large Surface Combatants from the years 2000-2030. The second does the same for Small Surface Combatants.
Range analysis was accomplished via a weighted average, taking into account the capabilities of each ship class ‘weighted’ by the number of ships in the inventory during a given year. Additional analysis was conducted to determine what percentage of the force were capable of the previously established 4,000 nm cruising range. Ship performance data was collected from multiple sources including the Naval Vessel Register13 ; Navy fact files14 ; and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) Fiscal Year 2014 report.15 Force structure information was extracted from: the Naval Vessel Register; Navy’s Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2016 (March 2015)16 ; and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan (October 2015).17
It should be noted that significant uncertainties in both ship capabilities and future force structure permeate this dataset, leading to the following assumptions:
- TICONDEROGA CG. There is limited information on plans to retire TICONDEROGA cruisers. It was assumed in this analysis that CGs would be phased out as newer DDGs join the Fleet.
- ZUMWALT DDG. Limited data was found on the ZUMWALT class destroyer, other than an expected range between 4,500-6,000 nm.18 Similarly, an unofficial reference cites a cruise speed of 20 kts.19
- AVENGER MCM / CYCLONE PC. It was assumed that these ships would be retired by 2020, as the LCS enters service in numbers and take on the mine countermeasures and patrol combatant roles.
- FREEDOM LCS. A cruising range of 1,961 nm at 14.4 kts was assumed for FREEDOM class, based on DOT&E test data for the USS FORT WORTH (LCS-3). 20
- INDEPENDENCE LCS. A cruising range of 3,500 nm at 14 kts was assumed for INDEPENDENCE, based on Navy threshold requirement.21 Navy sources predict significantly better performance (4,300 nm at 18 kts), however there is no evidence that this has been tested or proven.22
Large Surface Combatants, 2000-2030
The Navy does not provide a standard definition for a Large Surface Combatant in its Annual Shipbuilding Plan, although the CBO describes its roles and missions as follows:
“Large surface combatants, which include cruisers and destroyers, are the workhorses of the fleet. They provide ballistic missile defense for the fleet and for regional areas overseas. They defend aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare ships against other surface ships, aircraft, and submarines, and they perform such day-to-day missions as patrolling sea lanes, providing an overseas presence, and conducting exercises with allies. They also can launch Tomahawk missiles to strike land targets. Most of the Navy’s surface combatants displace about 9,000 to 10,000 tons.”23Table 2 shows data for Large Surface Combatants from 2000-2030. Speed remains constant at 20 kts, however range decreases every year from 2000-2030, eventually regressing towards a value slightly higher than that of its principal asset: the BURKE DDG. The driver is the retirement of the long-ranged SPRUANCE DD and the eventual replacement of TICONDEROGA CGs with BURKE DDGs. Total reduction in average range over the examined thirty-year period is 819 nm (-15%). However, even with this reduction in average range, all Large Surface Combatants in 2015-2030 are capable of unrefueled ranges of 4,000 nm.
 |
| Table 2 Large Surface Combatants, 2000-2030 |
Small Surface Combatants, 2000-2030
The Navy has only recently begun using the term Small Surface Combatant, and has not provided a standard definition in its Annual Shipbuilding Plan. The CBO describes a Small Surface Combatant as follows:
“Small surface combatants include frigates and littoral combat ships. Frigates are used to perform many of the same day-to-day missions as large surface combatants. Littoral combat ships are intended to counter mines, small boats, and diesel electric submarines in the world’s coastal regions. More routinely, they also patrol sea lanes, provide an overseas presence, and conduct exercises with allies. They range in size from 3,000 to 4,000 tons.”24For this analysis, the Small Surface Combatant definition includes legacy AVENGER MCMs and CYCLONE PCs, both of which displace significantly less than 3,000-4,000 tons ascribed by CBO. Since the roles of the AVENGER and CYCLONE will presumably be filled by LCS in the coming years, it is germane to include these smaller ships in the analysis to show the impact on average force range.
Table 3 shows the data from 2000-2030 for Small Surface Combatants. In 2000, the mode speed (i.e. most frequently occurring) is 18 kts - since the most common ships are the relatively fast OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class FF. This falls to 14 knots by 2030 for an overall decrease of 4 kts (22%). This reduction is attributable to LCS emphasis on short-range/tactical “sprint speed” over long-range/operational “cruising speed” of the PERRY class FF. A counter-intuitive finding is that the widescale introduction of a “fast, agile, focused-mission platform…”25 yields a future Small Surface Combatant force that at Pacific-scale cruising distances will be significantly slower than its predecessors.
Average range in 2030 falls well short of what was achievable in 2000. The driver is the introduction of the FREEDOM LCS, which according to DOT&E, has a shorter cruising range than the ship classes it replaces (AVENGER and CYLONE). The FREEDOM class accounts for half of the Small Surface Combatants by 2030, and its introduction drags range down considerably. Total reduction in average range over the thirty-year period is 794 nm (-23%). More than half of Small Surface Combatants were capable of cruising ranges of 4,000 nm in 2000-2010; none will be capable of 4,000 nm cruising ranges in 2015, 2020 or 2030.
 |
| Table 3 Small Surface Combatants, 2000-2030 |
It is difficult to accept that this steady reduction in Small Surface Combatant cruising capability supports the Navy’s strategic objectives - particularly a Navy which according to some views its mission as providing “…combat capable forward presence (i.e. the away game).”26 A Navy whose principal forward presence assets (LCS) lack the range to operate at relevant distance from base, and are significantly slower than the frigates they replaced does not appear to prioritize “the away game” in the Pacific.
Range provides flexibility and options. If the Navy remains committed to its shipbuilding plan, it may well transform from a Fleet that could choose to station itself forward or remain at arm’s length as conditions dictated, to a Fleet which due to its limited cruising range has little choice but to routinely station itself forward. This short-legged Fleet must either base itself within the adversary’s strike envelope and risk exposure to a decapitating first strike; or rely upon refueling support from a globally committed and already overtaxed Combat Logistics Force (CLF) to “buy back” what it lacks in cruising range.
The introduction of the LCS may lead to a “bifurcated” Battle Force, in which the Small Surface Combatants, because of their limited range and speed, are relegated to the sidelines in a Pacific-scale conflict. As an example: it is unclear how an LCS cruising at 14 kts can provide as an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) escort for a Fleet Replenishment Oiler at 20 kts.27 Similarly, given that an LCS would have to refuel approximately every 2,000 nm, its presence may actually complicate the ASW escort commander’s task by adding another “hungry mouth” to refuel. As a Fleet commander, the only reasonable option may be to substitute Large Surface Combatants (i.e. destroyers) for Small Surface Combatants (i.e. LCS) in the vital ASW escort role - when in earlier times a longer-ranged frigate could have sufficed.
Recommendations for Leadership
Collect empirical data on the cruising capability of both LCSs. Navy has committed to acquiring an additional twenty-four LCS of two variants (twelve FREEDOMs and twelve INDEPENDENCE). 28 Yet according to both DOT&E and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) there is a profound lack of empirical data regarding the performance of either ship types. 29,30 This knowledge gap should be remedied as soon as practical by evaluating both LCS types capability to operate at Pacific-scale distances (i.e. 4,000 nm).
Modify the current LCS acquisition plan. Preliminary test data on a FREEDOM class variant predicted cruising capability which fell short of the LCS threshold requirement (3,500 nm at 14 kts); and thus well short of the even longer ranges expected in Pacific operations.31 If operational testing of the INDEPENDENCE class shows that it can achieve this threshold, consideration must be given to altering the somewhat arbitrary ‘50/50’ split of FREEDOMs and INDEPENDENCEs. However, if the INDEPENDENCE does not prove capable of the required ranges, consideration should be given to pausing further LCS production and determine if engineering changes can feasibly increase their range.
Reestablish the initial LCS range requirements for the LCS-FF. The initial LCS concept of employment emphasized “forward deployment vice forward basing”, and placed a premium on “self-sustaining” operations.32 As such, the initial threshold cruising range requirement for LCS was 4,300 nm at 16 kts - fairly close to the cruising capability of the legacy PERRY class FF. This was subsequently reduced by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to 3,500 nm at 14 kts.33 Today, there remains uncertainty as to whether the FREEDOM or INDEPENDENCE will meet the 3,500 nm requirement - which this analysis has shown may be insufficient for the Pacific. Consideration should be given to reestablishing the 4,300 nm at 16 kts requirement for the modified LCS-FF. In addition, further decisions to increase the “lethality and survivability” of the LCS-FF should be examined against the impact on cruising range.
Recognize that platforms matter, and that the Pacific requires platforms purposefully designed for long distance operations. The current mantra of ‘payloads over platforms’ misses the mark. Platforms do matter. The Navy must come to terms with the fact that the LCS platform (seaframe) is ill-suited for operations in the vast Pacific. There is evidence that this realization may be taking place: comments from Seventh Fleet during the initial deployment of USS FREEDOM (LCS-1) expressed uncertainly on the ship’s utility, and stated to GAO interviewers that it might better be employed in the much smaller Fifth Fleet area of responsibility.34
It is perhaps too late to drastically redesign the LCS for the Pacific. However, the proposed LCS replacement (LCS(X)) - which according to the Navy’s Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2016 will not enter the Fleet until 2035 - should be assessed against Pacific-scale scenarios to determine its required cruising capabilities.35 Navy preference for variants of the current LCS designs should not steer the outcome; the study focus should be on rationally and objectively identifying a clean-sheet or existing design that meets the requirements. Continuing on the current path of adapting the LCS - envisioned decades earlier for operations in the short-ranged littorals - will prove expensive, time consuming, and unlikely to lead to the warship the Navy needs for the Pacific Pivot.
[1] “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, August 2015.
[2] “PACOM Issues and Challenges”, Brief, USPACOM, Accessed at http://www.slideshare.net/MatthewPopkin/pacomassessment
[3] Figure 1 from “2015 Index of Military Strength”, Heritage Foundation, Accessed at http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/
[4] “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy”.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] See “Distributed Lethality”, Rowden et al, USNI Proceedings, January 2015.
[8] See “Agents of Innovation”, John Kuehn, Naval Institute Press, 2009.
[9] Threat ranges per the “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC, 2015”. Department of Defense, 2015.
[10] Graphic from the “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC, 2015”. Department of Defense, 2015.
[11] Transit distances per Google Earth.
[12] Threat ranges per the “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Development of the PRC, 2015”.
[13] http://www.nvr.navy.mil/
[14] http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact.asp
[15] “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015.
[16] “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2016”, OPNAV N8, March 2015.
[17] “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan”, Congressional Budget Office, October 2015.
[18] http://defense.about.com/od/Navy/a/Ddg-1000-Zumwalt-Class-Destroyer.htm
[19] http://www.deagel.com/Destroyers-and-Cruisers/DDG-1000-Zumwalt_a000550001.aspx
[20] “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid. “DOT&E still has no data to assess the core mission capabilities of the Independence class variant seaframe.”
[23] “An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2016 Shipbuilding Plan”, Congressional Budget Office, October 2015.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Navy Fact File, Littoral Combat Ships, accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1650&ct=4
[26] See “What’s Driving the Navy?” Sears et al, December 1, 2015, Accessed at http://www.informationdissemination.net/
[27] Navy Fact File, Fleet Replenishment Oiler, accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4400&tid=600&ct=4
[28] “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, November 6, 2015.
[29] See “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015.”
[30] “Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions”, GAO 16-201, December 2015.
[31] “Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Annual Report”, DOT&E, January 2015. LCS-3 predicted range of 1,981 nm.
[32] “Littoral Combat Ship Concept of Employment Update”, http://faculty.nps.edu/jekline/docs/LCS%20CONOPS%20brief%2011-15pt1.ppt.
[33] “Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments”, GAO-14-749, July 2014
[34] Referenced in GAO-14-749 “Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments”, Government Accountability Office, July 2014.
[35] For a discussion on the proposed CBA, see “The Need for a Small Surface Combatant CBA”, Information Dissemination, October 2015.
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