Freedom of the Seas is the Purpose of American Seapower (Segment 2)

Some Thoughts on the McCain White Paper

Bryan Clark of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and I (Bryan McGrath) put together a few thoughts on the recent White Paper from Senator John McCain (R-AZ) entitled "Restoring American Power".

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The Trump Administration began work this week on its promise of an across-the-board enlargement of the U.S. military. The President-elect has thus far described his plan only in the broadest of terms, but those terms portend a sustained period of higher defense spending—something Congress has been unwilling to approve since it passed the Budget Control Act (BCA) in 2011. Chief among those who will shape the future of the American military is Senator John McCain (R-AZ), the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who waded into the debate last week with a strong, coherent outline that not only aims to restore the capacity of a significantly hollowed-out force, but also provides direction for how the force should evolve as it grows. There is a lot in this report, but we will restrict our comments to the larger context of the plan and its impact on American Seapower.

Hope versus strategy

Senator McCain’s report begins by rightly highlighting the fundamental disconnect in today’s U.S. defense planning between resources and objectives. Hoping revanchist regimes in Russia and China would not be able to act effectively on their objectives for more than a decade, Congress and President Obama passed the BCA in 2011, reducing military budgets by about 10 percent for the subsequent decade. The BCA, in turn, contained the a ticking time-bomb known as Sequestration, which implemented another 10 percent cut starting in fiscal year (FY) 2013 if the Department was not able to meet BCA targets for spending. Because FY 2013 was already halfway over, services had to immediately cut their spending, creating maintenance depot backlogs, personnel shortfalls, and training shutdowns from which DoD is still recovering.

As the impact of the BCA’s cuts became clear, DoD and Congress experienced buyer’s remorse, turning to various budget gimmicks and abuse of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to pay for expanding U.S. involvement in regional conflicts, growing compensation costs, and to allow for modest modernization of the force. McCain excoriates both Congress and the Executive Branch for these measures. Issuing a clear call to action, his report states “This law (BCA) must be repealed outright so we can budget for the true costs of our national defense.”

The most significant problem with the BCA’s reductions, McCain argues, is they do not allow modernization to address the rapidly improving capability of great powers such as Russia and China and regional powers such as Iran and North Korea. The BCA also does not provide the resources for U.S. forces to sustain the operational tempo to conduct daily strikes and raids on terrorists in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere. Notably, despite the hopes that underpinned the BCA, Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and China’s aggression in the South China Sea show, in McCain’s words, “A better defense strategy must acknowledge the reality that we have entered a new era of great power competitions. China and Russia aspire to diminish U.S. influence and revise the world order in ways that are contrary to U.S. national interests.”

McCain’s focus on great power competition is important in two ways. First, it draws a distinction between the Obama Administration’s approach and McCain’s more forward-leaning view of great power dynamics. Second, it sends a signal to the incoming administration of McCain’s wariness of Russia in clear and unambiguous terms. This could ultimately prove to be a contentious issue between Congress and the Trump Administration, which has indicated it may view Russia as a partner rather than a competitor or adversary.

Strategy and Fleet Architecture

McCain argues for a new set of defense strategies to address great powers, regional powers, and transnational terrorists, rather than a single U.S. security strategy. In CSBA’s upcoming study of alternative Navy fleet architectures, we argue the most important of these is a strategy to deter great power aggression, which could potentially have the most catastrophic consequences of these security challenges. With the realignment of American bases since the Cold War, U.S. ground and air forces overseas are less numerous and more easily suppressed than when they last faced a great power adversary a quarter century ago. Thus, naval forces will assume a more prominent role in conventional deterrence.

Recognizing both the Trump goal of a 350 ship Navy and the Navy’s own recently released 355-ship Force Structure Assessment (FSA), McCain lays out a plan that over the next five years that: 1) increases the size of the fleet over the final plan of the Obama Administration by building 59 ships as opposed to the Obama Administration’s 41,  2) truncates the current Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and accelerates the Navy’s move to an open-ocean frigate replacement, 3) funds design work on a new class of aircraft carrier, 4) increases Navy end-strength, 5) invests significantly in unmanned technologies of all varieties, and 6) provides additional, immediate funding to address fleet readiness and maintenance, and installations and infrastructure.

McCain’s plan aligns in large part with our proposed fleet architecture, and would improve the Navy’s ability to deter aggression by great powers, counter attacks by regional powers, and help keep terrorists on the run. Unlike the current fleet, McCain’s proposal would not focus on efficiently providing presence at the expense of the capability and capacity for combat against a capable adversary.

Three aspects of McCain’s force structure plan are of particular interest. First is its truncation of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in 2017 with a follow-on frigate proposed for acquisition no later than 2022. It is essential that the Navy move as quickly as possible from the LCS to a proper blue-water frigate capable of anti-submarine warfare and local air defense, but it must also continue to increase the size of the fleet and ensure the frigate can be affordable and built in large numbers. McCain proposes an acquisition “bridge” for the two shipyards currently building LCS to continue between 2017 and 2022. This would expand the fleet and enable these shipbuilders to compete for the follow-on frigate, which could lower costs for the frigate and increase the number of shipyards at which it could be built.

The second initiative of note is McCain’s proposal to move to a mix of large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and smaller, conventionally-powered carriers. As recommended in our fleet architecture study as well, conventional carriers would initially be based on current amphibious assault ships that carry short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft such as the AV-8B Harrier and F-35B Lightning II. As McCain argues, a smaller carrier would be suited to supporting many of the smaller steady-state operations that require naval air power, such as air strikes in Syria. Senator McCain is skeptical of the Navy’s new FORD-class carrier due to its high cost and poor management, but argues the fleet will continue to also need large nuclear-powered carriers to provide a mobile airfield for combat air sorties during larger conflicts in which host nation concerns or enemy actions prevent effectively using land bases.

Finally, though not mentioned in the narrative, a “patrol ship” of less than 800 tons appears in the McCain plan’s appendix for acquisition starting in 2020. The addition of this small combatant highlights the need for a larger, more distributed, and resilient force, which was also a finding of our fleet architecture study. A patrol vessel of 800 tons such as Sweden’s Visby-class would be able to defend itself against a salvo of a dozen or more anti-ship missiles and could carry 4 to 8 offensive strike or anti-ship missiles. This will make patrol vessels able to deny or delay enemy aggression while being too costly a target to be worth defeating in large numbers.

Overall, McCain’s proposal would grow the surface fleet by adding frigates and patrol vessels to the Navy’s current requirement of 104 large surface combatants and 52 small surface combatants. We agree a larger surface fleet is essential to conduct offensive strike and anti-ship attacks in a distributed manner that will make them harder to defeat in detail. But we would argue the Distributed Lethality concept and growing needs for logistics escorts suggest the surface fleet needs to both grow and be rebalanced, with more small surface combatants that can conduct widely distributed offensive operations and fewer large surface combatants that will tend to concentrate the fleet’s firepower.

A fleet for the future

A Navy is a capital investment that takes years to build and lasts for decades thereafter. Any plan for a future fleet should be based not on the world of today, but on a set of plausible futures that best represent the world of 15 to 20 years from now. Even with an aggressive shipbuilding increase such as envisioned by McCain’s plan, only ¼ of the fleet will change between now and 2030. McCain’s proposal considers the likelihood that the fleet of 2030 will need to deter revisionist great powers as its primary mission, while addressing the growing capability of regional powers and transnational terrorists. It appropriately invests not only in platforms, but across the board in the various enablers and extenders of maritime power, including ISR, networking, unmanned vehicles, cyber, and electronic warfare.

If the United States fails to make great power competition a priority in long-term force planning, rivals such as Russia and China will continue eroding American influence and alliances, with damaging economic and security impacts on the American people. McCain’s plan sets American Seapower (as well as the rest of DoD) on a solid course for an uncertain future. It remains to be seen the extent to which this thoughtful, strategic approach will be complemented by the other instruments of national power, or the degree to which the incoming administration will welcome it.

Last Week's Other Transition of Power

RADM James Shannon USN meets Commander South Sea Fleet RADM Shen Jinlong PLA-N in HMAS Perth at IMDEX Asia, Singapore. (Picture courtesy of Ivan Ingham, Commanding Officer of HMAS Perth.

Last week the largest Navy in Asia undertook a transition of power at the top for the first time in over a decade. The official announcement can be found here, but the English version was reported here.

The People's Liberation Army Navy has appointed a new commander — 60-year-old Lieutenant Admiral Shen Jinlong.

In a news release distributed by the PLA Navy on Friday, Shen spoke in a video conference with officers and sailors of the 25th Escort Fleet in the Gulf of Aden in his new capacity as PLA Navy commander.

That means he has replaced Admiral Wu Shengli, 71, to take charge of the largest navy in Asia. Although the Navy did not disclose when the transition took place, observers believe it was this week.

A point of interest that will be noted by most PLA Navy experts is that Shen Jinlong had been the Commander of the PLA Navy South Sea fleet since December 2014. As we have seen over the last many years, virtually all Commanders of the South Sea Fleet eventually rise to one of the top offices in the PLA Navy. These military moves within the PLA Navy come as China has discussed reorganizing that command into a more "joint" organization.

The South China Morning Post covered the possibility of Shen Jinlong becoming the new PLA Navy Commander last week, prior to it happening, and has additional information on the reorganization that is proposed, and may in fact already be underway.

The PLA is set to break with a long-standing tradition if a proposal to appoint a naval officer to head its strategic southern command is adopted, four independent sources said.

The proposed reshuffle at the helm of the Southern Theatre Command, which is responsible for the South China Sea and the PLA South Sea Fleet, also underscores the rising importance of the navy in the Chinese military and the decline of its army-centric doctrine under an overhaul begun by President Xi Jinping last year.

The article goes on to note other changes, but in discussing Shen Jinlong later in the article, this stood out as worth noting.

If Shen secures the top navy job, it will surprise many PLA watchers at home and abroad. Shen would have beaten a number of rivals, including Vice Admiral Qiu Yangpeng, the chief of staff for the navy, and Vice Admiral Wang Hai, the navy’s deputy commander.

Wang is tipped to be the new commander of the South Sea Fleet and deputy commander of the Southern Theatre Command, according to the sources.

Shen would be the least experienced naval boss for decades.

There are several news reports that the reorganization has taken place, the most interesting new development being that Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai has taken command of the new Southern Theater Command.

While I look forward to the analysis of these events from PLA Navy experts like Andrew Erickson, I see three important takeaways from the early news reporting.

First, Shen Jinlong is as much a scholar as he is a sailor. Shen Jinlong was President of Naval Academy of Commanding from 2011-2014, prior to taking command of the South Sea Fleet. Prior to that he was President of Dalian Naval Academy from 2010-2011. In other words Shen Jinlong spent five years as an Admiral immersed in the two academic establishments most noted for advancing the strategic and academic acumen of PLA Navy officers.

Would it be a feature or a bug if the US Navy CNO had spent five years as a Flag Officer Commanding either Annapolis and the Naval War College. What about both? Is it a feature or a bug that the new Commander of the largest Navy in Asia spent five years in Command of the equivalent of both? I can't speak to the US Navy admirals who take command at Annapolis, but in my opinion based on my own observations, US Navy Admirals who spend time in command at the Naval War College change while they are there, and almost always come out the other side with an increased strategic and academic acumen not easily rivaled by their peers.

Second, reorganizing the Southern Theater Command structure to be under the leadership of a naval officer represents a commitment towards true joint operations that China has been discussing for well over a decade. The Southern Theater Command incorporates Marine forces (sea, land, and air), the air force units in the region, and the rocket forces under the command a naval officer for virtually all military forces with domain responsibilities over the South China Sea region.

The significance of this change cannot be understated. This change ultimately discards PLA military tradition that has been in place for over seven decades where strategic rocket forces commanded by Army officers have controlled the command structure for a region. The Southern Theater Command structure represents the official beginning of a Command structure that includes naval officers, and the first instance of this inclusion takes place in China's most important strategic theater.

Finally, news that the Southern Theater Command will be led by Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai simply cannot be ignored. The world knows very well where Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai stands on South China Sea issues, because he certainly hasn't mince words and his promotion signals his previous comments on the subject almost certainly contributed to his promotion. From September of 2015:

The South China Sea, Yuan said, “is a sea for all the nations around, and a sea of peace.

“The South China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China. And the sea from the Han dynasty a long time ago where the Chinese people have been working and producing from the sea.”

While I suspect we will all learn more as the Chinese experts weigh in more facts and opinions on events taking place in the PLA Navy, my initial impression from changes in the PLA Navy last week is that the force took meaningful steps towards more strategic and academic acumen at the top of the PLA Navy, took serious organizational steps towards a joint forces approach for the South China Sea theater of operations, and among all the candidates that could be chosen to lead the Chinese military forces into this new joint forces era in the South China Sea - the PLA Navy ultimately picked one of the most well known vocal hard liners in their ranks for the position.

Why Do An American Seapower Speaking Tour? (Segment 1)

Hello World. Let's Try This Again.

Raymond Pritchett  (Galrahn)

It would be both foolish and self indulging to explain in any detail why I have been away for most of the last five years. It would be challenging to discuss publicly the reasons why I closed the blog for most of last year.

To keep it short and sweet... I have a career, and occasionally I am very good at it. Sometimes there are rewards, and sometimes there are restrictions, but I accept both as consequences of successfully navigating the rough seas found in ones professional journey.

It is in this time I find myself emerging again into a stable situation where my activities on this little corner of the Internet no longer represent a point of interest to those I associate with professionally. I am excited about the opportunity to reengage the discussions and build a new community online, even if it is on this old platform that has survived nearly a decade.

As I emerge from my late 30s into my 40s, it is possible I am not the same person you remember. But some things never change. With more information comes changes in my opinions. Basically, I wouldn't assume anything.

As a reminder, I would like to reiterate the rules of Information Dissemination.

1. I will not tolerate personal attacks against other people participating in this community. Be respectful to one another.
2. This is a professoinal forum, and my expectations is that all contributors will respect the professionals who leverage this forum for information, knowledge, and idea generation.
3. Do your homework if you intend to respectfully debate another community member, because the person you are debating almost certainly will have done their homework.
4. Update your Disqus profile and use the forum to network with other professionals.
5. The authors are not always right. We are here to learn as well.
6. There are no stupid questions, but there are stupid ways to ask a question. Respect the distinction.
7. If you have a short attention span, or read nonsense on the Internet and believe it, this is probably not the right community for you. Conspiracy theories are not welcome here, but well thought out and sourced theories are.
8. Have fun.

Welcome back to those who have long been part of this community. We welcome new professionals here as well.