USS MCFAUL Returns from 281 Day Deployment

Pictured here is the USS MCFAUL (DDG 74) returning to NOB Norfolk on 2 December after finishing a 281 day deployment.  For those without calculators, that is in excess of nine calendar months.

According to the caption on the official Navy photo, the ship spent "270 or more" uninterrupted days at sea.

I'm glad we have all those precision guided weapons and gee-whiz networks that keep us from having to have too many ships. 

This is only going to get worse.


Bryan McGrath

Airpower Diplomacy?

In contrast to Adam Lowther, I'm skeptical about the potential for airpower diplomacy:

Simply put, the United States Air Force is not a tool honed for “soft” or “smart” power. Its understanding of the commons is at odds with the idea of a positive sum game. This is not to say that airpower (whether manifested in the USAF or otherwise) does not have a critical role to play in the future of U.S. defense policy in the Asia-Pacific.  Rather, it is important to specify the contribution made by each instrument of foreign and defense policy.  The Navy has devoted substantial intellectual and material energy to developing “smart” and “soft” power tools for engaging with diplomatic partners, and has indeed made such engagement a critical element of its overall approach to maritime security. The Air Force has yet to develop a conception of “soft power” more complex than “friends make the exercise of hard power easier.”

Yet another predictable anti-airpower screed etc. etc.

Sunday Book Review: Viper Pilot

DoD photo by Senior Airman 
 Greg L. Davis, U.S. Air Force.

Dan Hampton, author of Viper Pilot, doesn't sound like a pleasant man.  This requires qualification; I suspect he'd be a lot of fun for a night of drinking, but he doesn't sound pleasant to work with for a prolonged period of time. It's not just that Hampton has contempt for people who aren't pilots; he has contempt for just about everyone who doesn't fly an advanced, single seat fighter-bomber specializing in  SEAD missions. The reviews over at Amazon are interesting to read; some of the one stars seem to be written by people who disliked Hampton personally. If you're fine with this (and frankly, the arrogance is mildly charming) then Viper Pilot is a pretty interesting read.  Hampton is convincing on the point that it is extremely, extremely difficult to become a single-seat fighter pilot in the United States Air Force today. As simple arithmetic this isn't surprising, but Hampton explains how he made it through ever cull along the way, and explains why it was necessary to use such a fine toothed comb.

The Wild Weasel plays one of the most critical roles in modern airpower operations, the defeat of enemy air defenses.  In context of a balance of technology and military power that heavily favors modern Western airpower, advanced air defense systems, most often purchased from Russia or China, represent the only effective defense for second-tier states. The most important enabler for modern airpower operations isn't the air superiority fighter, because modern Western air forces rarely have to fight air-to-air combat. Rather, it's the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense) team, which kicks the door open and holds it open long enough for all the other elements of an air operation to do their jobs.

Hampton's battle accounts are genuinely gripping.  He never becomes involved in actual air-to-air combat, but he's very convincing on the danger and excitement of the Wild Weasel mission, not to mention the close air support runs he occasionally has to make.  Moreover, Hampton's battle accounts connect well with his earlier discussion of training.  An F-16 pilot needs to be able to conduct an enormous number of intellectual tasks simultaneously, from managing his fuel to assessing threats to organizing her command to paying attention to where all the weapons are going, all while flying an aircraft that, aerodynamically, would prefer to be on or in the ground. Hampton suggests that flying an F-16 under combat conditions is akin to playing several musical instruments at the same time, which sounds about right. Hampton's accounts of non-combat missions (coordinating the landing of a squadron during a sandstorm, test-piloting a poorly maintained Egyptian F-16) are equally compelling.

At the same time, Hampton admits not the faintest grasp of or interest in grand strategy or international politics. He only occasionally comments on the geopolitical realities of the wars that he fights in, and then usually without much insight. In this he fits the stereotype of the Air Force fighter pilot who is interested, above all, in flying fighter aircraft in wartime conditions.  The rest (why he's there, what he's doing) is relatively incidental. He enjoys utilizing the killing power of the F-16, even on missions (such as close air support) that the Air Force as a whole is altogether unenthusiastic about.

Viper Pilot is a quick read; Hampton is a good writer, with a sound grasp of what should and shouldn't become part of the narrative.  He knows that no one has bought Viper Pilot to read about family. There's a fair amount of interesting trivia about the Air Force and about F-16s; I'll confess that I had never quite understood the Viper vs. Fighting Falcon debate, or the role that the original Battlestar Galactica plays in that conversation, but it makes sense in context.  If you like fighter pilot narratives, you'll probably like this book.  If you don't, you won't.

The Most Wonderful Time of the Year

The air is crisp and the skies at night are aglow with millions of stars.  Spirits are high with anticipation for the coming season.  No, I'm not taking about the holidays, I'm referring to the impending kick-off of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society's (SSCS) Southern Ocean counter-whaling season.  Many of those who follow the group see SSCS campaigns as not simply eco-activism, but as a living laboratory for the study of modern irregular warfare at sea.

This year's Antarctic campaign, dubbed "Operation Zero Tolerance," will be SSCS' largest ever in terms of fleet size and capability.  The fleet includes four ships, a helicopter, eight RHIB’s, three UAVs, and more than 120 international volunteer sailors.  SSCS has acquired a southern operating base at Seaworks, Williamstown near Melbourne, Australia.  Undoubtably, the campaign will also feature new tactics.

Guess #2 - Is this Sam Simon?

The Sea Shepherds have routinely integrated elements of operational and tactical deception to their campaigns.  Earlier this year, I made the mistake of taking SSCS press releases at face value and guessed that the new addition to their fleet was a former ice-breaker of German origin.  Rumors now abound that the SSCS were likely engaging in a disinformation dissemination campaign.  The new ship, named SSS Sam Simon, is likely actually the former KAIKO MARU NO. 8, a 56 meter survey vessel built in Japan in 1993 (see matching IMO numbers here).  In late November, the ship was renamed from "New Atlantis" and flagged to Tuvalu while inport Brisbane.   Reflagging and renaming ships has been a regular tactic of smugglers, pirates, and other groups trying to lay low at sea for as long as there have been ships.  This will be an interesting season to be sure.

MTF.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Nomenclature

In my latest at the Diplomat I call for a more standardized vocabulary of naval affairs:

Navies do a poor job of developing such a nomenclature, in part because they have good reasons to avoid standardized ship designations.  Civilian policymakers don’t like to hear that they’ve devoted a substantial portion of the government treasury to building a buying a light carrier (CVL); they’d prefer to think that they’ve invested state funds in an aircraft carrier comparable to those operated by the United States. On the other hand, the terms “aircraft carrier” and “destroyer” can have idiosyncratic negative political implications, pushing navies to refer to ships as “frigates” or “helicopter destroyers.” Whatever its other merits, the Washington Naval Treaty and its follow up agreements established an international standard for ship types. By defining the terms battleship, aircraft carrier, heavy cruiser, and light cruiser, the treaty system created a warship typology that allowed relatively easy comparison across states.  Giving the typology legal and normative substance surely created some odd incentives, including aJapanese effort to build fleet carriers of less than 10,000 tons and a multinational “light cruiser” competition involving ships bristling with 6” guns and displacing in excess of 10,000 tons.  Nevertheless, it resulted in a system of de facto standardization, and consequently of defense acquisition transparency.

This Week in Aircraft Carriers

What a wonderful week for the navalist, no?  The Middle Kingdom has taken its aircraft carrier to sea and operated jet aircraft on it.  Not to be outdone, the King of Aircraft Carrier Navies (the U.S.) is pictured loading a UAV for deckspot testing.  As we say in the world of TACAIR close control, "Fight's On".


Some random thoughts on these events, if you will.  First on China.

It has been interesting to read the varied reactions to China's accomplishment this week.  Those who believe the military threat from China is overblown tend to downplay the news, citing myriad operational issues they will have to overcome in order to become proficient, not to mention the clear overmatch the US holds in both numbers and proficiency.  On the other hand, those who believe the threat from China is real and mounting point to these events as the latest evidence of a nation whose ability to bend learning curves to their will is something to behold. 

I tend to come down closer to the latter crowd.  The plain truth is that for seven-ish decades, the US Navy has made much hay from the peacetime presence, deterrence, and assurance roles that its aircraft carriers play.  And while (for the time being), I see the Chinese carrier as a big, fat, target for US attack submarines, that advantage accrues only when the shooting starts.  In the meantime, China begins to add to its toolbox of regional persuasion.  It is not difficult to see how this capability could change the steady-state regional security picture, especially if China fits out several of these ships. 

As for the United States, the photos of the X-47B being loaded onto the HARRY S. TRUMAN are occasion for great anticipation.  We are watching the future of naval aviation play out before our very eyes.

The relevance of the aircraft carrier has been much bandied about lately.  It is unfortunately, a misplaced discussion.  The aircraft carrier is no more rendered irrelevant by threats to it than are tarmac and airstrips by threats to them.  The CVN is a means, not an end.  The combat power of an aircraft carrier is a function of several things, including its size and sustainability.   But no factor is more important than the configuration of the airwing.  The blithe assumption of Sea Control made for the past several decades drove our airwings to evolve into short-legged sortie generation machines.  As presently configured, a modern aircraft carrier and its airwing DO appear increasingly obsolete.  But the photos we saw in the past few days of the X-47B show the way forward into decades of additional relevance.

This relevance will be built along two lines--one will be long(er) range strike, and the other will be sea control.  The X-47B is a hint of the future of long-range, strike; stealthy enough to be difficult (but not exquisitely stealthy) and armed with long range stand-off weapons.  CNO's "payloads, not platforms" mantra in action.

Where I don't see similar progress is in the evolution of the airwing to act as a part of a grander Sea Control CONOPS.  The ability to project power from the sea depends on the capability to control the seas one wishes to operate in.  It grows increasingly clear to me that Sea Control must rise in the priority of Naval Aviation planners, even if it means privileging Strike less handsomely.  An airwing that can strike at range while contributing to the dominance of its own environment is critical to the nation's ability to project power from the sea, something it appears to still value. 

The P-8 will play a large role in Sea Control from the air, but organic (to the battle group) capability will still be required. 

First flight of J-15 off Liaoning

It has finally happened. We finally have news confirmation from Xinhua and also have pictures of J-15's first take/off and landing from Xinhua. The news of first landing came a couple of days ago, but this is the first time we have seen the photos.

Here is a timeline of China's naval flanker program just to give you an idea:

• 2001, Assemble the T-10K-3 prototype that PLAN purchased from Ukraine. Use this for long term technical study.
• January 2007, AVIC1 and PLAN’s major program (J-15) research work started.
• July 2007, AVIC1 SAC had a large program tackling meeting
• January 2008, blueprint work finished, start prototype research & production stage
• August 31st 2009, J15-0001 had maiden flight
• May 6th 2010, maiden take-off flight from the simulated jet-ski at CFTE. Continued production of single digit number of prototypes for future testing
• August 10th, 2011, China’s first aircraft carrier went out for sea trials. J-15-0005/CFTE-554 and J15-0008/CFTE-556 prototypes made numerous fly-overs, low altitude touch and go landing along the way.
• July 2012, Finished certification test flights, given permission to product single digit number of batch 0 J-15s for initial testing/trials works
• September 25th, 2012, PLAN first aircraft carrier was named Liaoning and had its first sailing after commissioning in October
• November 3rd, 2012, J-15S-0001 had maiden flight
• Early November, 2012, Liaoning had second sailing after commissioning
• November 20th, 2012, a PLANAF pilot made the first carrier landing trial.
• November 23rd, 2012, Two PLANAF pilots flying 2 J-15s finished carrier op controlled first official takeoff and landing trials. This marks successful completion of first stage of the Carrier aviation project.

Farley and McGrath on Bloggingheads

This time with the whole show, and with Rob's name spelled correctly.

Patterns of Defense Spending in East Asia

A couple of my recent posts at the Diplomat have concerned defense spending patterns in East Asia.  On general trends:

There are at least three potential interpretations of the increase in Asian defense spending. The first is straightforward; Asian powers are beginning to transform post-Cold War economic growth into military power, producing more modern, competent, and capable military organizations (especially at sea and in the air). The broad trend of defense growth suggests that these increases represent balancing against one another, perhaps with a focus on China.

A second interpretation, however, implies that the great powers of Asia feel relatively secure, and have not yet begun to engage in the kind of defense buildup that would suggest real concern about their safety.  In American political culture, dire warnings about the paucity of the defense budget are common, and yet few-to-no Asian countries devote nearly the same resources to defense as the U.S. In this interpretation, the absolute increases represent simply the results of economic growth, perhaps looming larger in the imagination because of simultaneous cuts to European budgets. 

A final interpretation is that the atmosphere of relative security in Asia depends on U.S. military hegemony, and that this hegemony depends on the willingness of the United States to spend and the willingness of potential competitors not to spend. U.S. military capability does not yet appear so threatening that enemies have balanced in response, and the potential for U.S. intervention in any given conflict holds down expenditures.

And on the character of the arms industry specifically:

An arms relationship represents both an economic and a political commitment. What’s at stake in making such a commitment? While Sino-U.S. competition likely won’t descend into the kind of alliance structure that predominated during the Cold War, some navies could nevertheless find themselves on the “wrong side” of political competition in the Western Pacific, which could leave them vulnerable. Committing to one supplier creates a relationship of dependency, with the client needing to stay in the good graces of the patron in order to maintain access to spares, munitions, and modernization kits. The smaller navies of Southeast Asia need to decide how best to develop force structures in a future which may see competition between the United States and China. 

On this last, see also this report (which is considerably better and more in depth than my post).

MLP Unveiled

General Dynamics-NASSCO launched the Navy's Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) in San Diego today.  NAASCO is on contract to build two of these "piers at sea" for about $372 million a piece.

The ship will be a key node in future sea-to-shore operations for the Military Sea-lift Command, with the ability to launch three LCAC's from side ramps.  More and more, the design and employment lines between pre-positioning and amphibious shipping seem to be  blurred.

The idea of using the MLP as a future afloat forward staging base to replace USS Ponce has also been tossed around in Navy circles.  Ponce earned her keep in the Arabian Gulf this summer as a mothership for international mine-hunting forces during IMCMEX 12.  She remains deployed hosting an interesting range of capabilities, including embarked ScanEagle UAVs and riverine craft. 

Looking at the huge amount of flat deck space on Montford Point, one immediately thinks flight deck.  What are some other ways the USN could employ these new ships?

UPDATE: One of our astute readers has pointed out that the Navy is not just considering the MLP as a future AFSB.  In fact, the Navy’s FY13 budget submission proposes building third and fourth MLPs modified to serve as AFSBs to replace Ponce in FIFTH Fleet, with the other AFSB to serve in a different theater.

 U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Oct. 26, 2012) U.S. Navy Sailors assigned to Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) 2 prepare to conduct patrol operations in the Arabian Gulf while aboard Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15). RIVRON 2 is deployed with Commander, Task Group (CTG) 56.7, which provides maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jamar Perry/Released)


The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.